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ABSTRACT
The effects of rail rapid transit on land uses and land values are discussed. Rail transit can
enhance accessibility, and can raise the demand for locating in areas around stations,
increasing land value, and in some cases fostering redevelopment at higher densities. The
attraction that the areas around stations produce depends on the number of trips generated
for unit of land for different types of land-uses. A series of studies on the effect of rail
transit on land values are reviewed.
Using data from censuses and origin-destinations surveys, the effects of metro lines on
land-uses during the 1990's in Mexico City and Santiago de Chile are determined.
Results show that in Mexico City neither zones located next to the new lines, nor zones
located next to the lines built before 1990 had a higher growth of population, income per
capita or employment, as compared to other zones with similar densities and incomes per
capita. In the case of Santiago, whereas the areas located next to the newly built line had
similar changes to other zones, the areas located next to the two lines built before the
1990's had a significantly higher growth in number of households and average income
per capita than other areas, especially in high-income districts. These results are
explained by the lower attractiveness of the metro for middle and high-income people in
Mexico City as compared to Santiago de Chile, which is proven by specifying relations
between ridership and GDP for both cities, using multiple regression models.
The potential of land value capture as a mechanism for funding rail transit in both cities is
discussed, based on the experience of other rail transit systems around the world, and on
the characteristics of both metros. In both cases a land value capture system is proposed
for new lines. Some guidelines for the implementation of land value capture mechanisms
are provided.
Thesis Supervisor: Ralph A. Gakenheimer
Title: Professor of Urban Planning
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Executive Summary
After 150 years building railroads and highways, transportation planners are starting to
realize what has been obvious for private investors from the first day: transportation
infrastructure opens land for development. Assuming that after the construction of large
pieces of transportation infrastructure land uses will remain unchanged, is nothing more
than a naive and myopic approach. The opening of rapid transit systems or highways
induces transformations of land uses, and an increase in travel demand. In most cases, the
benefits that justify the investment in highway projects do not remain in time: in few
years average speeds return to their original level, and average trip lengths increase. In
many cases, the only permanent benefits are the increases of accessibility and of land
values.
In the 19th and 20 centuries, many private firms used value capture as a funding source
for transportation infrastructure. In recent decades, the construction of roads and transit
has become a task of governments, but they have largely failed to recover the benefits of
their investment in this area. This passive attitude of governments has created perverse
incentives for private companies, which have been allowed to capture these benefits
through land speculation. Speculation reduces the availability of land for development,
promoting sprawl. The failure to get an adequate return on the invested funds produces a
shortage of transportation infrastructure, damaging the economy.
The lack of value capturing has reduced governments' accountability for the projects they
implement. A century ago, if a streetcar line did not generate increases in land values or
profits from its operation, the developer would go bankrupt. Nowadays, even if a
highway does not generate land value increases, other external benefits, or profits from
tolls or other sources, it can still be justified by the vague concept of being "good for the
economy". This is nothing else than wasting taxpayers' money.
International experience shows that there are several ways in which transit agencies can
maximize land values around stations. Some of them are to provide high quality
pedestrian facilities, assemble land for redevelopment, relax zoning constrains, remove
local externalities, and solve the problems generated by the imperfections of the real
estate market (e.g. speculation). Nevertheless, land value maximization should not be the
only objective of transit agencies. They should also foster the creation of mix-uses around
stations, which make transit a more attractive option by allowing people to make linked-
trips, generating traffic all along the day, and producing a balance of flows in both
directions of rail lines. At the network level, it is necessary to have a balance between
generated and attracted trips, and to maximize the use of land around stations for traffic-
intensive uses. These actions require metropolitan coordination, which is far from perfect
in cities like Santiago de Chile and Mexico City.
Transit agencies, local governments and private developers have used several
mechanisms to capture land value increases generated by rail transit. The most common
approach in the US has been joint development, which has captured only a minor part of
land value increases, but has been relatively successful in increasing the number of riders,
and hence, fare-box revenue. Several other alternatives, such as tax increment finance,
direct negotiations and special benefit assessment are usually more effective than joint
development to collect revenue, and have been used in Europe and Asia to fund transit. In
these regions private companies and governments have funded commuter lines through
land development. In other cases, property owners have been asked to help fund new rail
transit lines. The British government has recently announced that it will use this kind of
mechanism to fund a significant portion of Crossrail, the new line being planned for
London. In Latin America, there is very limited experience with these mechanisms for
funding transit systems, Sao Paulo being the city with the most successful experience,
through a program of joint development of shopping centers and bus terminal around rail
transit stations.
Land value capture has also been used to fund other transportation infrastructure.
Highways usually use mechanisms such as direct charges to users, and the creation and
rental of retail space next to highway (e.g. for gasoline stations).
A reform of the property tax systems, including a tax levied exclusively on land at a
higher rate than today, and based on the most intensive potential use of the land, would
create an efficient mechanism to capture land value increases. It would also have several
additional benefits, such as lowering monitoring costs and evasion (as there are no tax-
havens for land), reducing speculation and sprawl, and facilitating the access to land of
low-income people. The revenue from such a tax would allow governments to reduce
other taxes, or increase spending.
Rail transit systems can maximize their impact on land values and land uses by providing
an attractive value proposition for people that can afford living next to the stations and
that would like to live there. Alignments along high-income areas only have a positive
impact on land values if rapid transit's value proposition is attractive to those people.
Conversely, fares that are too high may have a null effect on land uses and land values in
low-income areas.
Sometimes local governments may need to provide incentives for the location of firms
and families around transit stations. People have many alternative areas to locate in, some
of which have prices that do not account for the external cost generated by locating there.
This is the case of the suburbs. Providing subsidies for the construction of rail transit is
only acceptable as a second best option, when charging vehicles for the congestion,
pollution, accident and infrastructure costs they produce is not feasible. Still in those
cases, to create an efficient allocation of resources, the amount of subsidy to transit
investment should be limited to the value of the external costs produced by cars. Even in
these cases, using land value capture to fund transit investment would not hamper the
objective of attracting residents and firms to the area, and in fact it can help create the
necessary infrastructure to make the area attractive.
Rapid transit investment is not only desirable for its own sake, but also for its capacity to
shape land uses and city form. Cities served by transit can have more interaction among
people. Moreover, transit can increase accessibility and labor efficiency. These benefits
are not fully captured by fare revenue but transferred to consumer's surplus and land
values. Finally, by reducing the number of cars in the streets, transit provides external
benefits, such as reducing pollution, congestion and accident costs.
I propose the usage of value capture mechanisms to fund future rail transit extensions in
Mexico City and Santiago de Chile. Among the possible methods of value capture, I
suggest the implementation of a scheme of different fares for distinct segments of the
market; special-benefit assessment, and special negotiations with property owners. I also
suggest implementing a plan for reducing the barriers for redevelopment around the
exiting and future lines, specifically to avoid zoning constraints, limitation for people to
sell the homes they bought with governments' support, fragmentation or lack of legality
in the ownership of the land, and speculation.
New lines would generate network economies for the overall transit system, and force a
more intense use of urban land. This intensification of land uses would ultimately benefit
transit systems by creating a larger base of origin and destinations along the alignments,
and therefore increasing ridership.
Implementing value capture to fund rail transit would have several benefits for Mexico
City and Santiago. The cost/benefit analysis of new extensions would be scrutinized in
more detail; the governments would be able to reduce the expenses in new projects, and
focus on transferring funds for the poor; the funds would create a stable and long-term
funding source, less dependent on political cycles than under the current funding system;
maybe some extensions of the metro network that would be profitable to built from a
social point of view, would not need to be postponed.
1 Motivation and Content
The purpose of this thesis is to study how the construction of rail transit affects land
values and land uses, to review the impacts of different rail transit systems around the
world on land values and land uses, to determine the result that mechanisms of land value
capture have had in different cities around the world, and to explore the potential of these
mechanisms in Mexico City and Santiago de Chile.
Chapter 2 is an introduction to the problem of mobility in cities around the world.
Chapter 3 gives an overview of the relation of transit and cities, explaining how the
accessibility provided by transit is capitalized into land values. It also discusses the
relation of rail transit and land values, and their impact on density. Then, it discusses
some of the conditions required for land values to increase, and the income-distribution
effects of these increases. Finally, it analyzes the way rail transit shapes cities at the
macro and micro levels.
Chapter 4 discusses the effect that rail transit systems have had on land values in different
cities in the developed world. Several hedonic price studies of urban real estate of cities
in the US and Europe are described. Some of the reasons explaining the contradictory
results obtained in these studies are discussed.
Chapters 5 and 6 focus on Mexico City and Santiago de Chile, respectively. These
Chapters review the history of the construction of their metros, and they discuss how they
have affected land values and land uses. The Chapters discuss the applicability of the
principles discussed in Chapter 3 for the context of the developed world to the context of
these two metropolitan areas.
In Chapter 7, different hypotheses to explain the different impact of the metros in Mexico
City and Santiago de Chile are tested.
Chapter 8 discusses the imperfection created by most property taxes, and makes the case
for using land value capture to fund rail transit construction. This Chapter also describes
different mechanisms that have been used to capture land value increases generated by
rail transit projects, in the US, Europe, Asia and Latin America, by a wide array of
entities, including transit agencies, local governments, and private companies.
Finally, Chapter 9 discusses the advantages and disadvantages of different mechanisms
for value-capture in the context of Mexico City and Santiago de Chile, and proposes
approaches to implement these mechanisms in the two cities.
2 Introduction
In many cities around the world, residents are expressing an increasing concern for road
congestion. Economic growth and the relative reduction of the cost of buying and
operating private vehicles with respect to income, have spurred a fast growth of
motorization rates. The problem is not exclusive to cities in developed countries. In fact,
in recent years, motorization rates have grown the fastest in some developing countries'.
The growth of motorization has driven the increase in congestion, and the decrease of the
modal share of transit. Congestion alters daily life dramatically, and this is why it has
become a topic of interest not only for transportation experts, but also for policy makers.
Adapting cities to the demand of infrastructure for vehicles has become a difficult task,
especially in cities that were shaped before the car-era. The high densities of pre-car
cities make the widening of roads and the construction of highway extremely expensive.
Meanwhile, some of the cities that have been designed to accommodate the automobile
and have low transit shares, have suffered a rise in the demand for road space, which has
.2
caused severe congestion . Very few cities around the world have been able to avoid
congestion. Some of them are cities with very low income and low motorization, and
3
others are cities with tight control on car usage such as Singapores
Due to the high cost of providing more road space in urban areas, governments are
looking for alternative solutions to congestion. Many cities have tried to improve transit
systems to make them an attractive option to automobiles. Other cities have tried to raise
the direct cost of using cars. Whereas the provision of transit usually enhance people's
mobility, making private transportation more expensive generally does the opposite,
1 Gakenheimer (2002) states that in recent years some developing countries such as China, Mexico and
Korea, have had motorization growth above 10% a year.
2 According to TTI (2002), between 1982 and 2000 Los Angeles was the US city with the largest growth in
annual delay per peak road traveler. Other car-oriented cities, such as Dallas, Denver, Orlando and Atlanta
are also among the 10 cities with the highest increases.
3 Gakenheimer (2002).
unless transit service is provided . Therefore, raising the cost of using cars should be a
complement of transit improvements, and its objective should be to produce an increase
in the modal share of transit.
It is expensive to provide high-quality transit service in areas with low densities. Transit
is a cost-effective option only in densely built environments. Convincing people to accept
an increase of the cost of using cars is not an easy task, because of the notion that people
have the right to use their cars wherever and whenever they want and free of charge, is
very entrenched in modem societies. Moreover, in cities where car ownership is not
affordable for everybody, as it is the case in Mexico City and Santiago, driving a car is a
symbol of social status.
By 1995 both Mexico City and Santiago de Chile, had fewer cars per capita than
comparable cities in Latin America. Whereas in Mexico City there were 200 private
vehicles per 1000 inhabitants in 1995, its two most similar cities in terms of population in
Latin America, Sao Paulo and Buenos Aires, had 301 and 264 per 1000 inhabitants
respectively. Santiago, with 83 private vehicles per inhabitant, also lagged behind
5Caracas (139) and Bogota (89), two cities in the region with almost the same population .
In addition to the benefits to their users, transit systems usually provide external benefits.
Compared to other modes such as private automobiles, transit usually produces less
congestion and less pollution per passenger, particularly as buses and trains have many
passengers per vehicle. In many cases, rail transit also produces an increase of the value
of real estate around stations, which is in part a measure of its passengers' consumer
surplus. If governments were capable of capturing part of these external benefits, they
could build more rail transit and increase social welfare.
4 The exception is when, just by charging a congestion toll, the carrying capacity of the road network is
increased. This happens when the initial density of vehicles on the roads is more than the density that
maximizes flows.
s All figures from UITP (2001). DICTUC (2003) reports that in 2001 the motorization rate in Santiago had
grown to 148 vehicles per 1000 inhabitants.
The high investment cost of rail transit is the main barrier to their construction. Rail
transit usually provides a high quality service, at least along the corridors it serves. In
spite of its popularity among city dwellers all over the world, rail transit is usually
discarded as an option, because of its high investment cost. With few exceptions, rail
transit systems are not able to pay for their operational costs, and they need government
6
subsidies . In this respect, they are not different from highways, with the exception that
subsidies to road construction seem to be more politically acceptable7. This dependency
on governments' budget makes long-term financing of transit uncertain, and heavily
affected by political cycles.
In recent years, there has been an extensive debate around the comparison between rail
8transit and bus rapid transit (BRT) . Heavy rail is accused of being too expensive for
developing countries, inflexible, and overall less cost-effective than BRT or than other
improvements of the bus systems9 . Mexico City and Santiago are two cities in developing
countries that have built heavy rail transit systems, but both are planning to build the first
BRT lines in the next few years.
In spite of the loss in modal share of rail transit in recent decades, the governments of
Chile and Mexico are planning further extensions of their capital cities' subways in the
future. These reductions in share will probably continue in the near future, for the
following reasons:
" The increase in income will determine a higher motorization rate
* Suburbanization is likely to continue, fueled by the availability of land on the fringes
of the city and the construction of roads to serve these areas
* Many train cars are approaching the end of their operational life. Unless governments
invest in fleet renewal, there will be a deterioration of their level of service
6 Some of the few subways that cover their operational costs are Honk Kong, Singapore and Santiago de
Chile.
7 The proportion of roadway construction cost that was paid by car users through fuel and vehicle taxes in
the US is only 56% (Moore and Thorsnes, 1994). In many other countries the situation is similar.
8 For example see Kuhn (2002) and Stutsman (2002).
9 See World Bank (1986).
The next Chapter reviews the effect of rail transit on accessibility, and discusses how the
increases in accessibility affect the location decision of different activities.
3 Transportation Infrastructure and Land Values
In this Chapter, I will discuss how rail transit and roads induce changes in the pattern of
land development through an increase of accessibility. I will also describe other factors
that affect land values. Then, I will identify the groups that may benefit from these
increases of land values, and those who may be affected. Finally, I will describe how rail
transit shapes cities, at a macro level (the entire city), and at a micro level (the
neighborhood).
3.1 Transportation infrastructure and accessibility
The construction of transportation infrastructure creates different effects on traffic,
depending on the time frame we consider. In the short-run, new infrastructure relieves
congestion. The beneficiaries of this effect are the users of the preexisting roads or transit
systems. Considering this benefit, several governments around the world have allowed
private companies to build new highways and charge tolls for using them. These
highways provide mobility in excess of what is considered to be the minimum
government's provision, which is given for free (for example the interstate highway
system in the US). The provision of transportation infrastructure by the private sector has
created a market for mobility. Tolls become price-signals that may lead to an optimal
provision of transportation infrastructure 0 . The same thing happens with railroads, which
in many countries are open to different users, in exchange for a toll.
In most cases, soon after the opening of new transportation infrastructure to the public,
new traffic is generated. This traffic comes as a consequence of the improvement of the
level of service provided, and it is equivalent to a movement along the transportation
demand curve. Generated traffic comprises diverted traffic and induced traffic. Diverted
traffic is a consequence of people's shift in time, route or destination as a response to the
10 However, charging a toll that covers the investment cost of roads is not optimal if there are scale
economies for the construction of roads or if the level of road investment is not optimal (G6mez-Ibinez,
1999).
reduction of the cost of using a route. Induced traffic refers to new vehicle-miles
generated as a consequence of people switching to cars from other modes, taking longer
trips or making new trips'1 . The construction of new infrastructure benefits these new
users, but at the expense of the rest of the users, who suffer an increase of their travel
times.
To reduce congestion, some highways charge an extra amount of money for driving at
rush hour, in addition to their flat tolls. Similarly, many rail transit systems charge more
during peak-periods. This is a second level of price signaling, which allows for a more
precise alignment of supply and demand in the short-run, and the optimal provision of
mobility in the long-run.
Once construction for the new road begins, it is very common to see real estate
developers taking advantage of the new accessibility by locating new residents, as well as
commercial or service centers in close proximity to the new infrastructure. So it is not
surprising to witness how new transportation infrastructure affects the location decision
of firms and families. In most cases, the construction of new transportation infrastructure
makes the served land more accessible. Accessibility is one of the main attributes that
affect the location decision of firms and, to a lesser extent, families. This difference is
due to the fact that firms usually generate more trips per unit of land than families (see
section 3.6.1). The relocation of activities that occurs after the construction of
transportation infrastructure is equivalent to a rise of the transportation demand curve.
The subsequent increase in traffic flows, plus the traffic generated by the reduction in
travel costs, is the total induced demand.
Accessibility is an abstract concept that represents "...the ease at which people can
pursue the activities they desire, and business can connect with consumers, employees
and goods"' 2 . There are several ways to measure accessibility. All them add up the
number of different activities around a point, weighted by a measure of how easy is to get
" De-Corla Souza (2000), Litman (2003).
12 Walker (1998).
to those activities (shops, firms, services, housing, etc.). Studies of property values with
hedonic price models have consistently proven that accessibility is one of the main
attributes that determine land values, and that its effect on them is highly positive.
There is also another type of accessibility, the so-called destination accessibility, which is
the proximity of out-of-home activities to each other' 3 . An easy connection between these
activities makes it easier for people to link trips, and therefore reduces travel costs.
The reductions in people's travel time, which are usually the main justification for road
construction, have been proved to disappear very fast as a consequence of induced
demand14 . The only lasting benefits of the transportation investment are the new trips,
which are marginally profitable (in fact they are not profitable at the previous average
cost level)' 5 . Only in the cases where tolls are charged, can reductions in travel time be
sustained over time.
3.2 Accessibility and land values
In this section I will discuss how the increase in accessibility produced by transportation
infrastructure affects land values.
As I said in the previous section, the construction of transportation infrastructure raises
accessibility through a reduction in travel time and travel cost. In some cases,
transportation infrastructure also promotes the clustering of activities, enhancing
destination accessibility. This is especially true for rail transit, which has a higher
capacity to concentrate development than highways. Therefore, if all other factors that
affect land values remain constant, the construction of transportation infrastructure
should produce land value increases. As in most cases, property owners do not pay for
the construction of transit facilities; this is an external benefit for them.
13 Ewing (1997).
14 SACTRA (1994).
15 Litman (2003).
In the long run, there is an additional mechanism through which transportation
infrastructure raises land values. The reduction in transportation costs or increase in
productivity generated by transit can attract labor and capital to the region served by
public transportation. In other words, cities that are more productive attract more
economic activity16 . The arrival of more labor and capital to the city generates an
increase in land values not only in the area directly served by the transportation
infrastructure, but also in the entire city or region. This compensates for losses in the
value of the land that is not served by the new infrastructure. These losses arise because,
in the short-term, the stocks of capital and labor are fixed.
The increases in land values are in part a result of consumer's surplus. Every road user or
transit passenger has a demand curve for the usage of the infrastructure. Given the fact
that these demand curves are different for every user, it is impossible to charge every user
a discriminatory toll that captures that user's entire consumer's surplus (it is usually
illegal also). Users that benefit from the service provided by the infrastructure are willing
to bid for the land served by it. The amount of money they are willing to pay for using the
land is equal to the surplus they obtain from using the infrastructure' 8 . This willingness-
to-pay for the land makes values rise, regardless of whether the owners of the land use
the infrastructure or not. The gains in accessibility only have an effect on land values, and
not on the values of the structures built on the land'9 .
When transportation infrastructure is built, the land served by this infrastructure can be
used more intensively, keeping the level of welfare of the previous users constant. The
construction of transportation infrastructure raises the capacity of the land to carry urban
development. This benefit is additional to the surplus of the previous consumers.
16 Increasing the competitiveness of the city has been one of the reasons cited most often to justify rail
transit investment.
17 1 am not aware of any study showing a long-term negative effect on land values for properties not served
by rail transit.
18 Moore and Thorsnes (1994).
19 See Alonso (1964) and Muth (1969) for a more complete description of the capitalization of accessibility.
As land value increases are in part a measure of consumer's surplus, governments should
not add all these increases as additional benefits to consumer's surplus in cost-benefit
analysis. These evaluations should include, however, the rise of values resulting from the
increase in carrying capacity of the land, along with the savings in travel time and travel
cost of the users of the infrastructure, plus all external costs.
The subsidies that both cars and transit receive reduce the attractiveness that private
investors can obtain from investing in transportation infrastructure. In some cases,
governments are willing to give similar subsidies to private companies to allow them to
compete against the existing infrastructure. In other cases, the high level of congestion of
some roads provides an additional cost to their users, and makes private providers
competitive against the existing infrastructure.
3.3 Land values and optimal floor-area-ratio
In this section I will discuss how people's willingness-to-pay for locating in a certain
place raises the optimal floor-area ratio (FAR) to use in its development. I will prove that
after the demand for the land rises, its value is maximized only when redevelopment at a
higher density is allowed.
The construction costs per unit of surface of housing, commercial and office spaces are
growing functions of the floor area ratio (FAR). This relation exists because the higher
the number of floors in a building, the higher that the support of the structures and
foundations need to be20 . Moreover, elevators are needed for buildings of more than a
certain number of floors, which increases their construction cost per unit of surface. A
corollary of this observation is that if land were free, the cheapest way to build a given
amount of floor area would be with one-floor buildings.
20 DiPasquale and Wheaton (1996), page 74.
People's willingness-to-pay per unit of surface of housing is a negative function of the
FAR, all else being equal21 . This is especially the case in the United States, where most
people express a strong preference for living in low-density areas2.
The preference for low FARs explains the paradox that in most metropolitan areas in the
US, the people that value their time the most are the ones that live the farthest from the
city centers, and tend to have the longest commutes. The next two graphs prove this
point. The following figure shows the travel time of the journey to work of households
23
with different income
Figure 1: Average travel time of journeys to work for households with different income
in the US
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Source: Created by the author based on US DOT (2002)
2' That is, keeping constant all characteristics of the housing unit itself (number and size of rooms,
equipment, construction materials, etc.), and of the community (crime rate, prestige, medical and
educational services, etc.).
22 For example, in a survey made in Northern California in the 1990's, 82% of people said they prefer a
single-family home rather than other alternatives (Building Industry Association of Northern California,
1993). According to Cervero (1997), 90% of people in the US prefer to live in single detached house rather
than multi-family housing.
23 Each category is represented by the average of the lower and upper limits of the income interval.
Households with more then $100,000 of annual income are represented with an income of $125,000, for the
purpose of including them in the graph.
As can be seen in the previous graph, starting at a household income of $32,500 per year,
there is a general trend of people having longer commutes (in terms of travel time) as
their incomes increase.
The following graph is based on the previous one. For different annual incomes it shows
the average commute time of people whose incomes are higher than a certain income
level, and the commute time of people whose income is less than the same income level.
Figure 2: Average travel time of the journey to work of groups of households with
different income in the US
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This graph does not provide an accurate measure of the average travel time for each
income level, since it does not weigh the commute times by the number of people in the
different income categories. Nevertheless, the graph gives a proxy of the overall trend.
Considering that the average income per households in the US for 2002 was $42,40924
we conclude that people whose household's income is higher than the average tend to
have longer commuting than those whose household's incomes are below the average.
24 In 2002 dollars. Information retrieved from US Census Bureau's Web Site.
This result implies that for most people in the US, the elasticity of the willingness-to-pay
for space with respect to income is higher than for reductions in commuting time.
Apparently, the American preference for large lots and single housing is less common in
Europe and in developing countries25 . In fact, in many cities in Europe and Latin
America, a large proportion of high-income people live close to city centers, and low-
income people tend to live in the periphery of the cities. There are also a few high-
income communities located close to city centers in the US, such as Beacon Hill in
Boston, and the Upper West Side in New York City.
People's expressions of preference for low-density settlements may be higher than their
real-life choices and than the social-optimal. People may express their preference for
single-family houses because, on average, this type of housing is more comfortable than
multi-family housing. But the relevant comparison is between houses and
apartments/condos of the same price. The ratio between the number of single-family
housing units built per year and the number of multi-family housing units built per year
may be a better indicator of people's preference. However, it may still not reflect the
socially-optimal proportion of both type of housing, since in most cases owners of single-
family houses use their cars more intensively than the rest of the population, creating
more external costs (e.g. road congestion and pollution).
As I said in the beginning of this section, the willingness-to-pay for a housing unit (P)
and the cost to build the unit(C) are functions of the FAR:
P = P (FAR)
C=C(FAR)
However, these P and C have opposite relations with the FAR. Whereas most consumers
prefer low FARs, all else being equal, the cost of providing housing space increases with
25 (Ingram, 1997), p. 1022. Nevertheless, similar preferences to the ones in the US have been reported in
other parts of the world. In the 1970's in Sweden 90% of people preferred houses to apartments (Popenoe,
1977). The same percentage was reported for Chile (DII-UCh, 2000).
FAR. The following graph represents the cost and market price of a unit of housing
space, as a function of the FAR, keeping all other variables constant:
Figure 3: Cost and price per unit of housing
Source: DiPasquale and Wheaton (1996)
We know that the higher the FAR, the higher the housing space the developer can sell,
for a given amount of land. For every combination of cost and price of housing, there is a
profit that a developer would obtain by building housing. In a perfect market, developers
would bid for the land until making this profit equal to zero (in real life, until making
profits equal to alternative return of the capital). Therefore, land values are equal to the
maximum profit that can be obtained by developing the land. The profit p would be the
following:
p = FAR * (P - C) Equation 1
Where:
P is the price of a housing unit
C is its cost
FAR = housing space / land space
0
0
0
0*
Cn
FAR
.--- House Price (P) ah- Construction Cost (C)
The following graph represents the profits that the developer would obtain at different
FARs per unit of area of land:
Figure 4: Profits per unit of land
Source: DiPasquale and Wheaton (1996)
As can be seen in the graph, from the perspective of the developer, the best use of the
land would be at the FAR that maximizes profits.
If demand for housing in a specific area rises because of the construction of rail transit in
the area, the curve P in the figure of page 27 will move upwards. The new demand curve
(P') may not be parallel to the old one (P), since the existence of rail transit could reduce
congestion, making living in an environment with high density less annoying for every
unit of increase in density.
The following graph represents the cost, the old market price (before the transit project
serving the area is built), and the new market price (after the transit project is built) for a
unit of housing space, as a function of FAR:
- Profits (p)
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Figure 5: Shift in demand after new rail station opens
FAR
- Construction Cost (C) .-- New House Price (P') --- Old House Price (P)
Source: DiPasquale and Wheaton (1996)
The following graph shows the old and new profits that can be obtained for the
development of the land at different FARs:
Figure 6: Profits per unit of land, before and after a rise in demand
FAR
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Source: DiPasquale and Wheaton (1996)
If the increase in accessibility raises demand for land in the area around stations, it will
raise the profits that can be obtained by developing the land (and therefore land values),
and will also raise the optimum FAR.
If zoning does not allow for higher densities than the ones existing in the area previous to
the investment in transportation infrastructure, redevelopment will not take place. In that
case, the value of the existing properties will increase and FAR will remain the same.
Land values will only rise from point X to point Y in Figure 6. On the other hand, if
redevelopment is allowed, land values will rise to the level Z in the same Figure. Sections
4.2 and 4.3 show that the cities that have seen the greatest impact on land values have
been those where redevelopment at higher FARs has been possible.
3.4 Other conditions necessary for land values to increase
Section 3.2 described how accessibility becomes capitalized into property values in
competitive land markets. Section 3.3 mentioned that the increases of land values would
be higher in places where redevelopment of the land at a higher density was possible.
There are also other conditions that have been identified as necessary for land value to
increase, including the following 26:
" A growing economy: only where income is growing, are there opportunities for
development, and therefore, land values increase
* Relatively high congestion in the streets: road congestion increases the cost of using
private vehicles, and therefore attracts people to transit
e A low stock of vacant land around other sections of the rail transit: land in other areas
of the city competes in the market against the land located next to transit stations,
reducing prices
e Provision of pedestrian infrastructure: as most rail transit trips include a walking
segment, the quality of the pedestrian infrastructure has an important effect on the
likelihood of people choosing public transportation
26 CerVerO (1992).
Another factor affecting land values is local externalities, i.e. the effects that adjacent
properties have on the value of real estate. In many cases, the density of adjacent lots
affects the value of land, for example because adjacent buildings reduce sunlight or
produce congestion on the streets. In other cases, the presence of industries creates
environmental degradation and hazards to local residents. Thus, local externalities can
impede the redevelopment of an area, producing a sub-optimal outcome.
Two cities that suffer local externalities are Toronto and Cleveland. In both cases, heavy
industries were the first to locate on the lakeshore, arguably the most beautiful location in
both cities. The fact that factories remained there has scared potential developers from
these areas, and has resulted in housing being built in other areas of these two cities.
As was pointed out in section 3.2, land values reflect consumer's surplus. The higher the
difference between the willingness-to-pay of passengers for transportation service and the
fare charged for the service, the higher the increases in land values will be. Therefore,
systems that provide high level of service, with reliable and high frequencies, low travel
times, high comfort, clean and safe facilities, and at reasonable fares, will have the
highest impact on land values.
Modes with high level of service are the ones with the highest impact on land values.
There is not evidence of an increase of land values caused by the provision of regular bus
service in the last few years in the developed world. On the other hand, there is some
evidence of a positive effect of rail transit on land values (see sections 4.2 and 4.3). This
difference must be caused in part by the higher level of service of rail transit compared to
the regular bus service, since there is no evidence of a specific preference for rail over
bus for other reasons than their level of service. In large metropolitan areas in the US
buses tend to suffer from low schedule adherence, and long travel times because of
congestion. Some bus rapid transit systems have had a positive effect on land values,
27 See Ben-Akiva and Morikawa (2002).
even in the developed world 28 . This may be a consequence of the higher level of service
of this mode as compared to regular buses.
Another reason for the different impact of buses and rail on land values are technological.
Rail transit systems have higher sunk costs than other modes. This characteristic gives
people the certainty that once built, rail transit will stay in service for a long time. In
addition, as most rail transit systems have a right of way that is separated from road
traffic, its performance is not affected by road congestion. These characteristics reduce
the risk of real estate investing in the area around stations, compared to investing in the
areas served exclusively by regular buses.
3.5 Who is benefited and who is affected by the construction of rail transit lines?
As was said in section 3.2, each person has a different willingness-to-pay for using
transit. For all transit users, their willingness-to-pay is higher than the fare, and this
difference is their consumer's surplus. This surplus is reflected in the value of properties
located in the area served by transit.
The effect of rail transit construction on property values depends on whether the city has
one or more employment centers. In mono-centric cities, office space located in the
central areas benefits from the construction of radial rail lines. They benefit because the
wages firms pay to their employees have to compensate for employees' commuting
costs29. If these costs diminish, wages will also diminish. These savings are capitalized
then into office-space values. Similarly, in mono-centric cities, the value of residential
properties located in the central areas is reduced after the construction of radial rail line,
2 TRB (2003) reports that the BRT system of Brisbane, Australia, caused a 20% increase in property
values around stops. It also mentions that the BRT systems in Ottawa and Pittsburgh have attracted
development to the areas around stations.29For example, Darien and Wheaton (2001) shows that firms located in zones with a more difficult
commute in the Boston and Minneapolis-St. Paul metropolitan areas have to compensate their employees
with higher wages than other firms.
at least in the short-term. The reason is that if transportation costs diminish, the benefits
of living close to where jobs are will also diminish.
On the other hand, in a multi-centric city, firms located out of the central business district
(CBD) benefit from the lower commuting costs of their employees, paying them lower
wages than what firms in the CBD have to pay. In fact, many firms have migrated to the
suburbs, seeking these lower wages (and lower land values), at the cost of giving up the
agglomeration economies of downtowns 30 . The construction of radial rapid transit
reduces the relative advantage of firms located in the secondary centers, and, therefore,
reduces the value of commercial properties located in those areas. Meanwhile, housing
properties located in any place in a multi-center city benefit from the reduction in the cost
to commute to alternative employment centers.
According to this analysis, residential properties in the suburbs would be the ones that
would have the highest gain in accessibility after the construction of radial rail transit
lines. Moreover, high or mid-income people, who usually live in the suburbs in the US,
are the ones who place the highest value on their time. Nevertheless, some studies have
shown a meager effect of rail transit on land values in high-income suburban areas in the
United States3 1. This may be a consequence of the low attraction of transit for people who
live in the suburbs, or of the fact that zoning in the suburbs has not allowed for
densification.
Land value increases may force some people to relocate. As was pointed out earlier,
consumer's surplus, which determines property value increases, is a function of income.
Therefore, in the short-term, low-income people may be priced-out of their properties.
This possibility is not necessarily bad. First, if they are owners of their property, they
would have the option to stay, and their decision to leave would be determined by the
economic advantage of selling their properties. However, people's decisions to leave
30 Suburbs now contain half of the office space and two-thirds of the new office space (Downs, 1992;
Diamond and Noonan, 1996).
31 For example, Nelson (1992).
their neighborhoods would produce external costs to the rest of the community. When
* 32
many people move at the same time, there is a loss in the "social fabric" of cities32
Gentrification would be less favorable for tenants than for homeowners. In the short term,
as population is fixed, there has to be a reassignment of properties for the same number
of residents in the city. After the rise in rents, priced-out tenants may be able to rent a
marginally better property than the one they used to rent, for a similar price. As in the
case of property owners, there may be a loss of the social fabric of the affected
neighborhoods.
There are reasons to believe that the probability of rail transit causing gentrification is
low. First, gentrification is usually a slow process. In most cases it only occurs when low-
income people live in houses with extraordinary architectural characteristics, or where
redevelopment is very easy. Even assuming that rail transit causes gentrification, the
social benefits caused by rail transit may compensate for this cost.
Densification in the station areas may benefit low-income people. Rail transit requires
high densities around stations to be sustained. The construction of rail transit encourages
city governments to increase densities in the areas around stations. Densification may
benefit low-income people, as that may increase the supply of affordable housing.
Finally, governments gain with land value increases. They get more revenue from
property taxes. The productivity of the workers and firms also increases, attracting more
investment and workers to the city or region (see section 3.2). This raise in investment
spurs the economic activity of cities.
32 See Jacobs (1961), part I.
3.6 Land values, location decisions and city structure
The previous sections discussed the effect of transportation infrastructure on
accessibility, and how accessibility increases land values. This section discusses the way
rail transit shapes cities, both at the metropolitan level (macro level), and at the
neighborhood level (micro level).
3.6.1 Macro Level
At the metropolitan level, rail transit provides a location advantage to areas around
stations, and especially to city centers, the area that is usually the best served by transit.
This advantage reduces the attractiveness of locating in the suburbs. The areas around rail
stations tend to concentrate development, especially the kind of development that gains
the most from location around them, namely employment and retail centers.
The effect of rail transit on different kinds of land uses varies according to their
transportation costs. Office space gains more from accessibility than single-family
housing, since the number of generated and attracted trips per unit of area of land is
usually higher for offices than for this type of housing. In this section, I will demonstrate
that on average, single-family housing is less trip-intense than office space and retail
space, at least in the US.
The following table shows the average number of trips generated per 1000 square feet of
floor area by different land uses in the United States.
Table 1: Trip intensity per unit of floor area in the US
Land Use Daily trips / 1000 Assumptions
square feet of floor
area
Single Family 7.2 e Average new house's lot is 2,225 square feet a
Housing e 3.8 people per unit b
e 4.3 trips per person'
* To be conservative, I assume all of them are to or from home
Multi-Family 7.7 e Average new apartment/condo is 1,105 square feet a
Housing * 2.0 people per unit b
e 4.3 trips per person c
e I assume all of them are to or from home
Office 9.9 e Average new office is 250 square feet per employee d
Buildings e 3.32 vehicle trips per employee on weekdays, 0.54 on Saturdays and
0.22 on Sundays b
e To be conservative, I assume all of them drive alone
24 h 759 0 738 vehicle trips per 1000 square feet of gross floor area on
Convenience weekdays, 863 on Saturdays, 758 on Sundays b
Stores e To be conservative, I assume all of them drive alone
Pharmacies 90 * 90 vehicle trips per 1000 square feet of gross floor area on weekdays b
e I assume the same rate for weekends
e To be conservative, I assume all of them drive alone
a US Census Bureau (1999)
b ITE (1997)
c BTS (2002)
d Garreau (1991)
Table 1 only considers floor areas. To compare the intensity of ground areas, it is
necessary to account for the floor-area ratio. The following table presents estimations of
the number of daily trips per 1000 square feet of ground area:
Table 2: Trip intensity per unit of ground area
Land Use Daily trips / 1000 Assumptions
square feet of
ground area
Single-Family Housing 1.1 New houses have an average lot area of 0.35 acres,
so average FAR is 0.15 a
Low density Multi-Family/ 7.7 Assuming FAR equals 1.0
Townhouses
Mid density Multi-Family 19.3 Assuming FAR equals 2.5
Housing
High density Multi-Family 34.7 Assuming FAR equals 4.5 d
Housing
Office Buildings 9.9 -50.0 For FARs between 1.0-5.0 *
24 h Convenience Stores 152-759 For FARs between 0.2-1.0
Pharmacies 45-180 For FARs between 0.5-2.0
a US Census Bureau (1999)
b As a comparison, the maximum FAR allowance in districts that permit townhouses but not more intense uses in
Chicago is 1.2 (City of Chicago, 2003), and in Washington D.C. is 1.8 (DCOZ, 2002)
'According to US Census Bureau (1999), 89% of the multiple-units built in the US in 1999 were in buildings of 3
or fewer floors, so they fit near the low and mid-density category of multi-family units
d As a comparison, the maximum FAR allowed for residential areas in Chicago is 10.0 (city of Chicago, 2003) and
in Washington D.C. is 6.0 (DCOZ, 2002)
e According to EIA (2003), 84% of office buildings in the US are one- or two-floor high, and therefore have a FAR
below 2.0
fAccording to EIA (2003), 73% of retail and services buildings in the US are one-floor high, and 18% are two-
floor high
As we can see, single-family housing generates and attracts fewer trips that all the other
uses included in the table, and retail space is often more intense than multi-family
housing and office space. These results were obtained even with conservative
assumptions, i.e. assumptions that would not benefit my hypothesis (that residential uses
are less trip-intensive than office and retail space), so it is a robust conclusion.
Shopping centers also have high trip-intensity. A survey in six metropolitan areas found
that the number of trips per 1000 square feet of retail shopping varies from around 3 per
peak-hour for super regional shopping centers to around 14 per peak-hour for community
shopping centers33 . As we see, these numbers are much higher than the trip intensities of
housing and office space.
Even though these results apply to the US and the trip-intensity should differ for cities
with different modal shares, the high difference between the resulting rates of the
different uses suggest that the trip-intensity ranking of these land-uses should be the same
for cities in the developing world, such as Mexico City and Santiago. Moreover, it is
likely that as a lower proportion of people own cars in these cities than in the US, and
their discount rate is higher (as average income per capita is lower) they shop more often
than people in developed countries. This characteristic would make retail space uses even
more trip-intense than in the US.
Given their high trip-intensity, it seems logical that retail stores are willing to pay the
most for accessible locations, followed by commercial space and housing. Nevertheless,
there are other reasons that suggest that the trip-intensity of retail space is not as high as it
appears in Table 2. One reason is that some stores prefer to locate in large plots of land,
where they can offer parking space to their clientele at an affordable price. The
availability of parking allows clients to carry the products they buy in their cars. Another
reason is that some stores may want to build parking facilities to make it difficult for
people without a car to come, as a way of selecting their clientele. The design of most
34
shopping malls reflects this intention
There are some agglomeration economies for retail. One is the economy that exists when
similar shops locate together, making it easier for consumers to compare the products of
the different stores in a single trip. Shops only benefit from this reduction in cost if the
products they sell are close but not perfect substitutes to each other. Otherwise they
cannot exert any market power35 . A classical example of this phenomenon is the
clustering of jewelry, antiques, expensive clothes, and cars stores that have arisen in
many cities around the world.
33 TRB (1992). The rates are an average of the midday and afternoon peak periods.
34 This is especially true in countries where not everybody can afford a car, such as Mexico and Chile.
3 See Boulding (1966).
Another location economy is destination accessibility (see section 3.1). The clustering of
shops allows clients to make linked-trips, or even better, one-stop shopping. This is one
of the main reasons why shopping centers exist.
As the number of clients traveling to stores is higher than the number of employees
traveling to stores, the main consideration retailers have when making their location
decision is the accessibility of the prospective customers. Moreover, shops have very
good substitutes, whereas jobs do not have perfect substitutes. Therefore, people change
stores more often that they change jobs, and they are willing to travel farther to their jobs
than to stores36. Locating close to the clients is essential. As customers live in dispersed
areas, especially in US cities, retail needs to follow population, and also locates in
dispersed areas.
Firms also have incentives to locate in accessible places, clustered with other firms. By
locating in accessible places, they gain a broader workforce base. People are willing to
travel to work a given time and distance, and beyond this limit there is a very steep
increase in the wage they would have to get to accept a job37 . Accessibility and clustering
allow firms to have more face-to-face contact with other firms, to access specialized
services38 , and to facilitate external transactions 39 . An accessible location, hopefully with
high traffic, may also promote the name and image of a company.
There are many reasons why families may want to locate close to rail transit stations.
These systems enhance the accessibility of the areas around stations. Residents gain a
larger area to find jobs, to choose a school for their children, and to select the place where
they want to buy and have fun. Transportation costs may be reduced, both in terms of
time and money. Contrary to retail and firms, housing has very small agglomeration
economies. The capacity to sustain shops at walking distance is one of them. But, as
36 Walker (1998).
37 According to Garreau (1991) this threshold is around 45 minutes each-way.
38 See Jacobs (1961). For example only with a cluster of office buildings it is possible to sustain services
such as restaurants, printing services, mail delivery offices, office supply stores, banks, etc.
39 Cervero (1997), Bollinger (1998).
discussed in section 3.3, most people in the US prefer to live in low-density settlements,
which cannot sustain shops at walking distance.
There is a lot of evidence suggesting that in developed countries, households' location
decision is based on social and economic factors such as the availability of well served
and affordable housing, more than on the availability of transit per se 40. Retail and offices
on the other hand, tend to choose locations based on the accessibility to clients,
employees and to other firms. These characteristics suggest that if households move to
the areas around stations in the first place, this will attract firms and shops, but not
necessarily the other way around. This situation may not be different in developing
countries.
The incentives for cities to compete for attracting firms and retail makes it necessary for
metropolitan areas to agree with their cities on a plan to avoid attracting land-uses that
are not traffic-intensive next to the stations. Firms and retail provide more taxes than the
cost they impose on cities in the US. Then cities tend to compete to attract them,
especially those with low-income residents, which are less concerned about their impact
on congestion4 1 . Some of these land uses, such as heavy industries, scare other trip-
intense uses away, so they should be avoided in the areas around stations.
The fact that cities in the US pay for public schools produces the so-called Tiebout
sorting, where people are segregated into cities of homogenous incomes. This sorting can
become an additional barrier to redevelopment. The situation in Mexico and Chile is
different. Although in both countries municipalities collect property taxes and pay for
certain services to local residents, in Mexico schools and medical services are funded by
the federal and state governments. In Chile, although schools are funded by
40 See Zhang (2000) for a description of this phenomenon in Chicago. Another study for Sydney found that
people that relocated to the suburbs increased the duration of their journey to work (Burnley et al, 1997),
which suggests that other factors have a more important role in the housing location choice than job
location.
41 DiPasquale and Wheaton (1996), page 339.
42 The failure to redevelop the industrial land located next to the alignment of the light-rail in San Diego
may be one of the reasons of its low ridership (Cervero, 1994b).
municipalities, people are not forced to attend schools in the municipality where they
live43
3.6.2 Micro Level
At the micro or neighborhood level, rail transit systems usually foster dense development.
Depending on the type of rail technology (heavy/light rail, electric/diesel traction, third
rail/catenaries) and of station (elevated, at grade or underground) the areas adjacent to rail
stations may become desirable places to locate. In contrast, most areas next to highways
are not desirable places to live because of air pollution, noise and congestion in the access
ramps.
The dense development and pedestrian flows that some rail transit stations promote,
create a favorable environment for shops to locate. Contrary to cars, transit provides a
connecting service. The usage of transit requires a connection to other mode, either to
walk, take a bus or drive a vehicle. Several studies have proved a strong aversion of
people to modal transfers, especially when buses are involved. When using rail transit,
many people walk to their final destination. These pedestrians are potential customers of
the shops located near stations.
High densities around stations provide the base of the customer needed by certain
services to exist. For example, several studies have estimated that in the US a
convenience store that can be reached in a five-minute walk can only be sustained with
densities above 10 units or 25 persons per acre (62 persons per hectare) 44. Similar
densities may be necessary for dry-clean services, post offices and cafes. The clustering
of different shops around stations allows clients to make chained-trips, even if they do
not use transit. In fact, the opening of stores around stations has proven to be one of the
main mechanisms through which rail transit raises residential property values45.
4 Zegras (2000), page 86.
4 Condon (2000); Marshall (2000), page 12.
4 For example, Bowes and Ihlandfeldt (2000) proved that this factor was very important in the outer
sections of the MARTA rail transit system in Atlanta.
The effect of rail transit stations on retail and office space values has proved to exist only
in close proximity to the stations, whereas for residential properties the increases in
values has reached properties located farther away4 6. This phenomenon is explained by
the fact that retail needs pedestrian flows to be sustained. These flows dissipate fast as
distance from the stations increases. The area of impact on property values is especially
big for commuter trains, and for stations with park-and-ride facilities. However, these
facilities have a negative effect on the areas immediately adjacent to the stations, because
of aesthetical impact, the barrier these facilities create to pedestrians, and a perceived
effect on crime (see section 4.4.9). Park-and-ride facilities on the other hand, benefit
residential properties located farther away from the stations.
The construction of a rail transit station in a neighborhood does not necessarily benefit
the commercial activities of that specific area. In Lille, France, the opening of rail transit
stations in low-income areas encouraged local dwellers to go to other areas of the city to
shop, damaging the commercial activities of those low-income areas47. Something similar
happened in Barakaldo with Bilbao's subway48
The clustering of office space around stations stimulates the opening of more office
space, because of agglomeration economies. It also stimulates the development of firms
that serve them, such as restaurants, printing stores, office supply stores, etc.
46 For example, Cambridge Systematic, et al (1998) proved that in San Francisco, single-family houses
located between 2,000 and 2,500 feet of BART stations still had a price premium, whereas retail space only
had a premium up to 1,000 feet, and office space up to 2,000 feet.
47 Walmsley and Perrett (1992).
48 Mikel Murga, personal communication with the author, 8/20/2003.
4 Literature Review: The Effect of Rail Transit Construction on Land Values
This Chapter reviews different studies about the effect that rail transit systems have had
on land values in cities in the developed world. It also discusses why the results appear to
be contradictory, and why the effects have not been the same in different cities and in
different sections of the same systems.
4.1 General considerations
Several papers have tried to determine the effect of rail transit on land values. Most of
them have used hedonic price models. These models assume that goods (real estate in this
case) are bundles of attributes, and that for each of these attributes people are willing to
pay, if they like them, or demand a compensation for accepting them, if they do not.
Hedonic price models are able to determine the price premium paid for each attribute in a
sample of transactions.
Most hedonic price models have assumed linear relations between prices and the
variables that determine them. These kinds of relations have the following form:
P = a + ZZ * Z i +Zyj *Lj Equation 2
Where:
a is a constant
si are parameters that reflect the value paid for the physical characteristics of the property
or land
Zi are the physical characteristics of the property or land
yj are parameters that reflect the value paid for the location characteristics of the property
or land
Lj are the location characteristics of the property or land
Alternatively, it could be argued that the effect of increases in the magnitude of the
physical or location characteristics have a decreasing marginal effect on property values.
In those cases, Cobb-Douglas specifications, such as the following, are more appropriate.
P =ca*ffZu * JLJ Equation 3
i I
In this cases si and yj are the elasticities of property prices with respect to the attributes Zi
and Lj.
Most studies on the effect of rail transit on property values have used one of these two
specifications in multiple regression models. Linear specifications have been more
common because of their simplicity, and their acceptable capacity to predict dispersion of
property values.
Not all studies have used hedonic price models. Others have used matched pairs and
repeat sale ratios techniques. Compared to hedonic price models, these models are easier
to estimate, and require less information. On the other hand, they are less accurate than
hedonic price models, since they do not control for other variables that affect property
values, such as economic cycles, and physical and location characteristics of the
properties.
Many studies have analyzed rents instead of sale prices. Rental contracts have other
specific characteristics than the price, such as the extension, concessions and others. Sale
prices are more standard and therefore can reflect the effects of transit on land values
more accurately. Most of the studies that are reviewed in the following sections have
used sale prices.
4.2 Studies on commercial properties
The results of the studies on the impact of rail transit on property values have been
mixed. While some studies have found significant effects, others have not.
Studies done for BART in the San Francisco Metropolitan Area have not found
conclusive effects on the value of adjacent commercial properties. A study done few
years after the opening of the system did not find evidence that BART raised commercial
property values around Walnut Creek station and Mission District 9 . Another study done
few years later (Landis, et al, 1994), could not find any effect on commercial property
either. Other studies on the contrary, analyzing longer periods, have found significant
price premiums for commercial and office properties, especially in downtown San
Francisco and downtown Oakland5 0 . In both areas high-density development is common.
For Atlanta the results have also been contradictory. Bollinger et al (1998) did not find
evidence of a premium for commercial properties located one mile or less from MARTA
stations. On the other hand, Nelson (1999) found that commercial properties in Atlanta
that were located close to rail stations, and were located in areas where high densities
were allowed, had higher values than comparable properties in other areas of the city.
The study identified the formation of special districts, and the relaxation of minimum
parking as additional factors that increased property values.
Many studies have shown that Washington D.C.'s subway has had a significant impact
on the value of land located close to stations. Using a hedonic price model, Damm et al
(1980) found price-elasticity with respect to distance of -0.69 for commercial property
within 2,500 feet of the subway. In both Washington D.C. and Atlanta, the increases of
51land values were in anticipation rather than as a response to rail station opening
4 Falcke (1978).
50 See Cervero and Landis (1997).
5 Cervero (1992).
The effects of light rail systems on land values have also been non-conclusive. Weinstein
and Clower (1999) used a matched-pairs methodology to assess the impact of Dallas
Area Rapid Transit (DART) on land values. The study concluded that there was a 30%
value-added premium for commercial properties located close to stations.
A study for Santa Clara County found price premiums of 23% for commercial parcels
located near light rail stations, and 120% for commercial land in business districts located
52near commuter rail stations . Santa Clara County had heavy congestion as a result of
high economic growth in the 1990's. The county has actively promoted Transit Oriented
Development (TOD) of the areas around stations. Some of the mechanisms that were
used include "...tax-exempt financing, sliding-scale impact fees, public assistance with
land assembly, and overlay zones to allow for higher densities than the norm' 3
In a study for New York City, using transaction data from 1985 to 1988 and records of
intended change of use, it was proved that commercial firms' property values were more
54affected than housing and retail by the distance to subway's stations
4.3 Studies on residential properties
Just like for commercial property values, the studies that been done on the impact of rail
transit on residential property values in the US have not had conclusive results.
Cities with a long history of rail transit tend to have increases in land values when new
extensions are built. A study on the effect of the Lindenwold line in Philadelphia
concluded that properties with access to rail had a price premium of 6.4%ss. A study for
the PATCO line that links Philadelphia with Lindenwold, found that increases in land
52 Cervero and Duncan (2001).
53 Cervero and Duncan (2001).
54 Anas and Armstrong (1993).
" Voith (1993).
values were equivalent to the total travel cost savings of the passengers5 6. A study for
Chicago proved that three years before the opening of the orange line, the value of land
located within a 1 miles radius of the stations rose by 17%57.
Cities that have started building new rail system in the last few years have seen low
changes on land values after the opening of the first few lines. A study on the effect of
Miami's Metrorail found no evidence of price premium for residential properties 8 . A
study for Atlanta found that MARTA raised housing values in low-income
neighborhoods but decreased values in high-income zones59. Another study for Atlanta
found that high-income areas had the highest land-value increases, especially areas
located about 12 miles from the city center 60. The effect proved to be more intense in
areas between one-half to one mile from the stations, where the accessibility is not hurt
by the negative local externalities of the rail stations. According to the paper, these
negative externalities are crime and pollution.
Some other new systems have had positive effects on residential property values. A study
for several Californian rail systems (Caltrain, BART, and San Diego's, Sacramento and
Santa Clara's light rails), found that single-family housing capitalized the accessibility
provided by them6 1 . The highest effect was for BART, and in the case of Caltrain, which
is a commuter train, there was a decrease in property prices near stations. This decrease
was probably a consequence of the usage of diesel locomotives, which may have been
perceived as heavy pollutant. A matched-pair study for apartment rents in San Francisco,
found a price premium of 15% for units located at walking distance from suburban
BART stations62
The effect of rail transit on single-family housing values has proven to be low, as we can
expect from the discussion in section 3.6.1. A study for Toronto found that housing units
56 Boyce et al (1972).
57 McDonald and Osuji (1995).
58 Gatzlaff and Smith (1993).
59 Nelson (1992).60 Bowes and Ihlandfeldt (2000).
61 Landis, et al (1994).62 CerVeTO (1996).
located close to subway stations had a price premium, controlling for other location and
structural characteristics63. This premium was equivalent to 4,000 Canadian-dollars (of
1995) for a typical house in the city 64, just around 2% of the average sale price. Another
study for Toronto also found a very modest price-premium for houses located around the
Spadina subway line. The study used a hedonic price model65. For the same city, Dewees
(1976) used a multivariate regression to assess the impact of the Bloor-Danforth line. The
study found that within 1/3 of a mile to each station, rent gradients became steeper after
the construction of the line, indicating a positive impact of the line on rent values.
Other cities have had the same effect of single-family houses value premiums being less
than apartment or condos' premiums for locations around rail transit stations. A study for
Washington D.C. found no price premiums for single family housing located up to 2,500
feet from stations. The value of land though was found to have a price elasticity of -0.19
with respect to distance for multi-family housing66.
Even in New York some studies have not been able to find an effect of rail transit on the
value of housing units. Using transaction data from 1985 to 1988, a study determined the
effect of New York's subway on the value of distinct types of housing properties. The
study found that for both single family and row-house values stayed constant up to 200
meters from the station, after which they had a steady decline of around $ 0.67/ft2 per
meter of distance to the stations. Apartment prices instead, showed a moderate increase in
67value at farther locations from the subway stations
Some studies have shown higher impacts of rail transit on land values in the UK than in
the US. An estimation of the land value increases generated by the Jubilee Line in
63 Haider and Miller (2000).
64 Defined as a detached house, with air-conditioned, four bedrooms, two washrooms, one parking space
and a fireplace.
65 Bajic (1983).
66 Damm et al (1980).
67 Anas and Armstrong (1993).
London was E13 billion, almost four times the construction cost, which was E3.5
68billion
4.4 Why have the studies shown different results?
The studies to determine the effects of rail transit on land values have produced different
results for different cities, and even for distinct parts of the same cities. The following
sections present some reasons to explain these results.
4.4.1 Different methodologies to measure land value changes
The methodologies used in these studies have varied from hedonic prices models to more
simple matched-pair comparisons or repeat-sale ratios. As was pointed out in section 4.1,
these methods are less capable of controlling for other factors that affect land values,
different than access to rail transit. This lack of control over other factors may lead to
wrong conclusions.
One study that lack adequate control over other factors is Anas and Armstrong (1993).
The study stratified the properties in classes (one to two-families residential, walk-up
residential, apartments, etc.). The regression equations estimated property values per
square foot, but without considering any characteristic of the property other than distance
to subway stations. These estimations then are very rough, and the conclusions of the
study cannot be taken as definitive.
Unfortunately, there is no agreement among researchers on what is the best method to
estimate hedonic-price models. Moreover, the available data and its quality is not the
same for all cities, restricting the degree of complexity and accuracy of the models.
68 Riley (2001).
4.4.2 Different technologies/annoyance to local residents
As was said in section 3.6.2, some rail transit technologies produce external costs to their
surrounding areas, in the form of pollution, noise, vibration, visual intrusion, and other.
These costs affect property values around the alignments.
Even though many highways provide similar or better accessibility than rail transit, their
pollution, aesthetic impact and noise usually cause land values next to them to be lower
than in other areas of the cities. For example, in Santa Clara County, commercial land
within half a mile of freeways was found to have a lower value than similar land in other
places . Similar effects may occur with modes that are perceived as polluting, such as
buses or trains with diesel locomotives.
There are contradictory reports regarding the effect of connecting buses on land values.
Cervero (1992) concluded that the value of office space in Atlanta and Washington D.C.
rose less around terminal stations than around other stations, probably because of the
presence of connecting diesel buses. On the other hand, a study for Atlanta found that
neither elevated stations, nor the existence of more than average number of buses serving
a station had any impact on land values. These two characteristics are some of the most
annoying ones of rail stations.
The construction of rail transit stations increases the demand for parking in the
surrounding areas, and makes it more difficult for local residents to find empty spaces.
This is an additional annoying characteristic of stations, but can be reduced with parking-
permit schemes. In the case where parking lots are built around stations, there is usually
71not any positive effect on the value of land located around stations
The level of service provided by rail systems of different technologies is not the same.
Heavy rail usually provides faster service with fewer stops, and with higher adherence to
69 CerVerO and Duncan (2001).
70 Bowes and Ihlandfeldt (2000).
71 See Bowes and Ihlandfeldt (2000).
the schedules than light rail. Consequently, the effect of heavy rail on land value has
proven to be higher than the one of light rail72 .
4.4.3 Different appeal to the public
The effect of rail transit on land values depends on the average income of riders. As was
pointed out in section 3.2, the increases in land values are in part a capitalization of the
consumer's surplus of riders. If low-income people account for most of the ridership, it
will be their consumer's surplus that will be reflected on land-value. As their willingness-
to-pay to save time is usually lower than the one of high-income people, the effect on
land values may be lower than if the same number of high-income people used the
system.
The value of retail properties is affected by the flow of purchasing power per unit of time
of the location. It is not necessarily the case that the higher the incomes of people
walking in a location, the higher property values are. Different stores are specialized in
serving people of different income, so they are attracted to the zones where people of
those incomes are. Nevertheless, for a given flow of people, the higher their income, the
higher the increases in land values that are likely to occur.
The fact that MARTA had a positive impact on land values in low-income areas and a
lower effect on high-income areas may be a consequence of the system's high
attractiveness to low-income residents. The high number of low-income riders may make
other people stigmatize MARTA as an inferior form of mobility. The problem is not
exclusive to Atlanta. Many high-income communities in the United States have rejected
rail transit extensions to their area (e.g. Georgetown in Washington D.C., Beacon Hill in
Boston), most likely for the same reason. The situation is not very different in Mexico
City, where communities in the western part of the city have rejected possible extensions
of the metro.
72 Cervero (1997).
There are several benefits for metros to have passengers from different income-levels,
other than fairness considerations. One of the benefits is that people of same income
usually have similar mobility patterns, including similar origins and destinations. A
diverse mass of riders provides a more dispersed pattern of origins and destinations in
time, benefiting transit operators. For example, in most cities in the US most high-income
people move towards downtown in the morning peak, and back in the afternoon. Many
low-income people who live in downtown do the opposite. By attracting both groups,
transit gains a demand balanced in space and time.
Another reason for seeking an income-diverse clientele is economies of scale. By
providing the service to more people, rail transit reduces its cost, and clients benefit from
a better quality of service. By having more passengers, trains can run more frequently.
Higher frequencies benefit all passengers. An increase in the flow of passengers is
positive up to the point where the additional passengers generate a higher marginal
decrease in the comfort of other passengers, than the added frequency they allow.
4.4.4 Different opportunities for redevelopment around stations
In many of the cases mentioned in sections 4.2 and 4.3, the gains in accessibility could
not be transformed into redevelopment opportunities because of zoning. As was
mentioned in section 3.3, the existence of redevelopment opportunities maximizes land
values, so in those cases land values could not be maximized.
As we saw in sections 4.2 and 4.3, some of the cities with the highest increases in land
values after the opening of rail transit lines have been those where densification was
allowed or even encouraged, like Washington D.C. or downtown San Francisco.
Nevertheless, density does not allow for land values to grow per se. If demand for
locating in an area does not increase, a relaxation of zoning would not produce a change
in development patterns.
None of the studies on the effect of rail transit on property values considered the effect of
zoning in full details. If density is restricted, the fact that rail transit did not affect
property values in a given city does not mean that rail transit cannot raise property values
under more flexible zoning. In fact, there is some evidence that many of the cities that did
not have an increase in land values, did not allow for densification of the station areas.
Some cities in the San Francisco Metropolitan Area even "downzoned" (i.e. reduced the
maximum FARs) the station areas, fearing densification and congestion 73 . There may
also be cases where cities forbid shops to locate around stations. As was pointed out in
section 3.6.2, these shops provide additional benefits to local residents.
The existence of many different owners of land around stations, and the free-riding
attitude of some of them, makes redevelopment become very difficult without the direct
involvement of city governments. To trigger redevelopment, governments need to
convince residents to share the cost of redevelopment, zone them away, or coordinate
land- assembling.
There are also other barriers for redevelopment, which may have prevented land values to
grow after the opening of rail lines. In some of the cities mentioned in sections 4.2 and
4.3, many sites around stations were already built. The cost of demolition and the cost of
losing rent revenue during construction periods may be too high to justify redevelopment.
Moreover, in some cities there were historic districts that could not be altered, impeding
redevelopment.
4.4.5 Different conditions of the real estate market
Property values are very sensitive to the conditions of the economy. Because of the long
lag between the decision to construct a building and its completion, short-run variations
in demand can only be absorbed through changes in prices7.
The rate of growth of cities, and the elasticity of the provision of urban land also affects
land values. In metropolitan areas that are undergoing fast development and where there
is an inelastic provision of land, the gains in accessibility provided by rail transit can be
7 Huang (1996).
74 DiPasquale and Wheaton (1996), page 242.
converted in redevelopment opportunities. In the cases where cities are growing at a
slower pace, or where the provision of urban land is elastic, the increase in accessibility
does not justify redevelopment, and therefore the existing pattern of development is
maintained. These conditions minimize the increases of land values around stations. As
we saw in the case studies, Washington D.C.'s metro has had a positive impact on land
values. The city has been undergoing rapid population and economic growth in the last
decades. The results in San Francisco are mixed. Even though the city has grown fast in
the last decades, the availability of land has allowed for sprawling to occur, and has made
redevelopment less attractive.
Most of the studies on the effect of rail transit on property values have failed to consider
that it can take time for land value increases to materialize. Property owners constrain
demand when prices are low, by waiting for better conditions before selling their
properties. They only offer more land when prices are high, attenuating in part the cycles
of short-term oscillations of sale prices. Therefore, if an area gained more accessibility,
instead of its price rising, the number of properties offered for sale could increase, and
therefore on the short-term property values would not rise up to their long-term level. For
example, some studies suggest that in San Francisco the effect of BART on land values
has taken some time to materialize75.
There is evidence that the property market suffers from adaptive or backward-looking
expectations. Developers and property owners expect prices to continue their current
trends76 . This characteristic causes property values to be unstable and cyclical 77, making
it difficult to determine the impact of rail transit on land values in a short period after the
opening of a new rail line.
75 Cervero and Landis (1997). There are also counterexamples such as the area around the Orange Line in
Chicago, whose land values rose in anticipation of the construction of the subway (McDonald and Osuji,
1995).
76 See Case and Shiller (1988).
77 DiPasquale and Wheaton (1996), Chapter 10.
4.4.6 Provision of pedestrian facilities
In many of the cases where land values increased as a consequence of the construction of
rail transit, there has been a special care for providing pedestrian infrastructure to
facilitate the access to stations. The improvement of pedestrian facilities and of the built
environment, is probably one of the main reasons explaining the success of many rail
transit systems around the world 8 .
The relation between the distance people are willing to walk to access to a station, and
the number of potential riders is usually not linear, but rather geometrical. The maximum
distance people are willing to walk to the station can be understood as the radius of the
circle of influence of each station, if we assume that people can walk in straight lines
from their origins to the station. Under this assumption, a 41% increase in the maximum
walking distance would produce a 100% increase in the number of passengers, assuming
homogenous densities.
Some weather conditions can make walking uncomfortable, regardless of the
characteristics of the sidewalks. The hot weather may be one of the reasons to explain the
low ridership in Miami's rail system, at least during days with high temperatures.
4.4.7 Accessibility that transit provides
Transit systems that provide high accessibility have higher impact on land values than
other systems. Households' location and people's trip decisions are influenced by
accessibility. The low effect of small rail transit systems on land values may be a
consequence of the reduced accessibility they provide. On the other hand, other systems
that provide access to more destinations, have had positive effects on land uses and land
values.
Ridership is a good proxy of the accessibility that a system provides. In fact, we can see
that the systems with the highest modal shares are the ones that have had the highest
78 One example is Strasbourg light rail, which has had a positive impact on development, due in part to the
improvement of pedestrian facilities around stations.
effect on land values in the US, such as the subways of New York, Chicago and
Washington DC.
For office space and housing, the value of accessibility is not specific to a station within a
rail transit network79 . We should then expect land values for these uses to have similar
prices all around the alignment, all else being equal8 0. Of course other characteristics of
the station make land values to vary. For retail space, especially for large-scale retail, the
relative location in the network is more important. Stations located in the margin of the
network have lower accessibility than the ones located in the center and especially in
intersections. The reason may be that people avoid connections when they go shopping,
but no so much when they go working.
The relative scarcity of highly accessible land is a necessary condition for transit having
an impact on land values. Only in areas with relatively high congestion levels will transit
be competitive with other modes, and therefore provide an advantage to the firms and
families located next to stations.
Systems that provide regional service tend to have a higher impact on land values than
those with only local service. For example in Santa Clara, the impact on commercial land
values of commuter train stations serving business districts was higher than the effect of
81light rail serving those areas . This difference may stem from the fact that this commuter
rail allows employees to easily access their offices without having to pay the high cost of
living in Silicon Valley.
Rail transit has network externalities as the construction of additional lines causes an
increase in ridership in the existing lines. Nevertheless, as most cities first build rail
transit in the corridors with the highest demand, these benefits are decreasing for every
79 People may not care about the relative location of their job, as long as it is close to any station of a rail
transit system. This is compatible with our discussion in section 3.6.1 on people willing to accept longer
trips to their jobs than to shops.
80 Cervero (1992) concluded that office space values in Atlanta and Washington D.C. grew in direct
proportion of the overall ridership of the system, and not in proportion to the traffic at the particular
stations.
81 Cervero and Duncan (2001).
successive new extension. By providing bus-connecting services, transit agencies can
capture part of these network externalities. In most modern subways, the strong resistance
of people to make connections makes network externality limited to potential trips
involving one or fewer connections.
4.4.8 Local externalities
The sole construction of a rail line does not make an area a desirable place to live. In
many cases, the presence of heavy industries, annoying transportation infrastructure, or in
some cases the presence of a high proportion of people of a certain ethnical o racial
group, may scare development away. These are all local externalities, which affect land
values.
There is strong evidence that heavy industries and highways preclude housing
development. Many cities have built rail lines along industrial corridors or highways
medians, taking advantage of the lower cost of land. Ridership in these lines has almost
always been very low. For example San Francisco's BART has some sections built in
highway medians, and St. Louis' metro has some sections along old railways going
through industrial areas. In both cases, ridership is lower than in other lines of the same
systems, and there have been low changes on land uses along the alignments.
4.4.9 Effects of Rail transit on crimes
Several papers have assessed the effect of rail transit on crime. The results have not been
conclusive. In theory, rail transit facilitates the access of people from one community to
the other, some of whom may be criminals. The perceived increase in crimes may reduce
property values around stations.
A study for Atlanta found that, controlling for variables such as density of low-income
people, vacant housing, retail and manufacturing employment, and distance to the CBD,
the areas around stations had higher crime rates than other areas in the city. Crime rates
82
were even higher in stations with parking lots
82 Bowes and Ihlandfeldt (2000).
4.4.10 Unbalance between transit value proposition and land values
For land values to increase and for land uses to become more intensive, there needs to be
a balance between property values and the value proposition of rail transit.
Mexico City may be a case of a city that does not have this balance. The city's subway is
very crowded, and there is a perception of insecurity among potential users. The fare is
currently only around 20. As it is now, the metro's value proposition is only attractive to
low-income people. Nevertheless, the subway only serves the Federal District, which is
the central part of the metropolitan area, where land values are the highest. Therefore,
most people willing to use the subway cannot afford living in the zones around stations.
This mismatch may reduce the impact of the metro on land values and land uses around
stations (more discussion about Mexico City in Chapter 5).
The opposite situation happens when the fares of rail transit are too expensive for the
people that live next to the stations. This may be the case in some parts of San Juan,
where Tren Urbano, a rail transit system that is planned to be inaugurated in 2004, will
charge $1.50 for a one-way rides3 . Meanwhile, buses running in the same corridor will
continue to charge 25 cents. The perspective of Tren Urbano is gloomy, considering that
the system is hoping to bring 60% of its riders from current bus users. A smaller
difference between fares of the two modes may attract more people to Tren Urbano,
inducing more changes on land uses. An upgrading of the service provided by buses (e.g.
free transfer to the metro, low-cost monthly passes) may reduce the opposition to an
increase in bus fares.
83 ATI (2003).
5 Mexico City and the Metro
This Chapter includes a review of the history of urban development of the Mexico City
Metropolitan Area (MCMA) in the 20th century. It also describes the evolution of public
transportation in the metropolitan area. Then, an analysis of the evolution of ridership in
the metro is presented. Section 5.3 includes a revision of the existing literature about the
effects of the metro on urban development, and a quantitative analysis of the effects of
the construction of three lines in the 1990's on population, average income per capita,
and employment in the areas around stations.
5.1 Urban development in Mexico City
During the 20th century, the MCMA grew considerably. Up to the 1920's, all the
population lived in the 12 central divisiones of the city. Only in the 1930's the city
expanded to the adjacent areas, initially Coyoacdn and Azcapotzalco. From the 1930's to
the 1950's, the ring of delegaciones located around the central area grew at a faster pace
than the city center. The latter concentrated 98% of the population of the urban area in
1930, but only 78% in 195084. Trams, and lately buses, facilitated the growth of this inner
periphery85.
As in most Latin American countries, the Mexican government implemented an
industrialization plan after World War II. This plan generated a massive immigration
from the countryside to the largest cities.
It was not until the 1950's that Mexico City surpassed the limits of the DF. At the
beginning the crossing to the State of Mexico was in the northern part of the city8 6. This
growth was made possible in part by the construction of the Pen'firico, the first beltway
built in Mexico City, the investment in water drainage, and the provision of drinking
84 Garza and Damiin (1991).
85 Garza and Damiin (1991), page 38.
86 Navarro and Gonzalez (1989).
water. The State of Mexico attracted both new factories, and old factories being relocated
87from the city center
In the 1960's, there was a fast growth of squatter settlements in the State of Mexico. The
process was spurred by immigration, by a strict ban on new land development in the
DF8 8 , and a permissive attitude of the State of Mexico with respect to illegal fractioning
of land89 . By 1970, the portion of the metropolitan areas that was located in the State of
Mexico accounted for 21% of the population"".
By 1980, the growth of the metropolitan area had produced its joining with the cities of
Toluca (Southwest) and Cuernavaca (South)91. The growth of Mexico City has created a
megalopolis, which thereafter has also incorporated Puebla (Southeast).
The following graph shows the number of residents in the Mexico City Metropolitan
Area:
Figure 7: Residents in the Mexico City Metropolitan Area
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87 Garza and Damiin (1991).
88 Schteingart (2001), page 226.
89 Duhau (1991), page 147.
9 Garza and Damiin (1991).
91 Garza and Damidn (1991), page 27.
The highest growth rate occurred in the 1950's, when the metropolitan area's population
grew 5.6% per year on average.
Mexico City, as most other metropolitan areas in Latin America, has a segregated pattern
of housing development. Between 1900 and 1910, the first signs of socio-economic
segregation appeared in the city, with the development of a series of high-income
communities in the southwest of the city, including Juarez, Cuauhtimoc, Roma and
Condesa. These communities were built by private developers, and included a better
quality of urban services then the rest of the city92 . The Mexican revolution did not
reverse this trend.
In the 1950's, the fast immigration of people did not produce an increase in density, in
part because of the policy of DF's Mayor Uruchutu, whose government was very strict
with the eviction of illegal settlements and the banning of new industries in the DF93
In 1985 an earthquake produced serious damage in the central area of Mexico City. Many
buildings in this area had to be torn down. Many of the former dwellers of these buildings
moved to the State of Mexico, causing a decline of the population of the city center.
Between 1970 and 1990 there was a fast change of land uses in the city. The four central
delegaciones suffered a lost of almost one million people, but an increase of almost 2,000
hectares of commercial space, a third of the growth of commercial space in the DF in that
period. The delegaciones Itzapalapa and Gustavo Madero not only had enormous
increases of land dedicated to commercial activities, almost 1,700 and 800 hectares
94
respectively, but also gained population
The big increase in the amount of space dedicated to commerce in the city center, in spite
of the loss of population, can have several interpretations. For some reasons, the city
92 Ibaffa (1991).
9 Gilat (2002).
94 Delgado (2001), page 91.
centers specialized in the provision of commercial services, oriented not necessary to its
own population but to the entire metropolitan area. Apparently, the increase in the
attractiveness of the city center for retail, may have driven property values up, and may
have forced the displacement of the inhabitants of this zone. A study proved that most of
the population loss was indeed caused by the closure of renting units, and their
transformation to other uses, mainly commercial and service activities 95. It is remarkable
that the loss of 1 million people happened at the same time that the metropolitan area
gained almost 6.5 million people.
In the 1970's and 1980's, there was a rapid growth in population density in the periphery
of the city. The following graph shows this change.
Table 3: Variation in urbanized area and population, 1970-1987
Area of the City Increase in Urbanized Increase in Population
Area (hectares)
Inner City 800 -1,000,000
Intermediate Area 11,800 1,400,000
Second Ring 9,400 2,900,000
Third Ring 24,200 2,200,000
Taken from Delgado (1991)
The areas in Table 3 include the following delegaciones and municipalities:
e Inner City: Cuauhtimoc, Venustiano Carranza, Miguel Hidalgo, Benito Juarez
e Intermediate Area: Gustavo Madero, Coyoacdn, Iztapalapa, Azcapotzalco, Alvaro
Obreg6n, Iztacalco
e Second Ring: Naucalpdn, Tlalnepantla, Ecatepec, Netzahualc6yotl, Magdalena
Contraras, Tlalpan, Xochimilco
* Third Ring: All other
The density of these four zones is represented in the following graph:
95 Coulomb (1984).
Figure 8: Density for concentric rings in Mexico City
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As can be seen in the graph, there was a fast flattening of urban densities between 1970
and 1990. This flattering was caused by a dramatic decrease of the population of the inner
city, a slight decrease of population in the intermediate area, and an increase of
population in the outer rings. As we will see in the following sections, the decrease in the
population of the central area was caused in part by 1985's earthquake, and by a change
of land uses from residential to commercial and service, fostered in part by the increase
accessibility of the central area that the metro produced. In the same period, total
densities for the metropolitan area decreased from around 148 persons per hectare to
12006.
The federal government, through its housing assistance programs, has had an important
impact on the development of the city. The government's programs have consisted only
on subsidies for the construction of new housing units97. As the buying of new houses is
subsidized, and the purchasing old houses is not, sprawl has been encouraged. In the
1980's, the economic crisis mad e e agency in charge of subsidizing housing suffer
9 6 Delgado (1991).
97 Schteingart (1991), page 233.
severe budget constraints. Rather than reducing the number of housing units being
subsidized, the agency reduced the amount of subsidy per person, reducing the average
lot size 9. This decrease in lot sizes may have been another cause of the increase in
density in the periphery between 1970 and 1990.
Delegaciones and Municipalities have many attributes, including zoning and collecting
property taxes. The federal entities (Federal District and State of Mexico in this case)
99have veto power over zoning decisions
In the second part of the 2 0 th century, high-income communities continued to grow in the
west and southwest section of the cities, whereas the East has continued to house some of
the largest low-income communities. An increasing proportion of new developments for
high-income people are in the form of gated communities, and very few high-income
communities remain well integrated to the rest of the city, Polanco being one of the few
example 00.
Segregation in Mexico City is not at the delegacidn-municipality level as it is the case in
Santiago' 01. The coefficient of variation of average income for the delegaciones-
municipalities (i.e. the standard deviation of average income per capita in the different
entities divided by the mean of their average income) is only 0.40, compared to 0.77 for
the municipalities in the Santiago Metropolitan Area. At the district level, this coefficient
102is 0.52 for the MCMAio2
The following figure shows the concentration of commercial and service jobs in the 135
districts of the Mexico City Metropolitan Area.
98 Schteingart (1991), page 240.
99 Gilat (2002) page 106.
1o Hiernaux (1999).
101 In the Mexico City Metropolitan Area there are 16 delegaciones and 27 municipalities, totaling 43
entities. In Santiago there is a similar number of municipalities, 34, so comparisons at this level are
meaningful.
102 Data for Mexico from Census 2000. There are 135 districts in the MCMA.
Figure 9: Density of commercial and service jobs in districts of the MCMA
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The nine districts with densities above 15,000 jobs in the commercial and service sectors
per square kilometer, are in the delegaciones Cuauhtimoc, Miguel Hidalgo and Benito
Juarez. They represent 1.2% of the area of the MCMA, but they concentrate 45.1% of all
commercial and service jobs. Three geographic clusters can be identified: Zdcalo and
Morelos districts in downtown, Del Valle and Ciudad de los Deportes districts along
Insurgentes Avenue in Benito Juarez, and the districts Zona Rosa, Condesa, Chapultepec
and Anahuac in the limit of the three above-mentioned delegaciones. After 1998, a new
concentration of office space has emerged in the Santa Fe area.
As other metropolitan areas in the developing countries, Mexico City does not have a
well-structured market for rents of affordable houses. 65% of the housing stock is not
103legal, so it cannot be formally traded
In 1942, the DF passed a law freezing rents in the city center. This policy caused an
accelerated deterioration of the housing stock of this area, since owners had no incentive
to invest in adequate maintenance. The downtown area suffered a steady decline since the
1950's to the 1990's. In recent years, there have been some signs of recovery. The current
103 Navarro and Gonzalez (1989), page 116.
DF government administration has been expropriating some old and deteriorated units,
and relocating their dwellers to enhance the built environment of the historic center of the
city 0 4 . A private company, called Centro Hist6rico, has been purchasing old buildings to
restore and resell them. The initial results of this firm have been positive, and it is
expecting to have profits by 2006105.
A study for the DF showed that there is a general pattern in which high-income people
locate close to the city-center. This rule has very few exceptions' 6. By the mid-1990's,
land values around the city center were almost three times as expensive as land in the
periphery of the DF1 7.
5.2 Public transportation and the metro
5.2.1 History of public transportation
By the 1930's, buses and trams where the only providers of transit service in Mexico
City. Trams were owned and operated by a foreign company, whereas buses' property
was dispersed among many different owners associated in the Alianza de Camioneros.
The flexibility of buses made them gain modal share in detriment of trams in the 1940's,
and buses became the mode with the highest share after World War II. In 1946, the
national government nationalized the trams and formed the Servicios Elictricos del DF
(STE) 08 .
In the 1950's three trends can be distinguished with respect to public transportation. First,
there was an impressive increase in demand, in part because of the growth of the city (see
section 5.1). Buses captured most of this demand. A second trend is STE's substitution of
trams for trolleys, and an absolute reduction in the demand for electric engine modes. The
104 Personal communication with Maria Teresa Atriin from SEDUVI, 1/27/2004.
105 Rendird Centro Histdrico Utilidades. Retrieved from El Universal newspaper, 2/18/2004,
www.eluniversal.com.mx.
106 Greizbord et al (1999).
107 CdM (1996).
108 Navarro and Gonzilez (1989).
third process is a rapid increase in the number of cars, and the growth of congestion in the
streets1 09. Whereas in 1950 there were 72,000 cars in the metropolitan area, by 1964 there
10
were 320,000, more than 10% growth per year" .
Up to the 1960's buses did not operate as an integrated system, but rather organized in
individual lines, most of them linking the periphery of the city with the center. This form
of operation caused tremendous congestion in the city center.
In the late 1950's, Ingenieros Contratistas Asociados (ICA), the company that then built
the metro, made a report on the future of public transportation in Mexico City. The report
recommended the construction of an underground train. The report included detailed
financial and geo-technique viability studies, but lacked a detailed forecast of the number
of potential passenger that the system would capture. By the time the report was written
no origin-destination survey had been made, and the government did not even have a
detailed study about the existing bus lines"'.
The initial project considered three metro lines, which would form a ring around the city
center, and all connect to each other. Buses, trams and trolleys were going to be banned
from the corridors served by the metro. Though integration with other modes was
mentioned as a long-term objective, the original plan did not consider any form of fare or
operational integration. Suburban and intercity buses were going to be banned from the
city center, so connecting centers would need to be built around terminal stations.
The metro has explicitly been planned, designed and managed to serve low-income
people 1 2 . Fares have always been very low. For 17 years fares were not modified, in
spite of the high inflation. By the early 1980's the fare was symbolic (see figure on page
109 Navarro and Gonzilez (1989).
110 Garza and Damiin (1991).
"1 Navarro and Gonzi1ez (1989).1 2 Navarro and Gonzi1ez (1989), page 94.
146). In recent years, fares have increased, but still Mexico City's subway has one of the
lowest fares in the world'13
The alignments of the lines have also been designed to serve low-income communities.
The first three lines were built along the corridors that workers used to go to downtown,
effectively by-passing most mid- and high-income communities.
Up to these days the metro still attracts low-income people almost exclusively. According
to Navarro (1993), during the 1980's 92% of Mexico City's metro users earned less than
3 minimum wages. Another survey made in the 1980's to determine the economical
activity of the passengers, showed that 32% of them were employees with no supervision
responsibility, 31% had blue-collar employments, and 21% were self-employed. The
average wage among them was close to the minimum wage. There was a negative
correlation between modal share and people's income 4. The orientation of the metro
towards low-income people may have caused a stigmatization of the system as a low-
quality mode.
It was not until 1968, under the Diaz Ordaz administration (1964-1970), that the
construction of the subway began. The first line was going to be inaugurated for 1968's
Olympic games. The construction suffered some delays and the first section could only
be inaugurated in September 1969. In the following 15 months, Line 2, almost the entire
Line 1, and the first 5 kilometers of Line 3 were inaugurated 5 . A public company that
would operate the metro was formed: Sistema de Transporte Colectivo (STC).
113 The current fare is only 2 pesos, approximately 20 cents of a dollar.
114 Navarro (1993), page 177.
115 Retrieved from www.urbanrail.net.
Initially, the subway had positive effects on the rest of the transit system. In spite of the
lack of explicit integration, bus operator adapted their routes to feed terminal stations, so
fewer of them entered the city center 116. Ridership in the subway grew very fast (see
Figure 11).
In spite of the high ridership of the first three lines, the Echeverria administration (1970-
1976) did not promote further extensions of the Metro. The only expansion of the system
in this period was the completion of the last segment of Line 1117. Some of the reasons for
postponing further expansions of the metro were the political pressure of the Alianza de
Camioneros1 8 , the high cost that the first three lines had, and the fact that there were no
obvious corridors to serve after the construction of the first three lines.
The Lopez Portillo administration (1976-1982) developed a new and ambitious urban
plan for the DF "9 . New avenues called Ejes Viales would be built to reduce congestion in
the city. The plan envisioned that these avenues would attract retail, office space, and
high-density housing development, and therefore would serve to decentralize activities in
the city. Additionally, the Circuito Interior an inner beltway linking the employment and
administrative sub-centers of Tepeyac, Pantitldn, Santa Ana, Villa Coapa, Tizapdn,
Tacubaya, Tacuba, and Azcapotzalco, would be built. Close to this beltway, new metro
lines would be built120 . This plan opened the second phase of development of the metro.
In this new phase of development of the metro, the government intended to use rail transit
to induce demand rather than to respond to existing demand, as it was the case with the
first three lines. In a risky bet, the government decided that the new lines would not cross
the city center. Lines 4, 5, 6 and 7 were built during this phase, which encompasses the
L6pez Portillo and De la Madrid administrations (1972-1982 and 1982-1988,
116 Navarro and Gonzalez (1989).
117 This segment was Tacubaya - Observatorio (Retrieved from www.urbanrail.net).
118 Navarro and Gonzilez (1989), page 90.
119 The plan was a response to the increase in the price of oil, Mexico's main export, and to the finding of
immense new reserves in the Gulf of Mexico.
120 Navarro and Gonzilez (1989).
respectively). After 1985's earthquake, the urban development plan of the DF was
revised, and 65% of the Ejes Viales planned in 1982 were discarded
In the second phase of development of its network, the metro preserved its basic
objective: to serve low-income people. One of the goals of the new lines was to facilitate
the commute of workers to the industrial district of the northern part of the Metropolitan
122area, as a response of the lobbying of the industrial associations of that part of the city
By 1981, the private bus operators were in a terminal financial crisis. The DF overtook
the operation and created a public company, Ruta-100, to operate all buses in the DF.
By the mid 1980's the government of the DF had total control over the operation of the
main transit services. It owned the STE, the metro, and Ruta-100. For the first time an
integrated transit system was in operation. In 1983 trolley lines were restructured to
complement rather than to compete against the metro. Ruta-100 started to provide trunk
service along the newly built Ejes Viales using articulated-buses, and feeder service from
the main metro terminals123 . In 1986, a transit pass for STC, STE and Ruta-100 services
was created. In the same year, a presidential decree banned the entrance of any bus from
the State of Mexico beyond the metro terminals , and STE closed the last tramline in
125
operation'
By the late 1980's, it was evident that lines 4, 5, 6 and 7 had failed to capture the
expected demand. On the other hand, the continuing growth in ridership in the first three
lines, was causing crowding conditions. The government adopted a new strategy for the
metro: new lines would be built to relieve demand on the first three lines. This strategy
inspired the construction of lines 8 and 9. Additionally, two lines would be built in the
eastern part of the city, surpassing the limits of the DF. These two lines were lines A and
B.
m Orrego et al (2000).
122 Navarro and Gonzlez (1989), page 97.1 Navarro and Gonzdlez (1989), page 42.
1 Navarro and Gonzilez (1989), page 99.
125 Garza and Damidn (1991), page 38.
From the mid-1980's there has been a steady increase in the modal share of colectivos.
Originally colectivos were shared taxis, and starting in 1982 they became gasoline-fueled
minibuses126 . Colectivos adapted very easily to the pattern of development that has
prevailed in Mexico City in the last twenty years: squatter settlements in the periphery,
primarily in the State of Mexico. These settlement lacked paved roads, so buses could not
enter to them easily. Colectivos connected these settlements primarily with terminal
stations, such as Indios Verdes and Cuatro Caminos. Starting in 1984, special
infrastructure for colectivos has been built in every new station. Taking advantage of their
semi-legal status, colectivos violated the restrictions to enter the DF from the State of
Mexico. Their fast growth determined the collapse of the public bus operator Ruta-100 in
1997, and the end of the integrated transit pass.
In 1996, a new development plan for the subway was made. The plan called for the
following extensions (terminal stations are within parenthesis)m
" Line 4 to the North (Santa Clara)
" Line 5 to the North (Tlalnepantla)
* Line 6 to the East (Villa Aragon)
* Line 7 to the South (San Jerdnimo)
" Line 8 to the North (Indios Verdes), and to the South (Acoxpa)
" Line 8 to the West (Hipddromo)
* A new line, Line 10, along Perifirico from Cuicuilco to Eulalia Guzmdn
* A new line, Line 11 from Bellas Artes to Santa Monica in the Northwest of the
metropolitan area
* A new line, Line 12, along the Eje 8 Sur, from Santa Lucia to Constitucidn de
1917
* 8 light rail lines in different parts of the metropolitan area
* New commuter lines, including one to the Northwest of the MCMA
126 Navaffo and Gonzilez (1989), page 46.
127 SETRAVI (1996).
In spite of the existence if these plans, no extension is being built by the first semester of
2004. The government of the DF has recently announced the construction of a BRT line
along Insurgentes, the same corridor that was going to be used for Line 10.
The following is a map of the current network. The tren ligero (light rail), which is
owned and operated by the STE, is included. Some of the projected extensions and new
lines are also included in the map.
Figure 10: Map of Mexico City's Metro
Source: http://web.media.mit.edu/-mmonroy/metro/metro/mapa.html
5.2.2 Metro and its ridership
In Mexico City passengers are charged a flat fare, regardless of the station where they
board or their destination. The following table presents the annual number of passengers
using the system per line. Passengers are imputed to the station where they board the
system.
Figure 11: Number of passengers in the different lines in Mexico City 1969-2003
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As we see in the previous figure, lines 1, 2 and 3 carry most of the passengers, accounting
for 59% of boardings in 2003.
Ridership in the first ten years of operation was very high under any standard. In 1980,
the metro transported more than 900 million passengers with only 50 km of lines.
Subsequent lines were not as successful as the first three lines though. Not only they
failed to attract as many riders as the first three lines, but also they did not produce
network effects in the first three lines, i.e. they did not induce more ridership in them.
Starting around 1986, there has been a steady decrease in the number of passengers in the
first three lines, and since 1989, there is an overall decrease in the number of passengers
in the entire system (see figure on page 146). The decrease was momentarily reversed in
1995, and in the 1999-2000 period.
5.3 Effects of the metro on the city
5.3.1 Commented review of existing literature
There is evidence to conclude that the metro has fueled the expansion of the metropolitan
area in Mexico City. The metropolitan area has a very even pattern of development, with
densities not varying a lot in the periphery from what they are in the city center. By the
1960's the rapid growth of the metropolitan area produced an increase in congestion that
hampered the continuation of the expansion of the city. As we see in the following table,
by 1970, average density in the metropolitan area was higher than in 1960.
Table 4: Population and density in the MCMA
Year According to DGP (1982) According to Lezama et al (2002)
Population Density Population Density
(inhabitants / (inhabitants /
hectare) hectare)
1900 541,000 200 540,000
1910 721,000 180 730,000
1921 906,000 195 900,000
1930 1,230,000 143 1,220,000
1940 1,760,000 150 1,780,000 150
1953 3,480,000 144 2,980,000 (1950)
1960 5,186,000 144 5,160,000 105
1970 8,797,000 156 8,650,000 127
1980 14,500,000 145 13,730,000
1990 15,050,000
2000 17,900,000 122
Source: As indicated
None of the studies referred to in the table has a detailed description on how they
estimated densities. UITP (2001) reported a density of 107 persons per hectare for
Mexico City in 1995, considering city parks, transportation infrastructure, hospitals,
utilities, urban wasteland and educational infrastructure as parts of the urban area. It is
then highly likely that the two studies shown on
Table 4 did not include some of these land uses into their estimation of population
density.
In the 1970's, after the opening of the first three lines of the metro, the expansion of the
metropolitan area continued at a fast pace, reversing the increase in density of the 1960's.
As we see in the previous table, in spite of an immense increase in population, densities
in 1980 were lower than in 1970. The construction of the metro may be of the main
reasons to explain this fast decentralization of the metropolitan area. Another reason may
be the extensive construction of roads after the Lopez Portillo. In the 1980's, the
sprawling effect of the metro and roads apparently declined, and there was an increase in
density and in the number of floors per buildings in the municipalities of the State of
128Mexico that were part of the MCMA
Most of the large redevelopment projects of the last few years have been made by private
investors. Most of these projects have focused on the mid- and high-income markets, and
have been located on the western and southern part of the city. The residents and
employees of the new developments have very different income from Metro's
passengers, and in fact the metro does not extend to these rapidly growing areas.
Rather than concentrating development, the metro seems to have encouraged sprawling,
by reducing travel times. Much of the growth in the periphery has been of low-income
housing in the State of Mexico. Many of the residents in this area use buses to access the
terminal stations of the metro, and connect from there to the CBD. Many residents from
surrounding cities (Toluca, Pachuca, Tlaxcala, Puebla and Cuernavaca) also connect to
the metro in terminal stations.
Most likely, the development of the metro made the city center more accessible, and
attracted commercial activities. As we said in section 5.1, after the opening of the metro,
retail in the city center increased its orientation to the entire metropolitan area, rather than
to the reducing number of local residents. Almost certainly, the large volume of traffic
128 Schteingart (1991).
the metro was able to transport, provided the ideal conditions for commerce to exploit
agglomeration economies (see section 3.6.1). The attractiveness of the city center for
commercial firms may have driven prices up, spurring the migration of residents to the
periphery of the metropolitan area. This was a push factor; people were pushed-away of
the city center by high land values. One symptom of this push is the loss of 350 thousand
129people in 30 years in delegacion Cuauhtimoc
In addition to the push generated by increasing land values that may have been generated
by the construction of the metro, there was an additional push factor: the destruction
caused by 1985's earthquake. The earthquake reduced the housing stock in the city
center, and therefore fostered redevelopment, switching to more profitable uses of land.
The earthquake may have facilitated the conversion from housing to commercial uses that
was mentioned in section 5.1.
Along with making the city center more attractive for commercial uses, the existence of
the metro may have raised the attractiveness of land in the periphery for housing uses.
This raise in the attractiveness of the periphery would be a consequence of the reduction
in the cost and time of commute to the city center, where most jobs and services are
located, as described in section 5.1130. This is a pull-factor, i.e. people are pulled-in to the
periphery by the reduction in transportation costs to the city center.
There is evidence to discard the idea that the flattering of the demand curve in the
MCMA (see Figure 8), has been caused by massive employment decentralization. Data
131
shows that in the MCMA jobs have not dispersed more than people in recent years'
129 Orrego et al (2000).
130 As we saw in section 3.5, in mono-centric cities the construction of radial transportation infrastructure,
such as lines 1, 2 and 3 in Mexico City, decreases the attractiveness of living in the city center, and reduces
housing property in this zone.
131 Gakenheimer et al (2002) page 219.
The Ejes Viales have failed to attract the development forecasted in the plan made by the
Lopez Portillo administration. This failure may be a consequence of the non-completion
of the corridors and the rail lines as they were planned.
The extension of the subway network to the sub centers of Tepeyac, Pantitldn, Tizapdn,
Tacubaya, Tacuba and Azcapotzalco has changed land uses in these zones. There has
been an increase in the number of stores in these areas, which has driven rents up, and
has produced the displacement of the low-income housing that was located around
stations132
In most cases, the opening of new stations has attracted large numbers of street vendors.
Apparently, the clientele of these vendors are metro riders. Although no formal study has
been done to support this claim, many people think that the presence of street vendors
also attracts crime. There is a common believe that the presence of street vendors produce
a decline on property values133.
There have very few studies about the effect of Mexico City's subway on land values.
Most studies in this area have been qualitative, and according to them, this effect has
been negative because the metro has scared mid- and high-income housing development.
Navarro and Gonzilez (1990) state that for low-income housing, the effect has been
positive. This report bases this statement on the fact that whereas the advertisement of
low-income housing stresses the proximity to subway stations, the opposite happens for
mid- and high-income housing.
Using a hedonic price model, Ochoa (no date) assessed the value of proximity to subway
stations in the Colonia del Valle Sur in the DF. This area comprises the land located
around stations Etiopia, Eugenia, Division del Norte, Zapata and Coyoacdn along Line 3
of the metro. The study used the following Cobb-Douglas specification of property
values:
132 Navarro and Gonzilez (1989).
133 This idea was expressed by all the Mexicans interviewed for this report (see list of people that were
interviewed Appendix 1).
P = f 0 * FARj',1 *Agei *Di65  Equation 4
Where:
Pi = is the price of property i per square meter of construction
FARi = is the floor-area ration of property i (see section 3.3 for a description)
Agei = is the time number of years since property i was built
Di = is the distance from the closest metro station to property i
The model did not include income information, because it assumed that the area is
homogenous with respect to this variable (it is a high-mid income area). Eighty-nine
properties were included in the analysis.
The result showed that the premium paid by proximity to the metro is positive, but very
low. Of the eighty-nine properties, the maximum premium paid was 0.16% of the total
value. This low value may reflect the little attraction that the metro has on high mid-
income people, where motorization rate is very high.
5.3.2 An analysis of the effects of the metro lines 8, A and B on land uses
This section describes an analysis I made on the effect of three metro lines on land uses
in the MCMA. These three lines are lines A, 8 and B, the last three lines to be opened.
Line A was opened in 1991 and extends for 17 km. It begins in Pantitldn, in the East of
the DF, passing through Iztapalapa near its border with Nezahualcdyotl, and ends in the
municipality of La Paz. This was the first line to cross the DF-State of Mexico border,
and the only metro line that uses steel wheels.
Line 8 opened in 1994. This line extends from the downtown area to the center of
Iztapalapa. It has achieved the fourth largest ridership among lines of the system, after
lines 1, 2 and 3. In its downtown segment, it runs parallel to lines 2 and 3 (North-South
direction), providing some relieve to these lines. Its total extension is 20 km.
Line B is the last line that has been built. Its first segment was opened in December 1999,
and in 2001 it was completed. It has 23.7 km, and it is the longest line of the system. As
line A, this line crosses the border between the DF and the State of Mexico. Its
northeastern terminal is in the Ecatepec municipality, and its southwestern terminal is
next to a closed railroad station, Buenavista, in the edge of downtown.
Using data from the housing and population Censuses of 1990 and 2000, and the
Economic Censuses of 1994 and 1998, I tested the hypothesis that the construction of the
three lines generated changes on land uses in the area around stations. To test if the
hypothesis is valid for housing uses, I compared the change in population, and income
per capita of three types of zones:
e Those not located close to any metro station (called X-type zones)
" Those located next to the lines built between 1990 and 2000 (called Y-type zones)
" Those located close to the previously-built lines (called Z-type zones)
To test if the hypothesis holds for commercial, service and manufacturing land uses, I
compared the changes in the number of jobs in the same three types of zones described
before. In this case, the data was taken from the Economic Census of 1994 and 1998. As
Line A was opened long before 1994, I did not include it in this comparison.
I made some assumptions and simplifications. All zones to be compared were to be
located in the same municipalities where the three lines were built. The comparison was
made for zones that had similar incomes per capita and densities in 1990, as well as
similar distances to the city center.
The analysis only considered zones in the DF. The reasons I had was that the real estate
market in the State of Mexico is less formal that in the DF (see discussion in section 5.1),
that the overall change of land uses in the outermost part of the metropolitan area is much
faster and may be affected by the urbanization of new land, therefore affecting the results,
and that the dimension of the blocks in the State of Mexico may not follow the usual
dimensions of the rest of the city (this is important because I used the number of blocks
per AGEB to estimate densities). In the DF in contrast, the amount of urban land may
have changed less in this period, reducing the risk of obtaining large changes in
population as consequence of these changes.
The censuses of 1990, 1994, 1998 and 2000 used similar zones. Each municipality or
delegacion was partitioned into small zones, called Areas Geogrdficas Bdsicas (AGEBs).
AGEBs in the DF had an average of 27.6 blocks, with a standard deviation of 20.0. Some
AGEBS were split in the subsequent censuses. All the comparisons were made using
1990's AGEBs. Data for AGEBs that were split was consolidated to make the
comparisons meaningful.
In the MCMA, groups of AGEBs form districts. Districts are always within a single
municipality, except for some cases in the State of Mexico. AGEBs are in all cases part
of only one municipality. At the time this thesis was being completed, I did not have
digitalized data of the location of each AGEB, but I did have the information that was
gathered for them in the four census that were mentioned before.
It was not possible to obtain an automatically generated list of the AGEBs located close
to metro stations. I had access to a map of the AGEBs, from which I made a list of the
ones with borders located up to two blocks from each station of the five delegaciones and
three municipalities in which the stations on lines 8, A and B are located. These
delegaciones are Cuauhtemoc, Iztacalco, Iztapalapa, Venustiano Carranza and Gustavo
Madero. The municipalities are Ecatepec, Nezahualc6yotl and La Paz.
The choice of two blocks was somehow arbitrary, but reasonable. In Latin America
blocks used to have a square shape and have a standard longitude called "cuadra", which
varied from 100 to 150 meters. This pattern has remained in use in most part of the cities
of Latin America' 34 . Two blocks are then equivalent to around 200 to 300 meters. As on
average AGEBS have 20 blocks, if we assume they are square shaped, the distance from
the station to the geographic center would be between 970 and 620 meters, which is
134 L6pez and Ibarra, 1997
similar to the maximum distance from metro stations at which changes on land uses have
been identified in other parts of the world. The large number of AGEBs included in the
analysis should reduce the errors associated with the differences in the shape of the
AGEBs and in the dimension of the blocks.
To compare the changes in population and income per capita of the AGEBs that gained
direct access to the metro in the 1990's with the changes in other AGEBs, I split Y-type
AGEBs in homogenous groups in terms of density, income per capita and distance to the
city center. To do this, I first sorted the 83 Y-type AGEBs by income per capita in 1990,
and graphed the number of these AGEBs in different income categories. The result is
shown in the following figure:
Figure 12: Histogram of Average Income per Capita in 1990 of 83 selected AGEBs
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Source: Developed by author
As we see in the figure, there is one AGEB whose income is far higher than the rest. To
reduce the variation of income per capita between these AGEBs, I decided to take this
AGEB out of the analysis. Eliminating this AGEB would allow me to restrict the range of
income of the areas to which we will compare these AGEBs.
I then made a list of the 82 remaining AGEBs sorted by average income per capita. For
each AGEB, I estimated the summation of the variance of average income per capita of
two groups of AGEBs: one group included the AGEBs that had less income per capita
that the AGEB I was considering, and the other group included all the other AGEBs
(including the one that was being considered). This function is defined for every AGEB,
except for the ones with the highest and the lowest income per capita. My objective was
to choose the two groups for which this function is the minimum. The result is shown in
the following graph:
Figure 13: Summation of variances of average income per capita of two groups of
AGEBs
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The minimum variance resulted by dividing the AGEBs in the following groups:
" Group 1: Those with average income per capita in 1990 from MXP 2,545 to MXP
1,911 (pesos of 2000). This last figure corresponds to the average incomer per
capita of the AGEB with the 10th largest incomer per capita. As can be seen in the
previous graph, this is the AGEB for which the calculated function is minimum
* Group 2: Those with average income per capita in 1990 from MXP 1,800 to MXP
781 (pesos of 2000)
-E -
I made a similar analysis for density. As was pointed out earlier, I did not have the exact
area of each AGEB. Nevertheless, the census reports the number of blocks per AGEB,
which is a proxy of the area (see discussion on page 84). With this information, I made
the following graph, which does not include the AGEB I eliminated from the analysis
because of its high income:
Figure 14: Histogram of Residents per Block in 1990 for 82 selected AGEBs
Source: Developed by the author
As can be seen in the graph, there are three AGEBs whose densities are well higher than
the rest, and one whose density is well bellow the rest. To reduce the range of density of
the group, I eliminated these four AGEBs.
I then calculated the summation of the variance resulting from splitting the remaining
AGEBS into two groups, as was done with the income. The following figure graphs this
function:
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Figure 15: Summation of variances of residents per block of two groups of AGEBs
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The resulting curve suggests splitting the AGEBS into two groups:
* Those between 341 to 67 inhabitants per block
* Those whose densities are between 538 and 394 inhabitants per block. The latter
is the density of the AGEB with the 1 1 th largest density, as seen on the graph
The range of the AGEBs with low densities very broad, so I estimate a new partitioning
of the AGEBS in three groups. Using a similar procedure, I found that the following
ranges would minimize the sum of the variance, while reducing the range of AGEBS
with low density:
* Group 1: AGEBS with densities between 190 and 67 inhabitants per block
* Group 2: AGEBS with densities between 341 and 194 inhabitants per block
" Group 3: AGEBS with densities between 538 and 394 inhabitants per block
Similarly to what I did for average income and density, I made a graph of the histogram
of the distance of AGEBs to the city center. I did not have a database with these
distances, but I did have the name of the district each AGEB belongs to, and the distance
from all districts to the district that includes the Zdcalo, the central square in Mexico
City. Therefore, I assumed each AGEB was located at the same distance from the Z6calo
4 12 20 28 36 44 52 60 68 76
AGEB number
as the district it belongs. The following is the graph of the histogram, including only the
78 AGEBS I had not eliminated:
Figure 16: Histogram of Distance to Z6calo for selected 78 AGEBs
Source: Developed by the author
In this case, one AGEB is way out of the rest in terms of distance to the city center, so I
decided to eliminate it from the analysis. With the resulting AGEBS, I found the way to
group them so that the summation of the variance of the distance to the city center of both
group be minimized, as I did with income per capita and with density. The following
graph shows the result:
Figure 17: Summation of variances of distance to Z6calo of two groups of AGEBs
Source: Developed by the author
So the summation of the variance is minimized when the 77 AGEBs are divided into the
following groups:
e Group 1: Those with distance to the city center between 0 and 3.1 miles
* Group 2: Those with distances to the city center between 4.4 and 9.0 miles
Then, I defined 12 categories of AGEB, resulting from 2 categories for income, 3 for
density and 2 for distance to the city center. In all cases the groups with number 1 are the
ones that are positively correlated with income. The following table presents the
correlation of income with the measures we are using for density and with distance to the
city center, for all AGEBs in the DF:
Table 5: Correlation of Density and Distance to Z6calo with Average Income per Capita
for AGEBs in the MCMA
Correlation with Average
Income per Capita
Density - 0.18
Distance to Z6calo - 0.07
Source: Developed by the author from Census 1990
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So as this table shows, the closer to the city center and the lower the density, the higher
135the average income per capita is . Therefore I called the groups of AGEBs with the
lowest density, and with the lowest distance to the city center "Group 1".
The following table shows how many of the AGEBs located next to the stations of lines
A, B and 8, and that were not eliminated from the analysis, exist in each category:
Table 6: Number of the 77 selected AGEBs in each of the twelve categories
As can be seen in the table, more than half of these AGEBs
high distance from the city center categories.
are in the low income and
As I said before, I compared the variation in population between 1990 and 2000 of the
AGEBs that gained accessibility to the metro in the 1990's (77 out of the original 83), in
13 This confirms the theory presented in Greizbord et al (1999).
Group Density Income Distance Number of
Name Group Group Group AGEBs
A 1 1
1
B 2 6
1
C 1 9
2
D 2 31
E 1 0
F 2 0
2
G 1 7
2
H 2 15
I 11 2
1
j 2 0
3
K 1 6
2
L 2 0
Total 77
Source: Developed by the author
each of these 12 categories, with other AGEBs in the same some, density and distance to
the city center categories.
As can be seen in the last table, several groups have very few of the 77 studied AGEBs.
The low numbers of AGEBs in some groups make their comparison with other AGEBs
not very relevant, since there is a high probability that changes in population and
employment of these AGEBs may be affected by another factor other than access to the
metro. Therefore I only studied the 6 groups that include 6 or more of the 77 AGEBs. In
the following pages I describe the results for each of these 6 groups.
5.3.2.1 Group B: High income, Low density, High distance to the city center
The following table shows the characteristics, and changes in population and average
income per capita between the Census 1990 and the Census 2000 of the three types of
AGEBs. They are all part of the same group of AGEBs defined by ranges of income per
capita, residential density and distance to the city center.
Table 7: Comparison of changes in population and average income per capita of AGEBs
with high income, low density and high distance to the city center, sorted by accessibility
to metro
Characteristics Number Average Inhabitants Change in Average Change in
of Distance per block population Income per average
AGEBS to the 1990 1990- Capita 1990 income 1990-
Zdcalo 2000 (MXP 2000) 2000
X - Not close to 13 6.2 121 27.9% 2,091 3.8%
any Metro station
Y - With direct 6 4.9 140 -3.6% 2,124 -7.9%
access to the
Metro since the
1990's
Z - With direct 0
access to the
Metro before the
1990's
Source: Developed by the author
As we see, there were no Z-AGEBs (those with previous access to the Metro) in this
category. The AGEBs that gained access to the metro in the 1990's had higher population
average density and income per capita than other AGEBs with similar characteristics.
However, they experienced a decrease in population in the 1990's, and a negative change
in income per capita, compared to increases of both values in X-AGEBs. This difference
may be partially explained by the fact that Y-AGEBs are slightly closer to the city center
than X-AGEBs. As was pointed out before, there has been a general flattering of the
density curve in Mexico City in the last few decades.
The following table shows the changes in employment for this group of AGEBs. As I did
not have the number of blocks per AGEB in 1994, I assumed they were the same as in
1990. I used this assumption for all the tables reporting density of jobs.
Table 8: Comparison of changes in employment for AGEBs with high income, low
density and high distance to the city center, sorted by accessibility to metro
Characteristics Number Manufacturing Change in Commercial Change in
of jobs per block manufacturing and Service commercial and
AGEBS 1994 jobs jobs per block service jobs
1994
X - Not close to 13 3.5 425% 5.6 366%
any Metro station
Y - With direct 5 5.1 -57% 5.8 39%
access to the
Metro since the
1990's
Z - With direct 0
access to the
Metro before the
1990's
Source: Developed by the author
As I said before, I am not including AGEBs located next to line A in this table, so that is
why there are fewer Y-AGEBs in this table than in the previous one.
As we see in this table, the AGEBs located close to the new lines of the metro had similar
job densities than X-AGEBs. But in the 1994-1998 period there was an impressive
difference in the creation of jobs in both areas, with X-AGEBs creating more commercial
and service jobs than Y-AGEBs, and the latter even reducing the number of
manufacturing jobs.
In general terms, for Group B AGEBs, the metro failed to bring more residents, income
per capita, manufacturing jobs or commercial-service jobs than to other AGEBs with
similar characteristics in terms of income per capita, population density and distance to
city center.
5.3.2.2 Group C: Low income, Low density, Low distance to the city center
The following table shows the characteristics, and changes in population and average
income per capita between the Census 1990 and the Census 2000 for AGEBs in Group C.
Table 9: Comparison of changes in population and average income per capita of AGEBs
with low income, low density, low distance to the city center, sorted by accessibility to
metro
Characteristics Number Average Inhabitants Change in Average Change in
of Distance per block population Income per average
AGEBS to the 1990 1990- Capita 1990 income 1990-
Zocalo 2000 (MXP 2000) 2000
X - Not close to 37 2.6 135 -11.1% 1,308 15.5%
any Metro station
Y - With direct 9 2.7 134 -6.3% 1,177 16.9%
access to the
Metro since the
1990's
Z - With direct 17 2.1 151 -14.4% 1,390 18.4%
access to the
Metro before the
1990's
Source: Developed by the author
As we see in this table, in 1990 Y-AGEBs were very similar to X-AGEBs in terms of
distance to the city center and density, and slightly less dense and located farther from the
city center then Z-AGEBs. Even though the three types of AGEBs had a reduction in the
number of residents in this period, the reduction was less severe for Y-AGEBs. There
was not a high difference in the change of income per capita of the three types of AGEBs.
In the following table I present the changes in employment for this group of AGEBs:
Table 10: Comparison of changes in employment for AGEBs with low income, low
density, low distance to the city center, sorted by accessibility to metro
Characteristics Number Manufacturing Change in Commercial Change in
of jobs per block manufacturing and Service commercial and
AGEBS 1994 jobs jobs per block service jobs
1994
X - Not close to 37 19.9 -18% 17.1 14%
any Metro station
Y - With direct 9 4.6 7% 5.8 -30%
access to the
Metro since the
1990's
Z - With direct 17 13.2 -13% 40.9 2%
access to the
Metro before the
1990's
Source: Developed by the author
In this case we see that Y-AGEBs had a lower density of jobs than X-AGEBs. Contrary
to what we would expect from our discussion in section 3.6.1, in this case manufacturing
jobs increased and commercial and service employment decreased in Y-AGEBs. Even
more, in the same period, X-AGEBs had an increase of commercial and job services,
exacerbating their advantage in the density of these jobs with respect to Y-AGEBs.
5.3.2.3 Group D: Low income, Low density, High distance to the city center
The following table shows the characteristics, and changes in population and average
income per capita between the Census 1990 and the Census 2000 for AGEBs in Group D.
Table 11: Comparison of changes in population and average income per capita of AGEBs
with low income, low density, high distance to the city center, sorted by accessibility to
metro
Type - Number Average Inhabitants Change in Average Change in
Characteristics of of Distance per block population Income per average
AGEBs AGEBS to the 1990 1990- Capita 1990 income 1990-
Zdcalo 2000 (MXP 2000) 2000
X - Not close to 167 7.0 130 14.9% 1,185 18.1%
any Metro station
Y - With direct 31 6.6 118 16.5% 1,215 15.3%
access to the
Metro since the
1990's
Z - With direct 4 5.4 114 -3.5% 1,492 6.5%
access to the
Metro before the
1990's
Source: Developed by the author
In this case we can see that Y-AGEBs behaved very similarly to X-AGEBs in terms of
changes in population and income per capita. Their performance though, was better than
Z-AGEBs'. The slightly higher population growth of Y-AGEBs over X-AGEBs may be
caused in part by a lower density at the beginning of the period (1990).
The following table compares the changes in employment:
Table 12: Comparison of changes in employment for AGEBs with low income, low
density, high distance to the city center, sorted by accessibility to metro
Characteristics Number Manufacturing Change in Commercial Change in
of jobs per block manufacturing and Service commercial and
AGEBS 1994 jobs jobs per block service jobs
1994
X - Not close to 167 8.2 10% 4.5 25%
any Metro station
Y - With direct 14 8.7 32% 5.8 44%
access to the
Metro since the
1990's
Z - With direct 4 3.3 62% 6.5 59%
access to the
Metro before the
1990's
Source: Developed by the author
The number of Y-AGEBs is much lower than in the previous table, because 17 of the Y-
AGEBs of that table are located close to stations in line A.
As we see in this table, Y-AGEBs began the period with a similar density of jobs to X-
AGEBs, and both for manufacturing and commercial and service jobs they had a higher
growth than X-AGEBs.
Overall, there seems to be a positive effect, i.e. the metro attracted firms to its
surrounding area.
5.3.2.4 Group G: Low income, Medium density, Low distance to the city center
The following table shows the characteristics, and changes in population and average
income per capita between the Census 1990 and the Census 2000 for AGEBs in Group G.
Table 13: Comparison of changes in population and average income per capita of AGEBs
with low income, medium density, low distance to the city center, sorted by accessibility
to metro
Type - Number Average Inhabitants Change in Average Change in
Characteristics of of Distance per block population Income per average
AGEBs AGEBS to the 1990 1990- Capita 1990 income 1990-
Zdcalo 2000 (MXP 2000) 2000
X - Not close to 26 2.1 246 -9.6% 1,326 15.0%
any Metro station
Y - With direct 7 1.5 247 -14.2% 1,231 14.9%
access to the
Metro since the
1990's
Z - With direct 36 2.0 241 -12.8% 1,394 8.9%
access to the
Metro before the
1990's
Source: Developed by the author
For this group we can see that in 1990 Y-AGEBs had a similar number of residents per
block than the other two types of AGEBs. Income was slightly lower in Y-AGEBs than
in the other types of AGEBs, and they tended to locate closer to the city center than the
rest. All the AGEBs had a decrease in population, but the reduction was higher in Y-
AGEBs. There was not an important difference between the growth in income in X- and
Y-AGEBs.
The following table shows the changes in the number of jobs:
Table 14: Comparison of changes in employment for AGEBs with low income, medium
density, low distance to the city center, sorted by accessibility to metro
Characteristics Number Manufacturing Change in Commercial Change in
of jobs per block manufacturing and Service commercial and
AGEBS 1994 jobs jobs per block service jobs
1994
X - Not close to 26 45.5 -7% 45.3 4%
any Metro station
Y - With direct 7 33.3 -21% 142.9 -46%
access to the
Metro since the
1990's
Z - With direct 36 34.1 -3% 83.2 -3%
access to the
Metro before the
1990's
Source: Developed by the author
As the table shows, there was a significant difference in the change of the number of jobs
between X- and Y-type AGEBs. Whereas X-AGEBs had a modest increase in
commercial and service jobs, Y-AGEBS has a significant decrease, even though the high
initial concentration of these jobs in Y-AGEBs means that by 1998 these AGEBs still had
a higher density of these jobs than X-type AGEBs.
5.3.2.5 Group H: Low income, Medium density, High distance to the city center
The following table shows the characteristics, and changes in population and average
income per capita between the Census 1990 and the Census 2000 for AGEBs in Group H.
Table 15: Comparison of changes in population and average income per capita of AGEBs
with low income, medium density, high distance to the city center, sorted by accessibility
to metro
Type - Number Average Inhabitants Change in Average Change in
Characteristics of of Distance per block population Income per average
AGEBs AGEBS to the 1990 1990- Capita 1990 income 1990-
Zdcalo 2000 (MXP 2000) 2000
X - Not close to 71 6.0 245 -6.7% 1,191 13.8%
any Metro station
Y - With direct 15 6.5 241 -5.7% 1,210 10.6%
access to the
Metro since the
1990's
Z - With direct 0
access to the
Metro before the
1990's
Source: Developed by the author
In this case we can se that X and Y-type AGEBs started from very similar residential
densities and income per capita. The change in these indicators in both types of AGEBs
was very similar.
The following table shows the changes in the number of jobs:
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Table 16: Comparison of changes in employment for AGEBs with low income, medium
density, high distance to the city center, sorted by accessibility to metro
Characteristics Number Manufacturing Change in Commercial Change in
of jobs per block manufacturing and Service commercial and
AGEBS 1994 jobs jobs per block service jobs
1994
X - Not close to 71 12.7 -2% 10.0 -3%
any Metro station
Y - With direct 7 16.9 -36% 25.3 -18%
access to the
Metro since the
1990's
Z - With direct 0
access to the
Metro before the
1990's
Source: Developed by the author
In this case we see a similar situation to group G, where Y-AGEBs had a higher density
of jobs in 1994, but suffered a higher lost of jobs that X-AGEBs. Also for manufacturing
jobs, Y-AGEBs suffer a higher lost than X-AGEBs.
5.3.2.6 Group K: Low income, High density, Low distance to the city center
The following table shows the characteristics, and changes in population and average
income per capita between the Census 1990 and the Census 2000 for AGEBs in Group K.
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Table 17: Comparison of changes in population and average income per capita of
AGEBs with low income, high density, low distance to the city center, sorted by
accessibility to metro
Type - Number Average Inhabitants Change in Average Change in
Characteristics of of Distance per block population Income per average
AGEBs AGEBS to the 1990 1990- Capita 1990 income 1990-
Zdcalo 2000 (MXP 2000) 2000
X - Not close to 7 2.0 470 -11.4% 1,343 -3.3%
any Metro station
Y - With direct 6 1.9 465 -9.5% 1,368 -5.2%
access to the
Metro since the
1990's
Z - With direct 3 2.2 477 -7.9% 1,422 -4.8%
access to the
Metro before the
1990's
Source: Developed by the author
As for all other groups, the stations that gained access to the metro in the 1990's did not
have a significant higher increase in population than X-AGEBs. In fact in this case both
types of AGEB had a similar change in population, which was negative in both cases.
The change of income in the three types of AGEBs is also similar.
The following table shows the changes in the number of jobs:
102
Table 18: Comparison of changes in employment for AGEBs with low income, high
density, low distance to the city center, sorted by accessibility to metro
Characteristics Number Manufacturing Change in Commercial Change in
of jobs per block manufacturing and Service commercial and
AGEBS 1994 jobs jobs per block service jobs
1994
X - Not close to 7 29.5 -4% 80.0 -9%
any Metro station
Y - With direct 6 100.9 -13% 76.1 13%
access to the
Metro since the
1990's
Z - With direct 3 28.6 -9% 94.8 -23%
access to the
Metro before the
1990's
Source: Developed by the author
This group, along with group D are the only ones in which Y-AGEBs had a significantly
better performance than X-AGEBs, in terms of the relative increase in the number of
commercial and service jobs. Manufacturing jobs diminished in Y-AGEBs even more
than in X- and Z-type AGEBs.
5.3.2.7 Conclusions of the analysis
In general terms, the construction of the metro in the 1990's, did not produce a major
positive effect on population growth or income per capita increase in the areas around
stations, for any of the studied groups. Only in two groups of AGEBs, C and D, there was
a higher positive relative growth in the number of manufacturing jobs in Y-type AGEBs
than in to X-type AGEBs . For commercial and service jobs, the same thing happened
only in two groups, D and K.
One reason that could explain the low increase in commercial activities around stations is
that the construction of the metro made it easier to local residents to go to the city center
to make their purchases, instead of relying on local stores. As we said in section 3.6.2,
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this phenomenon has been reported for cities such as Bilbao and Lille in Europe. To test
this hypothesis, I compared the change in commercial and service jobs in the 77 AGEBs
by delegacion, with that of comparable AGEBs that did not gained direct access to the
metro in the 1990's. The results are the following:
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Table 19: Change in Employment in AGEBs in
delegaci6n
the DF in Mexico City, sorted by
Delegaci6n Characteristics X - Not Y - With direct Z - With direct
close to access to the access to the
any
Metro Metro since the Metro before the
station 1990's 1990's
Gustavo Number of AGEBS 142 7 47
Madero Commercial and Service 6.0 2.8 28.0
jobs per block 1994
Change in commercial 9% 69% -9%
and service jobs
Iztacalco Number of AGEBS 62 9 3
Commercial and Service 8.0 17.7 81.4
jobs per block 1994
Change in commercial 33% 42% -32%
and service jobs
Iztapalapa Number of AGEBS 188 19 0
Commercial and Service 5.7 11.9
jobs per block 1994
Change in commercial 28% 5%
and service jobs
Cuauht6moc Number of AGEBS 30 10 28
Commercial and Service 67.1 153.0 244.0
jobs per block 1994
Change in commercial -2% -41% -14%
and service jobs
Venustiano Number of AGEBS 43 6 54
Carranza Commercial and Service 12.3 15.5 34.7
jobs per block 1994
Change in commercial 40% -14% -1%
and service jobs
Source: Developed by the author
As we see, in delegacion Cuauhtimoc, which is the one located in the center of the city,
the performance of the Y-AGEBs was very bad compared to X-AGEBs, and it is were Y-
AGEBs suffered the highest relative decrease of the five delegaciones. This result makes
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the hypothesis that people started going to downtown to shop not very credible, since
otherwise Y-AGEBs in downtown would have shown an increase in commercial activity.
One of the reasons to explain the low impact of the lines that were built in the 1990's in
Mexico City is that the city has a lot of land around metro stations available for
redevelopment. Therefore, there is not scarcity for metro-accessible land. As we said in
section 3.4, a relative scarcity of accessibility is a necessary condition for and values to
increase.
Another possible explanation for the low impact we observed is that it takes a lot of time
for land to redevelop, and that no impact may have been yet visible by 2000. This is a
viable explanation, and it coincides with what has been observed in other parts of the
world (see section 4.4.5). Nevertheless, the performance of Z-type AGEBs was in almost
all cases worse than X-type AGEBs as can be seen in the tables presented from page 92
to page 105, in terms of growth in population, in income per capita and in the number of
jobs. This result makes the time lag explanation not vary credible.
The low impact that these lines have had on land uses do not mean that the other lines in
Mexico City have not had any impact. In fact, as we discussed in section 5.3.1, there is a
lot of evidence that the metro has been one of the factors producing the loss in population
of the city center, its specialization in tertiary activities, the growth of the metropolitan
area, and the reinforcement of previously existing secondary centers. Nevertheless, most
of this change may have occurred before the 1990's, the period that was analyzed in this
Chapter, and mainly caused by the construction of the first three lines of Mexico City's
Metro.
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6 Santiago and the Metro
This Chapter includes a review of the history of urban development and public
transportation in Santiago in the 20th century. There is also a discussion about the
evolution of ridership in Santiago's metro. Section 6.3 includes a revision of the literature
on the effects of the metro on urban development, and a quantitative analysis of the
effects of the construction of the metro on population and average income per capita in
the areas around stations.
6.1 Urban development in Santiago
Up to 1940, Santiago had a compact city center, which concentrated the main commercial
and cultural activities of the city. Most high- and mid-income people lived in this area.
Low-income people had different types of housing: many located in rural areas around
the city where they rented land in subdivisions and build their own houses; other rented
rooms in the most deteriorated parts of the city; finally, some other occupied public land
illegally' 36
Chile, as Mexico, implemented a centrally planned industrialization strategy in the period
after World War II. This plan considered the location of industries in the main cities. This
strategy induced a massive immigration from the countryside to Santiago. As can be seen
in the following table, the growth of population in Santiago in the 1950's and 1960's was
way above the growth of previous periods:
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136 De Ram6n (1990)
Table 20: Population in Santiago de Chile
Year Population Average yearly growth up to
the year of the following row
1940 1,100,000 2.0%
1952 1,400,000 5.2%
1960 2,100,000 2.9%
1970 2,800,000 2.8%
1982 3,900,000 1.9%
1992 4,700,000 2.0%
2001 5,600,000
Source: Rodriguez and Winchester (2001) data for 1952-1992. Data for 1940 is urban inhabitants of the
Santiago Province, from Chile (1960). Data for 2001 from DICTUC (2003)
The growth of population and of car ownership in the 1950's and 1960's caused an
increase of congestion in the central city. In the 1950's high-income dwellers migrated to
the East of the city, in a very fast process1 37 . The houses they left would become multi-
family housing for the new immigrants.
High-income people moved first to Providencia, and few years later also moved further
east, to Las Condes. These two municipalities, along with the neighbor municipalities of
Vitacura, Lo Barnechea, La Reina and Rufioa form the so-called Zona Oriente (Eastern
Zone). This zone still houses almost all high-income people of the city, and almost no
other social groups. By 2002 these six municipalities had 15% of the population of the
metropolitan area' 38, and in 1998 their residents received around 45% of the income of
the metropolitan area 39.
The income segregation at the municipality level is higher in Santiago than in Mexico
City. In 1998, the coefficient of variation of average income per capita of the
137 Gross (1991), page 37.
138 Census 2002, data retrieved from www.ine.cl.
139 Average income 1998 per municipality retrieved from www.ine.cl, weighted by 2002 population. See
Appendix 3 for data.
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municipalities within the Santiago metropolitan area was 0.77. The same coefficient for
delegaciones and municipalities in the MCMA in 2002 was only 0.40140.
The massive immigration to Santiago exacerbated the shortage of housing in the city,
especially for low-income people. As a response, in 1953 the national government
created the Corporacion de la Vivienda (CORVI), which was in charge of the
construction of housing for the poor. The government's housing programs provide
housing for a significant part of the population in the 1960's. To reduce the cost per unit
of housing, CORVI tended to buy land in the suburbs of the city, exacerbating the
segregated patter of the city. During the Frei Montalva administration (1964-1970), the
government's housing program was responsible of 60% of the units built during the
141period . In spite of this effort, the shortage would become more intense and cause
serious political conflicts in the following decade.
In 1957 the first land invasion took place in Santiago. This invasion became then a
142neighborhood, La Victoria . This was the first of many more invasions to come. They
grew exponentially during the Allende administration (1970-1973), as a response to the
very few evictions undertaken by the police during that administration, which openly
sympathized with land invasions. In those years, for the first time, land with high value
was invaded 43
Chile suffered a drastic switch of its urban development laws after 1973's coup. In the
1970's, there was a lift of the urban border, which generated an important increase in
144land values outside the former border . There were also massive evictions of illegal
settlements from the Zona Oriente, which exacerbated segregation even more.
140 See section 5.1 for assumptions and comments.
141 Sabatini and Arenas (2000).
142 Gross (1991) page 37.
143 It is well known that invasions take place in land of low value to minimize the risk of being evicted. See
Sabatini and Arenas (2000).
144 Sabatini (2000).
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In the1980's the city witnessed the construction of the first shopping malls. Malls have
fostered the development of town centers around them, and provide badly needed
services in the periphery of the metropolitan area. Moreover, shopping malls in
traditionally low-income areas have attracted development for people of different
income, helping to reduce segregation14 .
An urban renewal program for Santiago was established in 1985. The program considers
subsidies for the construction of new buildings or the restoration of existing units. The
subsidy is for up to UF 200 (approximately $5,400) for new housing units. The program
has fostered the construction of more than 10,000 new units in the downtown area, most
of them in the form of multi-family housing 46.
The very fast pace of construction of housing for the poor in the 1980's and 1990's, has
produced for the first time in modem history a reduction in the estimated shortage of
units for the poor, and a reduction in the number of illegal settlements. This kind of
settlements are now extremely infrequent in Santiago, accounting for less than 1% of the
housing stock in Santiago, compared to more than 40% in Mexico City, Bogoti, Caracas
147
and Lima and 20% in Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo
The Santiago Metropolitan Area comprises at least 34 comunas or municipalities, each of
which has its own government. Among other attributions, municipalities are in charge of
establishing zoning codes and collect property taxes.
Mid-income people tend to locate in either comunas close to the city center (San Miguel,
Independencia, Santiago) or certain suburban municipalities, such as La Florida and
Maipd. According to recent reports, there has been a switch in demand by middle-income
people, from houses in the periphery to multi-family housing in downtown. The Santiago
145 Sabatini (2000).
146 Information retrieved from http://www.cordesan.cl/barrios/index.htm.
147 Clickevsky (2000), cited in Arriagada and Simioni (2001).
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municipality has become the one with the highest number of new units built in the last
148few years
Low-income people tend to locate in the periphery of the metropolitan area, clustered in
certain municipalities such as La Pintana, Pudahuel and Puente Alto. The government
has located its housing projects in municipalities already occupied by low-income people.
The government is still an important actor in the housing market in Chile. More than 40%
of housing units built every year have a direct or indirect subsidy of the national
149
government
Santiago has a well-developed formal market for new houses. On the other hand, the
market for used houses and rents is formal only for the high-income segment, in part
because of the effect of the government in this area 0 . Some examples of government's
action that impede the development of these markets are the exclusive focus on
promoting house ownership instead of renting, and the restrictions imposed on the selling
of subsidized units.
Multi-family housing accounts for an important share of the housing stock in the
Metropolitan area, a 22.4% in 2002 1. In recent years apartments/condos have surpassed
houses in terms of the number of units built per year. Multi-family housing is highly
concentrated the municipalities of Santiago, Providencia and Las Condes.
The city has two main employment clusters. The main one is the Central Business
District, located in the municipality of Santiago, which in 1991 accounted for 31.5% of
152the employment in the metropolitan areai . A new cluster emerged in the area of
Providencia in the 1980's, and then extended to Las Condes in the 1990's. These two
municipalities account for 10.3% and 6.3% of the jobs in the metropolitan area
148 See for example El Mercurio, March 11, 2004 "Pabell6n de la Construccidn: Departamentos lideraron
preferencias habitacionales del 2003".
149 Cummings and DiPasquale (2000).
150 Cummings and DiPasquale (2000).
151 Census 2002, retrieved from www.ine.cl.
152 From Sectra (1991).
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respectively15 3. The share of these two employment centers in white-collar jobs is even
higher. These three municipalities plus Vitacura and Huechuraba account for 96% of
square meters of office space in the metropolitan area 4.
In the last few decades there has been a homogenization of densities in the metropolitan
area. The following figure shows the curve of densities in concentric rings around the city
center. All densities were estimated by dividing the population for the specific years by
the urban area of each municipality in 20025.
Figure 18: Density for concentric rings in Santiago
See Appendix 3 for sources and assumptions
As we see in the graph, the loss of population in the inner city stopped in the 1990's.
From the 1970's, the population in the intermediate city has been very stable, and
development has concentrated in the second and third ring.
The concentration of housing in the low-income periphery municipalities has been an
important driver of the flattering of the curve. The Zona Oriente has a very different
pattern of development than the rest of the metropolitan area. There has not been any
153 From Sectra (1991).
154 Rodriguez and Winchester (2001).
155 Not reliable estimations of urban area per municipality for 1970, 1982 and 1992 were found.
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government-sponsored social housing program in this area for decades, because of the
high value of land. If we take this zone out of the analysis, the outer ring would be denser
than the city center, as seen on the next figure.
Figure 19: Density for concentric rings in Santiago, excluding Zona Oriente
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See Appendix 3 for sources and assumptions
Contrary to the previous graph, in this case there is a decrease in the population of the
intermediate area. This difference is caused by not including Nufioa, whose population
grew between 1970 and 2002.
We can see that excluding the Zona Oriente, the third ring is the zone with the highest
population density. Given the fact that the two main employment clusters are one the city
center, and the other close to the city center, this distribution of population is very
inefficient.
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6.2 Public transportation and the metro
6.2.1 History of public transportation
At the beginning of the 20t century, Santiago had an extensive tram system. Up to the
1930's, trams were the main transportation mode in the city. By 1930 they carried
approximately 200 million passengers per year' 56. All trams in Santiago were privately
owned, being the Electric Bond & Share, from the US, the owner of most of the lines by
then.
In the 1940's, the growth in the number of buses reduced the modal share of trams. In
1945 the national government nationalized all the trams, and a public company was
formed to operate them. This company was named Empresa Nacional de Transporte,
which in 1953 changed name to Empresa de Transportes Colectivos del Estado (ETC)'.
Soon after its formation, the ETC started to replace trams with buses. In 1947 the first
trolleys entered to service in Santiago' 58 . The number of buses owned by the ETC and by
private operators increased significantly in the 1950's and 1960's. In 1958 the ETC
closed the last tramlinel5 .
In the 1960's the growth of the city was causing a fast increase in congestion. The
government assumed a more active role in public transportation regulation. It started
controlling fares, routes and frequencies of the services operated by private firms, and
assigned routes in tendering processes. A regional master plan for Santiago was
developed in 1960, which identified the need for the establishment of a metropolitan
transit system. By the late 1960's the ETC reached its peak share, serving around 10% of
160
the trips in Santiago
156 Morales (1988), page 21. This is almost the same ridership of Santiago's Metro in 2003.
157 Morrison (1992).
158 Information retrieved from http://www.tramz.com/cl/tb/tb.html.
159 Morrison (1992).
160 Darb6ra (1992).
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The Frei Montalva administration (1964-1970) implemented several projects to
modernize Santiago: Route 5, which runs along Chile, was enhanced to highway standard
and placed bellow ground level in its downtown section; the construction of a new
beltway, Americo Vespucio was initiated; and a new metro was planned, and the works
for the first line began.
The original plan for the metro considered five lines, totaling 60 km161. The following
map shows the alignment that the plan considers for these lines.
Figure 20: Original Metro Plan in Santiago
Source: http://members.fortunecity.es/trencitoschilenos/metro de santiago.html
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161 www.urbanrail.net.
Although it had a different political agenda from the previous government, the Allende
administration (1970-1973) continued the construction of the metro. Because of political
turmoil, there were extensive delays in the construction.
The Pinochet administration (1973-1990) inherited a project that was running behind
schedule and over budget. In the middle of the intense economic crisis of 1975, the works
were stopped, and the entire plan was revised. To reduce costs, the government decided
to build only lines 1 and 2 in a fist phase, and postpone the construction of the other lines.
Moreover, the government also decided to change the alignment of the eastern part of
Line 1 to the Providencia-Apoquindo corridor instead of Vitacura Avenue. Line 2 was
also moved from its planned alignment, San Diego - Banderas, the main north-south
corridor of the city, to the median of Route 5.
The fist phase of Line 1 was open to the public in 1976, and Line 2 opened in 1978. The
extension of Line 1 to the East opened in 1980.
The initial results were disappointing overall. The final costs were much higher than what
was planned. Ridership in the first few years was almost a third of what was considered
in the original plan. Nevertheless, this difference may have been caused by a slower pace
of construction than expected, by the lack of integration that the metro had with buses,
which was an essential part of the master plan, and by the change of the alignment of
Line 2.
In 1978 the Pinochet administration decided to reorganize the entire urban transportation
system of Santiago. That year ETC was closed, and the last remaining trolleybus line
ceased operation. The provision of public transportation was liberalized in a gradual
process that began in 1979.
The effects of deregulation of bus service were negative overall. In the 1980's, the
number of buses grew 100%, compared to a modest 10% increase in ridership. Premium
buses, which only carried seated passengers, ceased operation in this decade. Between
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1978 and 1990, bus fares increased more than 300% in real terms. The average extension
of the routes grew from 30 km in the late 1970's to 55 km in 1991 (roundtrip). The mean
age of the fleet grew from 6 years in 1979 to 10 years in 1989162. Finally, the number of
routes grew tremendously, as buses started to offer direct service between most
municipality pairs. In a context of low income, the option of a one-seat-one-fare ride
proved to be very attractive.
The following graph compares the average fare of buses and the metro from 1978 to
1991.
Figure 21: Bus and Metro Fares 1978-1991
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Source: Darberi (1993). Figures were approximated.
The cease of the premium bus service can be explained by different reasons. One is that
economic growth and the decrease in import tariffs paid by cars induced many of its
customers to buy vehicles 63. Another plausible reason is that people tended to take the
first bus they could to their destination, since the value of the expected time after the next
162 All figures taken from Darbdra (1993).
163 In 1977, the high tariffs that imported cars had to pay were lifted, significantly reducing the cost of
buying a car. This produced a significant increase in the number of cars in Santiago.
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arrival was higher than the extra benefit of the premium service. This characteristic
would have made frequency the most important attribute for bus operator, and created
economies of densities, which discourage operators to provide non-standard service.
Deregulation also generated some benefits. The increase in the number of buses and
routes reduced headways, and the number of connections people needed to make. The
reduction in the number of passengers per bus increased the chance of finding an empty
seat. In fact, the problem of overcrowded bus, which was a serious one by 1978, almost
disappeared in the 1980's164.
Up to the 1980's, the Metro lacked any formal integration with feeder buses. Many
people used buses to reach stations, but there was no integrated fare or infrastructure to
make these connections easy. To tackle this problem, in August 1987 Metro created a
system of subcontracted feeder buses. The system, called Metrobas, had very modest
results and was downscaled in the 1990's. In 2003 it was re-launched with a new route
bidding process. The fare integration of Metrobds with the metro is still limited. A plan to
reduce the integrated fare and use a smart card as unique payment mode was planned for
late 2003, and by May 2004 it has not been fully implemented.
The 1982-1983 economic crises, along with the 1985 earthquake, created a heavy burden
to the national budget, and postponed the plans for the expansion of Line 2 and the
construction of Line 3. The only expansion of the network for 17 years was an extension
of Line 2 to the north, inaugurated in 1987. Only in 1997 Line 5 was completed, and in
2000 it was expanded to downtown.
In 2001, the national government announced a plan to expand the network from 40 to 90
km in 2006. A new line, called Line 4, is being built along avenues Tobalaba, Am rico
Vespucio and Vicuia Mackenna. Additionally Line 2 is being extended in both
directions, and Line 5 is being extended to the west. The next figure shows the lines that
exist and the ones that are being built by the first semester of 2004.
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164 Darb6ra (1993).
Figure 22: Map of current lines and lines being constructed in Santiago
Source: www.metrosantiago.cl
There are several plans for extensions of the subway. In 2003, the national government
announced a further extension of Line 2 to the North, up to Americo Vespucio. The
government has stipulated that the next line to be built will be Line 3, which will run
along Irarrdzaval, Matta Avenue, Arturo Prat, Ahumada and Independencia Avenue.
This line will follow parts of the alignments originally planned for lines 2 and 3. Finally,
it is highly likely that a light rail line will be built along the current Cerrillos Airport,
where a new government-sponsored redevelopment project is being planned. This line
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would begin at Quinta Normal station (Line 5), and end in Maipd, in the southwest of the
metropolitan area.
In 2001, the national government announced a new urban transportation plan, which was
then called Transantiago. The plan considers the integration of buses, metro and
commuter trains. A new process of route tendering will be made, and companies will
have to bid for one of eight packages of trunk routes or one of the complementary feeder
services. A smart card will be used as the unique mean of payment. This card is already
being used in the metro. Additionally, two bus rapid transit lines will be built'65.
6.2.2 Metro and its ridership
The following table shows the number of passengers per line and per year in Santiago's
metro. All the figures are the number of passenger-boardings in each line.
Figure 23: Number of passengers per line in Santiago
Source: Metro de Santiago (2003)
165 Information retrieved from www.transantiago.cl.
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Since the early 1980's, Line 1 has been a success in terms of ridership. The line is located
on Santiago's busiest corridor, Alameda-Providencia -Apoquindo. In 1981, a year after
the opening of its eastern-most section, the line transported 109 million people. In 1997 it
carried 141 million people, and since then it has had a slight decrease, probably because
of the cool-down of the Chilean economy.
Since the early 1990's, the central section of Line 1 is experiencing congestion, in spite
of an increase in the number of trains, and of the number of cars per train. In 1994, Metro
implemented different fares for rush and non-rush hours, which has been able to curve
the growth of ridership during rush hours 66.
On the other hand, Line 2 has been a major failure in terms of ridership. In 2004 it only
carried 34 million passengers, far from the maximum ridership it achieved in 1989, 44
million passengers. One of the plausible explanations for this poor performance is the fact
that the line does not connect directly to downtown, but rather make people change line
to get there. The need for connecting to access the city center may make the line less
attractive than other one-seat options such as buses or shared taxis.
Line 5 has also carried meager traffic. In 2001, after the opening of its extension to
downtown, the line transported 36 million passengers. Two stations (Plaza de Armas in
downtown and Bellavista de La Florida, the terminal station in the south), account for
49% of the labor-day boardings167. The low-intensity of urban development in the rest of
the alignment has determined low ridership.
During the 1980's ridership in the Metro grew very fast. One of the reasons for this
growth was that buses' fares grew more than 100% in real terms (see figure on page 117).
The increase in street congestion, particularly in the Alameda-Providencia corridor,
improved the attractiveness of the metro. The growth of passenger flows in Metro was
166 Between 1992 and 2002 the summation of the ridership in the one-peak hour of all line on labor days in
Santiago, has decreased 20%, whereas overall ridership has increased 11% (Metro de Santiago 2003). This
may have been in part caused by the differentiated fare, and part by the congestion of the system, which
cause people to choose other modes at rush hour.
167 Metro de Santiago (2003).
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particularly strong in a period were the level of service of buses declined significantly,
1681984-1986
There is a government policy to ask Metro to pay for its operational cost since 1979 169. In
1990, the military government transferred 200 million dollars of the debt it subscribed to
fund the construction of the original two lines to the metro. Recently Metro agreed to pay
part of the investment costs of Line 4 and of the future extension of Line 2. To achieve
these goals, Metro has maintain a fare which is much more higher other metros' fares in
170Latin Americao. This policy has been successful in producing an operational surplus
since 1980, the year that the extension of Line 1 to the East was openedi. In spite of its
self-sustaining fare policy, Metro's fares were lower than bus fares for most parts of the
1980's, as shown in the figure on page 117.
Contrary to the case of Mexico City, the metro in Santiago attracts middle and high-
income people. In 2002 an internal survey of Metro showed that the percentage of riders
who are university professionals varies form 21% to 38% at different times of the day,
with other professionals accounting for 15% to 26%. Blue-collar employees are less than
2% of the riders, and people that are self-employed are less than 5%. In contrast with
Mexico City's metro, students account for a very large portion of the riders, 25% to
3%17235%2
6.3 Effects of the metro on the city
6.3.1 Commented review of existing literature
Several studies have discussed the effect that Santiago's metro has had on land values
and land uses. According to Galilea and Hurtado (1998), the metro has had a double
168 Figueroa (1990).
169 Morales (1988), page 35.
170 In 2002, the average fare in Santiago's metro was 38 cents of a dollar, compared to 34 in Sao Paulo and
16 in Mexico City (information on Sao Paulo's fare from www.metro.sp.gov.br, for Santiago and Mexico
City see Appendix 2).
171 Morales (1988), page 32.
172 Metro de Santiago (2003).
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effect. On the one hand, they say it made the city center more oriented towards high-
income employment, specifically in the tertiary sector (e.g. financial sector), but on the
other, they say this specialization has been in detriment of the industries sector that
existed in the area up to the early 1970' S173.
The decadence of industrial firms located in the city center appears to be more related to
the change of economic conditions of Chile than to the construction of the metro. The
manufacturing sector in all regions of the country had a strong transformation with the
economic reform of the 1970's and 1980's, reducing its share in the GDP 174, and re-
orienting itself towards foreign markets. The entire country, and not only the central area
of Santiago, has specialized in service and commercial activities. Therefore it does not
seem just to blame the subway for the contraction of industrial activities in the city
center.
Many studies have criticized Santiago's metro for serving almost exclusively mid and
high-income people17 5 . They blame the chosen alignment and the fare policy for
excluding the poor. With respect to the chosen alignments, it is true that the first three
lines do not go to low-income areas, probably with the exception is the westernmost part
of Line 1 and the southernmost part of Line 2. Nevertheless, it has to be considered that
low-income people tend to live in the periphery of the city, where it is less cost-effective
to have mass transit service. Line 4 in Santiago is intended to serve Puente Alto, a
predominantly low-income area.
There are a few studies about the effect that the subway had on land values. According to
Galilea and Hurtado (1988), there was a spectacular increase in land values in the eastern
part of the city, immediately before the opening of the extension of Line 1 to the east, and
probably as a response to it. The following table shows the value of land in different parts
of the city:
173 Galilea and Hurtado (1988).
174 In 1974, the year before the opening of the Metro in Santiago, manufacturing accounted for 25% of the
GDP. In 1995 it accounted for 19%. In absolute terms the manufacturing has grown though.
175 See for example Galilea and Hurtado (1988) and Navarro (1993), page 10.
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Table 21: Value of land in different areas of Santiago (constant CHP of 1980 / m)
Area 1969 1976 1977 1978 1980 1985
Average Santiago 602 285 445 866 442 931
Metropolitan Area
Northern Sector 401 336 200 175 262 179
Southern Sector 201 101 110 64 362 393
Downtown 4,943 1,174 1,675 2,226 5,855 2,445
Eastern Sector 878 382 830 1,887 5,804 1,694
Western Sector 652 101 138 69 177 202
Source: Adapted for inflation from Galilea and Hurtado (1988)
The increase in land values was the highest in the Providencia municipality (located in
the eastern sector). During this period the area around stations Tobalaba, Los Leones and
Pedro de Valdivia, became the second largest employment center in Santiago. Land
values got to their peak in 1981, but fell significantly when the economy entered into
recession in 1982. Land values though increased compare to their initial value. At the
beginning of the 1990's, Providencia was the municipality with the highest average land
values in the city, and by 1997 it was second to Las Condes176
It is not clear if the increase of land values was a response to the construction of the
metro, but most likely the metro had some effect. The construction of the Nueva
Providencia, and avenue under which the metro would run, and of several pedestrian
streets between this avenue and Providencia may have also made the area more
attractive. But there is no doubt that the large number of office buildings that have been
constructed in the area benefit from the presence of the metro, and therefore office space
in the area has a price premium. The construction boom in Providencia from 1977 to
1981 produced overinvestment in retail space. After the economic crisis of 1982-1985
many stores were vacant177. In the 1990's there was a fast reduction in vacant space, and
a new boom in construction.
176 Arriagada and Simioni (2001).
177 Galilea and Hurtado (1988), page 57.
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The downtown area also had a significant construction boom in the 1980's and 1990's.
Many building were built especially around stations Universidad de Chile and Santa
178Lucia . The municipality of Santiago invested heavily in improving the downtown
area. The construction of two pedestrian streets, Ahumada and Huirfanos made the area
very attractive. In the 1980's property values rose significantly in downtown, probably
because of the growth of the financial sector, which was attracted to the area. Moreover,
there was an increase of the proportion of space dedicated to retail, which gained a larger
influence area after the opening of the metro'7 9 .
Contrary to the major changes on land uses in the eastern part of the city, land uses in the
western part of the city did not have major changes after the opening of the metro. The
fact that the eastern part of the city concentrates high-income people and professionals
may have made the western part less attractive for office development. Nevertheless, this
does not explain the lack of housing development in the area. Only in recent years, with
the help of an urban redevelopment program, have new buildings been built around the
western part of Line 1.
Until the 1990's, Line 2 failed to foster new development around its stations. Several
reasons explain this failure:
e Most of the alignment is along an open-trench highway (Route 5), which may scare
development away
* The line serves a mid-income community, San Miguel, and during the 1980's and
1990's, there was a big supply of mid-income single-family houses in the
municipalities of La Florida and Maipd
* Probably only during the 1990's economic growth created a critical mass of mid-
income people whose income was big enough to afford living in high-rises. In Latin
America this form of housing is costly compared to the option of one-floor houses in
the periphery (probably this is different in the US because of zoning in the suburbs)
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178 Figueroa, 0 (1990).
179 Galilea and Hurtado (1988).
" There were few efforts by the government to induce redevelopment in the areas
around stations. The urban renewal program that was mentioned in section 6.1,
promoted the redevelopment of the area, but only from the 1990's
* The growth in commercial activities in the city center, and the construction of
shopping malls in the periphery, deterred the construction of commercial space in the
areas around stations
* The lack of big lots made the construction of shopping malls or high rises around
stations too expensive to be made
Only from the mid-1990's multi-family housing geared towards mid-income people have
become common in Santiago. The areas around Line 2 in San Miguel, and downtown
have been two of the places where this type of development is taking place. In spite of the
long time it took for redevelopment to occur in San Miguel, land values rose after the
construction of the metro' 80, maybe as a result of developers holding on land to wait for
the appropriate moment to develop it.
Six years after the opening of Line 5 the major changes in land uses around the alignment
have occurred in the southernmost part. The area around station Bellavista de La Florida
has continued its rapid development, triggered by the opening of a shopping mall in 1990,
before the metro station was built. The station has helped fuel the attractiveness of the
area for housing and development 181. As there is no intensive housing development along
Line 5, the line probably does not bring a significant number of customers to the
shopping mall. Nevertheless, many people park their cars in the shopping mall, use the
subway to go to their jobs18 2 . Probably this behavior does not bother the mall, since it has
not done anything to stop it. Probably some of the people who use the parking lots of the
mall, stop for shopping or entertainment before going back home. Moreover, only during
180 Galilea and Hurtado (1988), page 54.
181 De Mattos (1999) quotes a manager of the mall, who expressed how the metro station has become an
asset for Plaza Vespucio Shopping Center.
182 According to DICTUC (2001), the Auto-Metro mode is the one that has the highest proportion of their
users coming from the Southeastern part of the city, which is only served by line 5. Presumably, this is
caused by the large supply of free parking in the mall.
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weekends is the demand for parking space from shoppers comparable to the supply. This
leaves a lot of available space for commuters on weekdays.
A significant portion of the areas around Line 5 still are devoted to industrial uses, and
have not been redeveloped. The slow redevelopment of the areas may be caused by the
interest of municipalities to preserve the tax-base provided by these industries, and avoid
paying the cost of the services required by housing developments. It may also be the case
that the owners of the industries are speculating with the land. Most likely, for the first
industry to be redeveloped to more intense uses, the costs will exceed the benefits,
because of the presence of other industries in the zone, which make it an undesirable
place to live for most people. Nevertheless, the reduction in the number of industries
would ultimately make the area more attractive, and therefore the profits that could be
obtained by redeveloping the last few industries is probably very high. As was pointed
out before, this is the kind of market failures that the government has to solve for
redevelopment to occur.
In spite of the significant growth of metropolitan area from the time the metro opened, it
is highly dubious that the metro had any effect promoting the extension of the
metropolitan area. The lines do not go deep into the suburbs. The government's housing
building plans, which has caused a reverse gradient of densities as seen in Figure 19, may
have had a higher effect in the expansion of the metropolitan area. The increase of
motorization rates and the lift of the urban boundary may have also had an important role
fueling this expansion. Line 4, which will extend to Puente Alto, may change this
situation, and promote development in the yet not fully urbanized municipality of Pirque.
On the other hand, the provision of large parking facilities in terminal stations can
promote sprawl, but the metro in Santiago does not have large parking facilities. The
percentage of metro riders who access by driving their cars is only 4.5% in the morning
rush hour and even less during the rest of the day183
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183 Metro de Santiago (2003).
At a micro level, Galilea and Hurtado (1988) identified three impacts of the metro. First,
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housing has been displaced by commerce and service in the areas around stations
Second, low-income residents have been displaced by more affluent people in downtown.
Finally, in some areas of the city center, informal commercial activities have grown
around stations1 85. Apparently, informal commerce has grown in periods of economic
crisis (1982-1985, 1999-2003) but less so in other periods, and it is less common that in
Mexico City.
Overall, there is a general consensus that the metro reinforced the intensification of land
uses in the eastern part of Line 1 from the 1980's, and the emergence of a secondary
commercial and employment center in Providencia and Las Condes. This redevelopment
was triggered by an increase in demand for land in this area, which generated an
enormous increase in land values (see table on page 124). It is also clear that Line 2
generated the densification of San Miguel, but only since the second part of the 1990's,
twenty years after its opening. Finally, authors agreed that the metro has helped stop the
decline of the city center in terms of population and business activity.
6.3.2 An analysis of the effects of the metro on land uses
This section describes an analysis I made on the effect that Line 5 and the original two
lines had on land uses in Santiago in the 1990's.
The first segment of Line 5 opened in 1997, linking Bellavista de La Florida to
Baquedano, connecting to Line 1 in this station. In 2000 the line was extended to the
west, crossing the downtown area, and ending in Santa Ana, where it connects to Line 2.
In March 2004 a new extension to the West was opened.
I utilized the same methodology used in section 5.3.2, to estimate the effect of Line 5 on
land uses. In this case, the analysis is based on the zones used in 1991's origin/destination
184 Galilea and Hurtado (1988), page 60.
185 Galilea and Hurtado (1988), page 62.
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survey for Santiago 18. The population, area and income per capita of these zones were
compared to the same data for the zones of 2001's origin/destination survey for
Santiago 18. The changes on population and income per capita were estimated for zones
around Line 5, zones around other lines, and zones without direct access to the metro 88 .
189The analysis considered all the zones of 19 municipalities of the metropolitan area.
Most of the zones used in the 2001 origin/destination survey were exactly the same as
1991. Others are partitions or aggregations of the zones of 1991, and in other cases
groups of 1991's zones were split into new zones. All these changes are accounted in the
comparisons, so in all cases the comparisons are relevant.
Using the same methodology of section 5.3.2, I ranked the 23 1991's zones that gained
access to the metro network with the construction of Line 5, by average income per capita
in 1991. Then I separate them into two groups. The groups were chosen so that the
summation of the variance of the average income per capita within the each group was
minimized.
I formed similar groups based on population density in 1991. In this case two zones had
densities way out of the rest, so I decided to discard them. The other 21 zones were
divided in two groups, formed in such a way to minimize the summation of the variance
of density.
The range of average income per capita and density for each of the groups are shown in
the following table. As in the case of Mexico City, group 1 is the one with higher income
and lower densities. Both variables were negatively correlated for the different zones of
Santiago in 1991, as was also the case in Mexico City:
186 Data provided to the author by Sectra. There were 521 traffic analysis zones in the survey.187 Data provided to the author by Sectra. There were 749 zones in this survey.
188 As for the case of Mexico City, two blocks were considered the maximum distance to consider a zone
adjacent to a station.
189 Only municipalities at a similar distance to the city center were included. A full list of the included
municipalities is included in Appendix 4.
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Table 22: Upper and Lower limits of average income per capita and population density
for zone groups in Santiago de Chile
Group Limits Average Income per capita Density 1991
1991 (CHP of 2001) (Residents / Ha)
Upper 174,491 91.2
Lower 100,699 49.1
Upper 89,837 159.6
Lower 32,300 102.1
Source: Developed by the author
The 21 districts were also divided into those located in the core of the central city, and the
rest. What I mean by "the core of the central city" is the area with the highest
concentration of office space in the municipality of Santiago, which forms a triangle
limited by Alameda Avenue, Mapocho River, and Ruta 5. The high concentration of
office space in this area makes it very likely that the response to an increase in
accessibility in this zone was not the same as in the rest of the city. As the zones in the
core of the city center have higher average income per capita than the rest of the zones in
the 19 municipalities included in the analysis, I called the zones in this area "Group 1".
There are then two groups based on income per capita, two based on density and two
based on location. Therefore there are eight possible combinations of these groups. The
following table shows the how many of the 21 studied zones and how many other zones
of the 19 municipalities follow in these eight groups. The 21 zones that gained direct
access to the metro with the construction of Line 5, were called zones type-Y following
the names used in section 5.3.2. The rest of the zones were divided between those with
direct access to the other two metro lines (type-Z), and those without access to the metro
(type-X).
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Table 23: Number of zones in each of the eight categories
Group Income Density Location Y - With direct Z - With direct
Name Group Group Group X - Zones: access to the access to the
(high (low (core of Not close to Metro after the Metro before
income = density = central city any Metro construction of the 1990's
1) 1) = 1) station Line 5
A 1 8 5 1
B 2 2 1
1
C 1 4 3 1
2
D 2 2
E 1 20 5 7
F 2 1 1
2
G 1 39 6 13
2
H 2 5 3
Total 77 21 29
Source: Developed by the author
The low number of zones that gained access to the metro with the construction of Line 5
makes some groups have very low number of Y-zones: only 4 groups have 3 or more Y-
zones. As was pointed out before, no meaningful conclusions can be drawn from changes
in population or average income per capita with small samples, so only groups with 3 or
more Y-zones were analyzed. The following four tables compare the population density
in 1991, average income per capita in 1991, and the change of these indicators for these
four groups:
6.3.2.1 Group A: High income, Low density, Outside the city center
The following table shows the characteristics, and changes in population and average
income per capita between the origin-destination survey of 1991 and 2001 for the three
types of zones:
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Table 24: Comparison of
of roup A in Santiago
changes in population and average income per capita of zones
Characteristics Number Inhabitants Change in Average Change in average
of Zones per hectare population Monthly Income income per capita
1991 1991-2001 per Capita 1991 1991-2001
(CHIP 2001) (Constant CHP)
X - Not close to 8 80.5 32% $ 149,579 174%
any Metro
station
Y - With direct 5 60.3 28% $ 115,009 36%
access to the
Metro after the
construction of
Line 5
Z - With direct 1 69.5 37% $ 103,165 139%
access to the
Metro before the
1990's
Source: Developed by the author
As we see in this table, Y-zones had a similar change in population to X-zones. The
average income per capita in the former zones grew at a much smaller rate than in the
latter. No conclusion can be drawn from Z-type zones, since there is only one zone in this
group, and its change in population and in income per capita is likely to be highly
affected by other factors.
6.3.2.2 Group C: High income, High density, Outside the city center
The following table shows the characteristics, and changes in population and average
income per capita between the origin destination survey of 1991 and 2001 for the three
types of zones:
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Table 25: Comparison of changes in population and average income per capita of zones
of group C in Santiago
Characteristics Number Inhabitants Change in Average Change in average
of per hectare population Monthly Income income per capita
Zones 1991 1991-2001 per Capita 1991 1991-2001
(CHP 2001) (Constant CHP)
X - Not close to 4 126.6 -4% $ 120,269 73%
any Metro station
Y - With direct 3 114.1 5% $ 160,030 46%
access to the
Metro after the
construction of
Line 5
Z - With direct 1 127.0 3% $ 165,128 106%
access to the
Metro before the
1990's
Source: Developed by the author
As we see in this table, Y-zones increased their population, whereas the comparable X-
zones lost population. The average income per capita in the former zones grew at a much
smaller rate than in the latter zones. As it was the case for the previous group, the low
number of Z-type zones (one in this case) makes the changes of their population and
income per capita non-representative of the effect of the metro.
6.3.2.3 Group E: Low income, Low density, Outside the city center
The following table shows the characteristics, and changes in population and average
income per capita between the origin destination survey of 1991 and 2001 for the three
types of zones:
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Table 26: Comparison of
of group E in Santiago
changes in population and average income per capita of zones
Characteristics Number Inhabitants Change in Average Change in average
of Zones per hectare population Monthly Income income per capita
1991 1991-2001 per Capita 1991 1991-2001
(CHP 2001) (Constant CHP)
X - Not close to 20 68.7 1% $ 47,912 154%
any Metro
station
Y - With direct 5 78.2 13% $ 80,171 87%
access to the
Metro after the
construction of
Line 5
Z - With direct 7 68.8 13% $ 58,033 132%
access to the
Metro before the
1990's
Source: Developed by the author
As we see in this table, Y-zones had a higher growth in population than comparable X-
zones. As in the previous two cases, the average income per capita in the former zones
grew at a much smaller rate than in the latter zones. In this case there are seven Z-type
zones, so comparisons between groups are meaningful. The change in population of Z-
zones was similar to the one of Y-type zones, and its relative change in income per capita
was in between the change of the other two groups.
6.3.2.4 Group G: Low income, High density, Outside the city center
The following table shows the characteristics, and changes in population and average
income between the origin destination survey of 1991 and 2001 for the three types of
zones:
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Table 27: Comparison of
of group G in Santiago
changes in population and average income per capita of zones
Characteristics Number Inhabitants Change in Average Change in average
of Zones per hectare population Monthly Income income per capita
1991 1991-2001 per Capita 1991 1991-2001
(CHP 2001) (Constant CHP)
X - Not close to 39 126.5 2% $ 51,937 134%
any Metro
station
Y - With direct 6 126.5 -2% $ 51,583 112%
access to the
Metro after the
construction of
Line 5
Z - With direct 13 119.6 -3% $ 53,510 152%
access to the
Metro before the
1990's
Source: Developed by the author
As we see in this table, all the types of zones in this group had a similar change in
population, which was nearly zero. Y-zones had a lower growth in income per capita than
X-zones, which had less growth than Z-zones.
From the last four tables we can draw some conclusions. First, for some groups the
population in the zones that gained access to the metro with Line 5 (Y-type zones) had a
significant higher growth to the population in the areas without access to the metro,
something that we could not see in Mexico City (see section 5.3.2). In all comparable
cases, the change in average income per capita in Y-type zones was lower than for the
other two types of zones.
The low number of Z-zones included in two of the four groups made it impossible to test
if the low increase in income per capita of Y-type zones may be a consequence of the
little time between the opening of the line, and the measurement of income per capita (in
2001). In other words, we could not test if it may take time for the real estate market to
adjust to the changes in accessibility and demand.
To evaluate if this hypothesis is true, I compared the changes in population and average
income per capita between lines that had access to the metro before the 1990's (Z-zones),
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and those that do not have direct access to the metro (X-zones), redefining the groups so
that the number of zones in each group allows for meaningful comparisons.
The following graph shows the density and income per capita in 1991 of the zones
located next to lines 1 and 2 (Z-zones).
Figure 24: Income per capita and population density of zones located next to lines 1 and 2
in Santiago, Chile
250 .
1||200
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Source: Developed by author based Origin/Destination survey 1991
As can be seen in Figure 24, there is a big dispersion in the average income per capita,
and much less in population density.
Using the same methodology described for Y-zones, I made a list of all Z-zones, and
divide them into two homogenous groups according to their location in the core of the
city center, three groups according to their income per capita and three groups according
to their population density in 1991. As was done before, the groups were chosen to
minimize the summation of the variance of income per capita or density of the different
groups (see section 5.3.2 for further details). Some of the groups with the two highest
income per capita had fewer than 3 Z-zones, making their changes in population and
income per capita non good estimations of the effect of the metro itself, but subject to
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other effects. Therefore, I merged the two groups with the highest income per capita. The
ranges of the resulting groups are included in Table 28.
Table 28: Upper and Lower limits of average income per capita
for zone groups in Santiago de Chile
and population density
Group Limits Average Income per capita 1991 Density 1991
(CHP of 2001) (Residents / Ha)
1 Upper 312,474 
79.3
Lower 165,128 21.1
2 Upper 143,586 
168.6
Lower 23,772 87.2
Upper 232.6
Lower None 184.4
Source: Developed by author
The following table presents the changes in population and average income per capita for
the different groups. Only groups with three or more zones are included:
Table 29: Change in income per capita and population density for X and Z-zones in
Santiagc
Number of Zones Relative change in Relative change in
population Income per capita
X - Not Z - With X - Not Z - With X - Not Z - With
Income Density Location close to direct access close to direct close to direct
Group Group Group any to the Metro any access to any Metro access to
(high (low (core of Metro before the Metro the Metro station the Metro
income density central station 1990's station before the before the
=1) =1) city = 1) 1990's 1990's
1 1 2 8 4 37% 52% 133% 166%
1 2 2 8 5 19% 46% 79% 81%
2 1 2 19 11 59% 25% 142% 155%
2 2 2 89 24 -2% -4% 131% 153%
2 2 1 6 3 6% 26% 122% 191%
2 3 2 23 6 -28% -8% 170% 118%
Source: Developed by the author
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As can be seen in the table, for four of the six groups, the zones located next to the lines
built before 1990 (lines 1 and 2) had a higher increase in population than the ones located
far from the Metro. In the case of zones with low income, intermediate density and
outside the core downtown (combination 2-2-2), the difference between the two groups is
almost null. Moreover, for this group the growth in the number of households for Z-zones
was 9% versus 0% for X-zones (not shown in the table) 190. As can seen in the table, for
all the high-income areas population growth in Z-zones was higher than for X-zones,
confirming the observations that the metro in Santiago attracts middle and high-income
people.
With respect to changes of income per capita, in all but one case the change of income
per capita was higher in Z-type zones than in X-type zones. This difference can be a
consequence of people of relatively higher income's locating close to the metro
(gentrification), or of an increase in income of the people located next to the stations, as a
consequence of the reduction of transportation costs.
The results in the lasts table confirms that the areas around lines 1 and 2 went through a
development process in the 1990's that was significantly different from the one of areas
without direct access to the metro. This development was characterized in most cases by
a faster growth in population and average income per capita than in the rest of the city.
This difference does not prove by itself that the metro caused this change, but it suggests
that it did. At the very least these results prove that for most groups of zones, the metro
by itself did not hinder housing development and neither did it produce decreases in
average income per capita of the residents. The higher population and income per capita
growth around lines 1 and 2 compared to Line 5 may be an indication that it takes time
for redevelopment around stations to occur, or that lines 1 and 2 had a different impact on
land uses than Line 5.
190 This may indicate that these zones had very high number of people per unit of floor area, but
predominantly single-family houses, so not so many people per ground area (population density).
Redevelopment may have occurred in the form of apartment buildings, with fewer people per household,
and much lower people per floor area, as appears to be by the more than proportional increase in income
per capita for Z-zones.
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7 Reasons to Explain the Different Impacts in Both Cities
There are several reasons that can explain the difference between the impacts that the
metros of Mexico City and Santiago have had on the land uses. In this Chapter I will test
two hypotheses, namely that the impacts in Santiago have been higher than in Mexico
City because of differences in the intensity of use of the systems, and because of
differences in the average income per capita of their passengers.
7.1 Differences in the intensity of use
One reason that can explain the difference in the impact of both systems is the difference
in intensity of use. We will expect that systems with big flows of people per station to
attract retail to the areas around stations, since retail can draw clients from these flows.
The location of retail around stations may then attract some housing development.
Therefore if this hypothesis were true, the metro in Santiago would be used more
intensively than the metro in Mexico City.
Just to have an idea of the difference in magnitude of both metros, the following graph
presents the number of riders per year:
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Figure 25: number of passengers per year
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As we see in the graph, both systems have a completely different magnitude, being the
ridership in Mexico City almost six times larger than in Santiago. The metro in Santiago
though has experimented a more steady growth in the number of passengers, whereas the
peak of ridership in Mexico City was in 1989, and since then it has had an overall
decrease with some fluctuations.
The following graphs show the evolution in the number of passengers per station in both
systems:
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Figure 26: Passengers per station in Mexico City and Santiago
Source: See Appendix 2
As can be seen in the graph, the intensity of use has suffered a steep decrease in Mexico
since the early 1980's, especially in 1982 with the opening of lines 4 and 5. The initial
intensity was very high by international standards, and the construction of any new line
was likely to reduce the average intensity. Still now the intensity of use of Mexico City is
comparable to that of other subways of similar dimension, as seen on the following table.
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Table 30: Passengers per station in selected subways around the world in 1998
City Passengers per year Passengers per year
(millions) per station (million)
Mexico 1,344 8.0
Mexico in 1981 987 16.6
Moscow 3,188 20.2
Tokyo 2,090 13.5
Seoul 1,338 11.7
New York 1,093 2.3
Paris 1,029 3.5
Osaka 992 11.7
Hong Kong 813 21.4
London 784 3.0
Sao Paulo 694 16.7
Source: Data taken from Gilat (2002)
In Santiago, the intensity of use increased steadily from the opening of the system in the
mid-1970's until 1997, when line 5 was opened. Since then the intensity of use has
remained almost constant. The average intensity of use is still higher in Mexico City than
in Santiago, but the difference has been reducing in the last two decades.
As we see the difference in intensity of use is not a valid explanation for the apparent
higher impact of Santiago's metro on land uses, since the intensity is lower in Santiago
than in Mexico City. Nevertheless, we are only considering average intensity. If we look
at the intensity of use per line, we can see that there is an enormous difference among
them. The following graph shows the intensity of use per line in 2003:
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27: Intensity of use per line for Mexico City and Santiago de Chile in 2003
. Santiago + Mexico
Source: Passengers, see Appendix 2, number of stations from www.metrodesantiago.cl and
www.metro.df.gob.mx. Line 10 refers to Line A, Line 11 refers to Line B
In both cities, the initial lines are the most intensively patronized, and subsequent lines
have been less successful. In absolute terms, Line 1 in Chile is similar to most of the low-
ridership lines in Mexico City in terms of number of station per station, and lines 2 and 5
from Santiago, are only comparable to line 4 in Mexico.
As we see in this last figure, the intensity of use cannot be the cause of the apparent
higher impact of Santiago's subway on land uses. It can explain though the apparent
higher impact of the first three lines on land uses in Mexico City, specifically in the city
center, compared to the impact of subsequent lines, particularly the three lines we studied
in detail in section 5.3.2. It can also explain the apparent higher impact of Line 1 on land
uses in Santiago, compared to lines 2 and 5.
As was said in section 4.4.3, the attractiveness of the areas around stations for retailers
depends on the flow of purchasing power around them. What I mean by flow of
purchasing power is the flow of people multiplied by their purchasing power. Flows of
people are lower around stations in Santiago than in Mexico, but probably the purchasing
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power of those people is higher in the Chilean capital. I discuss this point in the following
section.
7.2 Different average income of riders in both cities
One of the reasons that may explain the apparent different effect that the metros of
Mexico City and Santiago have had on land values and land uses, is the different average
income of passengers in both systems. As was said in section 5.2.1, the metro of Mexico
City has been planned to serve low-income people, whereas, as was said in section 6.3.1,
the one in Santiago de Chile attracts many mid- and high-income people.
There are several reasons why the average income of passengers in the two cities is big,
other than the enormous differences in fares. One reason is the level of service of each
system. It is a widely recognized fact that during rush hour, lines 1, 2 and 3 are very
crowded in Mexico City, whereas in Santiago this situation is less acute. Another
plausible reason is the perception of insecurity in the metro, which apparently is high in
Mexico City and low in Santiago. An additional reason is related to the status that people
associate with riding each system. Whereas Mexico's metro has a stigma of being only
for low-income people, the opposite is true in Santiago. The apparently cleaner
conditions of cars and stations in Santiago may be another reason why this subway seems
to be more attractive to high- and mid-income people than Mexico's.
Some other reasons are less plausible. The design of the cars is not a viable explanation
since until the mid-1990's all the cars in Santiago were the original model of Alstom cars
bought in the 1970's, which were also used by Mexico City's subway. None of the
metros' cars have air-conditioned, and the weather in both cities is not significantly
different.
In this section, I try to probe the hypothesis that the metro in Mexico City has become an
inferior good, i.e. one which is less consumed as people's income grow, contrary to
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Santiago's metro. The reduction in metro usage in Mexico would be explained by
people's switch to cars as soon as they can afford it. Given the fact that low-income
people in both cities tend to live in cheap land, most of which is far from the city center
and from the metro network, most passengers in Mexico City would connect from their
homes to the network through feeder buses. This characteristic would explain the little
changes on land uses around stations in Mexico City.
To test the hypothesis, I used multiple regression analysis to relate changes in metro
ridership with changes in GDP, fares and the number of stations in both systems. The
values of all these variables are presented in Appendix 2. Unfortunately, I did not have
access to a reliable estimation of bus fares or estimations of the cost to operate a car in
both cities at different times. These variables could have improved the models I
developed in the following two sections.
7.2.1 An analysis of ridership in Mexico City
The following graph shows the evolution of GDP, fares, number of stations and ridership
from 1981 to 2003 in Mexico City. GDP, fares and the number of stations are expressed
as a percentage of 1990's values. GDP and fares are in constant pesos. I chose to start my
analysis in 1981, because that year was the first one in which lines 1 and 2 were
completed, and line 3 had 16 of its 21 stations. As can be seen in Figure 11, these three
lines are the core of the system, concentrating 59% of the boardings in 2003. Therefore I
expect that after 1981 a more stable base of riders had been established, and that changes
in GDP, fares (adjusted for inflation) and number of stations had a more stable effect on
demand.
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Figure 28: Ridership, GDP, average fare (adjusted for inflation) and number of stations in
Mexico City's metro
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Source: See Appendix 2 for details and assumptions.
In this graph we see that during the 1980's, when GDP was stable, the number of
passengers moved in tandem with the number of stations, in spite of a tremendous growth
in fares. This increase in the number of passengers suggests that fares had a modest
impact on ridership in this period. In 1995, there was an important increase in ridership,
in spite of another rise in fares, and at the same time of a major economic crisis. This
high ridership and its subsequent decrease in the following two years, when GDP was the
only of the three explaining variables to change significantly (it increased), suggest a
negative correlation between ridership and GDP.
Other reasons can also explain the decrease in the number of passengers in the last
decade. Some of them are the following:
e The earthquake of 1986 may have caused a decrease in the number of residents in the
central area of the city, which is the largest trip generator and attractor in the metro
network. The explanation seems reasonable, since the decrease in the number of
passengers roughly coincides with the earthquake. There was indeed a decrease in the
number of residents in the central areas, since many of the buildings became
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inhabitable 91. Moreover, the ridership decrease was especially intense in lines 1, 2
and 3, the lines that served the central area directly
e An inadequate maintenance and investment policy in the first three lines made the
level of service decrease after 20 years of operation, reducing the level of service of
the metro, and making it less attractive to the public. The reduction in the level of
service of these three lines may have driven the loss in ridership in the other lines,
since most passengers' trips include segments in at least one of the three lines. This
theory is not very credible, since Mexico City's metro has a good operational
performance compared to other metros in the COMET group192
e The fragmentation of the bus system in the late 1980's may have affected the metro,
since buses may have feed it with passengers. This is also a plausible explanation.
Although there was not a free transfer program in Mexico City, except for the 1986-
1997 period, people may have used buses to access the metro
* The original plan of the subway only considered three lines. Subsequent lines have
suffered from the lack of planning for their connection to these core lines. It is not
unusual to have very long walks to connect from one line to the other
* Rather than stimulating more demand in the other lines, new lines may have diverted
passengers. This is a plausible explanation for the decrease in the number of
passengers in Line 1 after the opening of Line 9, which was designed precisely to
relieve congestion in Line 1
e The low ridership of the lines opened in the 1980's and 1990's can also be explained
by the fact that they essentially by-pass the downtown area, which still is the main
attractor and generator of trips in the metropolitan area. This theory and the previous
two do not explain the loss in ridership in the entire system
I could not test the hypothesis of the effect of the deterioration of the bus system on
Metro's ridership, because I did not have access to any reliable indicator of the quality of
the service it provided in the period of the analysis.
191 According to Ward (1998), buildings in the central area were already in bad conditions before the
earthquake, because of disinvestments caused by rent controls.
192 Gilat (2002) The COMET group is a benchmarking group formed by the nine largest subways in the
world, including Mexico City's.
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Given the small number of years we are considering, it is better to use a limited number
of variables. The inclusion of more variables would have made it extremely difficult to
find coefficients that are significantly different to zero, given their likely correlation with
the other variables being used. As was said before, the variables that are going to be
tested are GDP, fares (adjusted for inflation) and number of stations. To test the relation
of these variables, I ran several regressions, with different specifications. The first
specification is linear, and has the following formula:
R = QA + 2GDP + /33Fare + / 4Num _stations + E Equation 5
Where R is the number of riders in a year.
The following table shows the results of this model, which I dubbed Model 1:
Table 31: Results of regression with Model 1 for Mexico City
Adjusted R2 = 0.866
Variable Coefficient T-stat
1 1389.9 20.55
P2 -0.0012 -8.35
P3 -19.700 -0.81
p4 8.6291 9.45
Source: Developed by the author
As we see in Table 31, the model has a very high adjusted-R square. The coefficients
have all the signs we expected. The coefficient of the fare, although having the expected
sign, negative, is not significant at a 95% confidence level.
To improve the results of the previous model, I discarded Fare from the equation,
obtaining the following results:
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Table 32: Results of regression with Model 2 for Mexico City
Variable Coefficient T-stat
01 1401.2 21.35
$2 -0.0012 -8.42
@3 - -
P4 8.1722 11.47
Source: Developed by the author
This model produced higher adjusted R2 than the previous model, and makes all
coefficients have the expected sign, and be significant at the 95% confidence level.
The high adjusted-R square of the previous two regressions may be misleading. GDP and
the number of passengers may have exponential growth curves, i.e. their growth may be a
constant percentage per year, all other affecting variables being equal. To check if this is
the case, I ran a regression with the following formula:
R = exp(QA + Q2Num - stations + 3 Fare + $4 year + e)
Where year = 1 for 1981, 2 for 1982, etc.
This equation is equivalent to:
logR = $A + 2Num _stations + /33Fare + fl, year + e
Equation 6
Equation 7
The following table shows the results of this model, which I dubbed Model 3:
Table 33: Results of regression with Model 3 for Mexico City
Adjusted R2 = 0.889
Variable Coefficient T-stat
1I 6.1578 68.71
$2 0.0128 10.48
@3 0.0095 0.54
04 -0.0533 -9.18
Source: Developed by the author
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Adjusted R = 0.869
The model has a higher adjusted R2 than the previous models. As in Model 1, the
coefficient of Fare is not significant at a 95% confidence level, but in this case the
coefficient is positive, which is obviously contra-intuitive. Then, I ran the same model,
but discarding the variable Fare. The result is the following:
Table 34: Results of regression with Model 4 for Mexico City
Adjusted R2 = 0.893
Variable Coefficient T-stat
01 6.1493 70.96885
P2 0.0130 11.14
p3 - -
p4 -0.0532 -9.34
Source: Developed by the author
Finally, I tested a Cobb-Douglas function, in which there is a constant elasticity of the
number of riders with respect to the explaining variables. I did not include the variable
Fare, giving the previous results:
R =A* Num _ stations * GDPA * E Equation 8
Which is equivalent to:
log R = log $1 + $2 log Num _ stations +$3 log GDP + log -F Equation 9
The following table shows the results of this model, which I dubbed Model 5:
Table 35: Results of regression with Model 5 for Mexico City
Adjusted R2 = 0.904
Variable Coefficient T-stat
P1 13.141 14.85
P2 0.6322 13.46
P3 -0.6558 -8.43
Source: Developed by the author
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The model is an additional improvement to what we had before. The value of adjusted R2
is higher than for any other of the models, the coefficients have the expected sign, and
they are significant at a 95% confidence level.
Finally, I tried a similar model to Model 5, but substituting GDP for Time. The results are
in the following table:
Table 36: Results of regression with Model 6 for Mexico City
Adjusted R2 = 0.593
Variable Coefficient T-stat
pi 8.4934 3.72
$2 -0.3765 -0.69
@3 0.2376 1.21
Source: Developed by the author
2
This model yielded a low adjusted R . Moreover, the coefficient of the number of stations
is negative, though not significant at any reasonable confidence level. Finally, the year
time coefficient is not significant.
I ran models 1 and 3 again using the proportion of the GDP per capita that 1000 tickets
cost for every year, instead of the raw fare. The estimated coefficients for this variable
also failed to be significant for Model 1, and had a negative sign for Model 3. I also ran
models 1, 2, 4 and 5 including a dummy variable that was 0 up to 1985, and 1 after that
year to determine the impact of 1985's earthquake on ridership. In all cases the
coefficient for this variable was positive, which in light of the figure on page 76 is clearly
193
wrong
193 This result may be a consequence of the small number of years included in the analysis, and the
correlation of this dummy variable with the other explanatory variables: 0.76 with fares, 0.79 with the
number of stations 0.54 with GDP and 0.72 with year.
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Several conclusions can be made from this analysis. First, the best model to explain the
variations of ridership in Mexico City's metro is Model 5. Apparently increases in GDP
cause decrease in the number of passengers, or at least both variables are correlated.
People may switch from Metro to other modes in periods of economic growth. This mode
switch is even stronger than the growth of trips in all modes associated with economic
growth. Ridership does not seem to be affected by changes in fares, probably because
fares in Mexico City are very low (currently around 20 cents of a dollar for a single trip).
Ridership increases as a response to the increase in the number of station, but this effect
has not impeded a decrease in the number of passengers in the last few years.
7.2.2 An analysis of ridership in Santiago de Chile
The same variables shown in the figure on page 146 for Mexico City are shown in the
following graph for Santiago. As in the case of Mexico City, GDP, fares (adjusted for
inflation) and number of stations are expressed as a percentage of 1990's values. GDP
and fares are in constant Chilean pesos. Similar to the case of Mexico, I chose to start my
analysis in 1981. I chose this year because that was the first year line 1 was opened in its
full extension for the entire year. This line in 2003, and as we saw in Figure 23, this line
is the core of Santiago's subway, concentrating 64% of the boardings.
Figure 29: Ridership, GDP, average fare and number of stations in Santiago's metro
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Source: See Appendix 2 for details and assumptions.
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As can be seen in this graph, in the period 1981-1983 there was a decrease in the number
of passengers, despite the decrease in average fares (adjusted for inflation), and a fixed
number of stations. GDP, which decreased in this period, is the only explanatory variable
included in the graph that can explain the decrease in the number of passengers. The
subsequent growth in ridership in 1984-1986 when fares increased and stations remained
fixed, while GDP grew, reinforce the idea of a positive correlation between GDP and
ridership. The theory is further reinforced by the decrease of ridership in 1999, the first
year of economic contraction since 1983. The relation is positive, contrasting with the
negative relation we found for Mexico City.
The decrease in ridership in 1987, in a year of economic growth, increase in the number
of passengers and sharp increase in fares, suggests the existence of a high elasticity of
demand with respect to fares. This high elasticity is reinforced by the decrease of
ridership in 2001, though in this case the elasticity seems to be lower than in 1987.
The opening of Line 5 in 1997, and its extension in 2000 seem to have produced a
permanent increase in ridership.
Other variables can also explain the reduction in the growth of ridership since 1997. One
of them is the increasing congestion of the system at rush hour, which may be making
people choose other modes. This explanation is valid for the stagnation in the number of
people traveling at rush hour (see footnote 166). Unfortunately no index of congestion
was available to test the effect of this variable on demand.
To test the relation of ridership with GDP, fares and the number of stations I tested
several models with different specifications for ridership, all of which were estimated
using linear regressions. The first model is similar to Model 1 for Mexico, so it considers
the following formula for the number of riders:
R = + J 2GDP +,,Fare +6 4 Num _stations + e Equation 10
Where R is the number of riders in a year.
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The following table shows the results of this model, which I dubbed Model 1:
Table 37: Results of regression with Model 1 for Santiago de Chile
Adjusted R2 = 0.9327
Variable Coefficient T-stat
P1 7.4000 5.43
P2 3.84E-06 7.12
p3 -0.1227 -1.34
p4 0.5708 0.96
Source: Developed by the author
This model seems to fit the data very well. The adjusted R2 is very high, and the signs of
the coefficients are the ones we expected. The coefficient of GDP is significant at a 95%
confidence level. Considering that the distribution of the estimated coefficient is
Student's t with 19 degrees of freedom, and using a one-sided percentile, since we know
for sure that the coefficients of fare and number of stations are negative and positive
respectively, we can obtain the significance level of these coefficients. The coefficient of
Fare is significant at more than 90% confidence level, and the one for Num-stations is
significant at more than 82% confidence level.
I tested a new model, where instead of using fares, I used a measure of the ration between
fares and GDP per capital . It makes sense that people's response to changes in fares
depends on their income. As the economy of Chile grew 155% between 1981 and 2003,
the difference between using fares or fares/GDP per capita should be significant. In this
new model, ridership was estimated with the following equation:
Fare *1 _ million
R =A+/ 2 GDP +Q3 A er cpita + /in 4Num _stations + e Equation 11
GDP _ per _capita
194 The variable was (Fares*1I million) / (GDP per capita). See Appendix 2 for values.
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I called this model for Santiago "Model 2". The results of the regression are presented in
the following table:
Table 38: Results of regression with Model 2 for Santiago de Chile
Adjusted R2= 0.9339
Variable Coefficient T-stat
P1I 94.253 5.08
P2 2.93E-06 5.18
$3 -0.2709 -1.47
04 0.6882 1.12
Source: Developed by the author
This model is better than Model 1. Adjusted R2 is higher, and so are T-stats of the
coefficients of fare (in this model it is the coefficient for Fare *1 million /GDP per
capita), and of the number of stations. The coefficient of GDP continues to be significant
well above the 95% confidence level. All the coefficients kept their sign.
Considering again a one-sided percentile of Student's t distribution with 19 degrees of
freedom, in this model the coefficient of Fare *1 million /GDP per capita is significant at
more than 92% confidence level, and the one for Numstations, at more than 86%
confidence level. Considering the small number of observations, and the fact that the
signs of the coefficients are the ones we expected, these levels of confidence seem high
enough for including these two variables in the model.
As in the case of Mexico City, I tested other models. First I checked using an exponential
growth of ridership with respect to time, fare and number of stations, using the following
equation:
Fare *1 _millionR = exp($+#2Num _ stations +$3 Farn+$4 year + e) Equation 12
GDP _per - capita
Where year = 1 for 1981, 2 for 1982, etc.
As was pointed out in the previous section, this equation is equivalent to:
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Fare * 1 million
log R = $1 + $2Num _ stations +,$3 + $4year +
GDP - per - capita
Equation 13
The following table shows the results of this model, which I dubbed Model 3:
Table 39: Results of regression with Model 3 for Santiago de Chile
Adjusted R2 = 0.9041
Variable Coefficient T-stat
p1 4.8072 33.39
P2 0.0026 0.60
p3 -0.0015 -1.07
p4 0.0242 4.86
Source: Developed by the author
As we see in this table, Model 3 has a lower adjusted R2 than Model 2. Moreover, the
coefficients of Fare *1 million /GDP per capita and of Num-stations are lower than the
equivalent coefficients in Model 2.
I also tested a Cobb-Douglas model, in which ridership has constant elasticity with
respect to the explanatory variables, in this case Fare*1 million /GDP per capita,
Numstations and either GDP (Model 4) or Year (Model 5). In these models ridership is
estimated with the following equations:
Fare *1 million
logR= log 1 +82 log Num _ stations + 3  - +4 log GDP+ logeGDP _ per _ capita
Equation 14, for Model 4.
Fare * 1 _million
log R = log$1 + $82 log Num _ stations +, $ + , log Year + log e
GDP - per - capita
Equation 15, for Model 5.
The results of the regressions using each model are presented in the following table:
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Table 40: Results of regression with Model 3 for Santiago de Chile
Model Number 4 5
Adjusted R2  0.9283 0.8605
Variable Coefficient T-stat Coefficient T-stat
Pi -2.1941 -1.85 3.5419 4.61
s2 0.1418 0.92 0.6316 4.31
@3 -0.0746 -0.63 -0.2304 -1.43
@4 0.4204 5.85
P5 0.1008 2.89
Source: Developed by the author
As we see in the table, Model 4 had a higher adjusted R2 than Model 5, but the former
has higher absolute value of t-stats for the coefficients of Fare *1 million /GDP per capita
and of Num-stations, probably caused by a correlation between these two variables and
GDP. Both models are inferior to Model 2 in terms of the goodness of fit, and Model 4 t-
stats for Fare *1 million /GDP per capita and of Num-stations are much lower than the
ones obtained in Model 2.
I also ran a model similar to Model 2 for Chile, but which instead of using GDP, includes
Year. I called this Model 6. Ridership was estimated with the following equation:
Fare * 1 _ million
R= 1 + $J2Year + 3 Fare apml an+$4Num _ stations + eGDP _ per _ capita
Equation 16
The results of the regression are in the following table:
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Table 41: Results of regression with Model 6 for Santiago de Chile
Adjusted R2= 0.9294
Variable Coefficient T-stat
p1 104.16 5.39
p2 3.2668 4.89
p3 -0.2619 -1.36
p4 1.0206 1.74
Source: Developed by the author
This model has the second highest R2 of the six models we estimated for Chile, only
behind Model 2. All the coefficients have the expected sign. Compared to Model 2,
Model 6 has lower absolute t-stat for the coefficient of Fare *1 million /GDP per capita
and higher for the coefficient of Num-stations. Model 2 has an additional advantage over
Model 5: a lower intercept, meaning that a larger proportion of ridership is explained by
the variables.
Several conclusions can be taken from this analysis for Santiago. First, the best model to
explain variations in ridership is Model 2. GDP growth is positively correlated with
ridership, and probably there is a causal effect. People may switch from other modes to
the Metro in periods of economic growth (most likely from buses), or make more trips in
all modes, including the Metro.
Ridership seems to be elastic to fares, but this elasticity has decreased over time as GDP
per capita has grown. This reduction in the elasticity of demand with respect to fares is
proved by the fact that the ratio between fares and GDP per capita was able to explain
more of the variation in ridership than fares by themselves.
Ridership seems to increase after more stations are opened. The most important increase
in the number of stations in the period occurred only in the last few years. In these years
ridership has been volatile, maybe because of some of the steepest increases in fares and
decreases in GDP in the period. This volatility may have impeded us to obtain a more
significant coefficient for the variable Num-stations.
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7.2.3 Conclusions from the analyses
In the previous two sections, we have seen the similarities and differences of the effects
of GDP, fares and number of stations on ridership both cities. In both cases models using
GDP as explanatory variable were better able to explain changes in ridership than models
using time. In both cases the increase in the number of stations in the system was
positively correlated with ridership.
Whereas in Mexico City ridership had a negative correlation with GDP, the relation was
positive in Chile. Whereas ridership was inelastic to fares in Mexico City, it was elastic
in Santiago.
These results confirm our hypothesis that the metro in Mexico City has become an
inferior good, i.e. one which is less consumed as people's income grow, contrary to
Santiago's metro. This idea though is not new in the literature. As was mentioned in
sections 6.2.2 and 5.2.1, several studies confirm that there is a significant difference in
income of metro passengers in these cities.
There is a spatial mismatch between demand and supply of rapid transit in Mexico City.
As we said in section 5.1, densities in the metropolitan area do not vary significantly with
respect to the distance to the city center. Additionally, we know land values are in general
terms higher in the city center, and that, on average, high-income people live closer to the
city center than low-income people (see section 5.1). On the other hand, the densest part
of the rail transit network is in the city center. As was pointed out in section 5.2.1, the
metro lines follow the corridors used by low-income workers in their commute, not
necessary the corridors with high concentration of low-income people's housing, which
tend to locate in the periphery of the metropolitan area. Many low-income people travel
from the terminal stations to the city center. The terminal stations accounted for 30% of
the incoming passengers in labor days in 2000195. The area between the terminal stations
and the downtown is generally occupied by mid-income people, who are much less
195 Information provided to the author by STC. Considering that a large proportion of these passengers
enter to the metro on their way to downtown, we can see that probably more than half of the trips in the
metro correspond to people who live beyond the terminal stations.
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attracted to the metro than low-income people in the periphery. This spatial distribution
of the population determines a situation in which people willing to use the metro cannot
afford to live close to the stations, and people that live close to the stations do not want to
use the metro.
The situation is the opposite in Santiago. The municipalities served by the metro are more
affluent than the average municipality in the metropolitan area, and their land values are
higher, as was mentioned in section 6.1. But contrary to Mexico City, metro attracts the
people that can afford to live close to the stations. It has been estimated that for trips from
196
and to areas around stations, Santiago's metro captures 52% of the trips1 . Moreover,
except for the morning-peak period where the access mode of 1/3 of Metro's passengers
is walking, in all periods more than 58% of the passengers come to the station walking. In
the evening peak, more than 50% leave the station walking, and in other periods this
figure is higher than 61%197. Walking trips are most likely from origins and to
destinations located close to the stations. A large portion of metro users is people who
live close to the stations. Terminal stations only accounted for 20% of incoming
18
passengers in 2002, much less than in Mexico19 .
This difference in the location of the passengers with respect to the network is another
factor determining the different impacts that subways have had on land uses in these two
cities.
196 Metro de Santiago (2000) cited in Zegras (2000), page 56.
197 Metro de Santiago (2003).
198 Metro de Santiago (2003).
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8 Using Land Value Capture to Fund Transit Investment
This Chapter explains several reasons why land value capture should be used to fund rail
transit construction. It also describes how land value capture has been used around the
world to fund rail transit construction.
8.1 Distortions generated by property taxes
The property taxes that exist in Mexico and Chile, as in many other jurisdictions around
the world, entail two different taxes: one on the land and another on the buildings located
on the land. These two taxes have very different effects on the real estate market. While
the tax on buildings generates several distortions such as sprawl and land speculation, the
tax on land has a neutral effect with respect to these problems.
By taxing buildings, governments promote a reduction in the intensity of use of the land.
Private firms and individuals can trade-off land for capital (in the form of buildings).
Then, if one of these factors is taxed, the other is used more extensively and their price
rises. Therefore, the tax on building promotes sprawl and raises land prices. Cities with
low densities are less suitable for transit service and part of their infrastructure is more
expensive to build and operate (water, sewage, telephone service, natural gas, etc.).
Taxes on buildings promote the abandonment of land by making the maintenance and
improvement of old buildings more expensive' 99 . In fact, many property owners end up
tearing down these buildings, and replacing them with parking lots to pay lower taxes.
Both Mexico City and Santiago have been expanding fast in the last few decades, in spite
of the existence of vacant or underutilized land near their city centers. This land is usually
in the areas best served by the existing infrastructure. The existence of taxes on buildings
may be one of the causes of this problem.
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19 Harris (1999).
There are several other reasons to avoid taxes on buildings. These taxes encourage a
reduction of the planned durability of them. Charging more for buildings made to last for
longer, cause developers to reduce their quality 200. Taxes on buildings also favor
speculation. If there were a tax exclusively on land, the marginal cost of developing the
land would be lower than under the current tax structure, so the relative cost of holding
land undeveloped would be higher. Having taxes on buildings raises the relative
advantage of land uses with lower construction costs. This advantage means that under
the current tax structure, activities such as parking lots and gas stations occupy more
accessible land than what is socially optimal201
The development of different land plots in the same area of a city is mutually dependent.
This dependency means that the abandonment, lack of maintenance or low quality in the
development in a site, affects the development of the surrounding sites. Therefore, the
negative effects of the tax on buildings are reinforced by this characteristic.
A tax based exclusively on land values would have redistributive benefits. It would keep
ownership costs (i.e. the price plus the tax) constant, while reducing land values. As the
interest rate paid by people depend on their income or wealth, switching to a property tax
only based on the value of land would reduce the relative purchasing power between
people of different income. This reduction would allow poor people to live in lower
202densities, and would force rich people into more dense housing
Several local jurisdictions have property taxes based exclusively on land values. Many of
them are in Australia, New Zealand, Denmark and certain regions on England. In the US,
several Philadelphia jurisdictions have lead the way in this direction, by lowering the tax
on buildings and increasing the one on land values. These localities have had larger
numbers of permits for constructions than comparable communities in the same area.
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200 Gaffney (1999).
201 Gaffney (1999).
202 Gaffney (1999).
Although no causal relation can be inferred, the results are at least not contradictory with
203
what one would predict
8.2 The case for land value capture
Value capture, also called benefit-sharing, is a mechanisms in which part of the benefits
gained by the beneficiaries of a project are used to fund the required investment. For
example, in some cases the construction of transportation infrastructure generates
increases in the value of the land served by it. Governments around the world have used
land value capture mechanisms to fund these investments. In many cases, this has been
the only possible way to finance these projects.
There are many reasons to use value capture. First, value-capture is more just and
efficient than using traditional taxes to fund infrastructure. Value capture reduces land
speculation, creates a stable source of funding, and it makes governments more
accountable for the benefits of their investments 204. Value-capture mechanisms can fund
several transportation projects that, although being cost-effective, are not built because of
the shortage of public funds. The revenues generated by value-capture mechanisms are
less dependent on political cycles than the funds that come from the government.
Therefore, these mechanisms can provide long-term funding, which can reduce the risks
associated with funds coming from other sources.
Value-capture mechanisms are inherently different from what people understand by
taxes. With value capture the ones who pay for the project are the beneficiaries, not the
general public. Value capture is therefore a charge for a service, a good, or a right. The
amount of money each of the beneficiaries pay can be proportional to the benefit they
obtain, not necessarily to the cost of the project. Used in this way, value capture can also
be a source of revenue.
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203 See Harris (1999).
204 Wenzer (1999).
The value of urban land almost never varies as a function of what the owners do on it, but
as a function of societies action: the infrastructure that is deployed, the zoning codes, the
economic growth of a region, etc. 205 . Contrary to taxes, value-capture mechanisms charge
for the impact of investments made by the government or by society, not for what
property owners do on it.
Value capture is more efficient than taxes, because it does not create deadweight losses.
Urban land is completely inelastic; it cannot be created nor destroyed 206. Therefore,
taxing urban land, or charging for the betterments, does not reduce the total amount of
land consumption as it is the case for taxing any other good207. Moreover, it does not
promote tax-elusion, since urban land is impossible to hide.
Land value capture reduces land speculation. The fact that land values rise as a result of
governments' decision regarding transportation investment, makes people speculate with
land. The land that is left out of the market for speculation purposes pushes development
to the periphery of the city, and leaves resources unutilized for society. Capital gains
from speculation are only transfers between individuals; they are not net social gain.
The usage of tax revenues for funding public works makes the general public unaware of
the cost/benefit analysis that justify these projects. The implementation of value capture
mechanisms would make governments more prone to choose projects with high
cost/effectiveness ratio, and citizens more aware of how governments spend their money.
As capital and labor are mobile in the long run, their profits are determined at a regional
or national level. But land is a fixed factor, and therefore its value rises as a consequence
of an increase in efficiency. The usage of revenue from land value taxes to reduce the
205 One of the few exceptions may be when landowners clean the land that was previously polluted.
206 We could argue that indeed it can be created, as it proved to be the case with the land reclaiming in
Kansai and Hong Kong for their new airport projects, the dam building projects in Holland, and the
extension of Manhattan through land filling projects. Nevertheless, these are extremely expensive ways of
creating land, and therefore not practical in most cases.
207 It may be argued though that any tax increase will cause a decline in consumption, given the fact that
people's budget is finite.
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cost of services to their short-run efficient level would produce gains in efficiency that
208
would more than compensate for the required taxes
Value capture can help avoid the irreversible damage produced by sprawl. The lack of
funds to build public projects forces their postponement. In the case of transit, the lack of
investment fosters sprawl and low-density development. Location decisions are almost
irreversible, so the damage caused by the lack of good transit lasts for a long time.
Redevelopment is very expensive, and therefore city form depends on which mode
209prevailed at the time of fastest development of a city . The existence of sustainable
sources of income such as the ones available with value-capture mechanisms could help
governments avoid this risk.
Transit Oriented Development (TOD) has been proposed as a way of dealing with
congestion. Although having large popular and political support, TOD has not been
implemented extensively, probably due to the inability of government to fund this type of
development2 . Value-capture mechanisms make TOD a viable strategy. In fact, as we
will see in the next sections, it has allowed different cities such as Stockholm and Tokyo
to orientate development towards public transportation.
8.3 Land value capture in the US
The most common form of land value capture to fund rail transit in the last few years in
the US has been joint development. This mechanism consists on transit agencies selling
or leasing part of a station area for its development. The developer usually pays for direct
connections from the stations to the new buildings.
208 Vickrey (1999).
209 This idea is explained in Hoyt (1939). Marshall (2000) stresses that city form depends on the prevailing
mode, but only if the government allows that mode to prevail. For example, he states that cars prevailed in
the US because governments build highways, not the other way around.210Renne and Newman (2002).
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A study on all rail-related joint development experiences in the US found that 40% of
them include cost sharing, and 20% revenue sharing 21 . Washington D.C. and Atlanta
have the most successful cases of station area property and air rights leasing. Joint
development has added a premium of $3 per square foot to office rents, while office
vacancy rates have been lower, average building sizes have been bigger and growth has
been higher around stations than in the rest of both citiesm
WMATA, the transit agency of Washington D.C., has used value capture mechanisms for
213decades . In 1999 it had a total of 24 completed projects, including 4 million square feet
of office space, 1,000 hotel rooms, and 300 residences. These projects generate around $6
million in annual revenues, and a total of $60 million have been generated by their first
project, Rosslyn, which was completed in 1973. Furthermore, the agency estimates that
the projects induce more than 1 million trips per year. In addition to the direct revenue,
these projects have helped to pay for the costs of the operation, through passengers' fares.
Two of WMATA most successful projects have been the ones around Ballston station in
Arlington, Virginia, and Bethesda station in Maryland. Ballston station is located in an
old boulevard. Arlington County designed an incentive program for the redevelopment of
the area, where in exchange for paying for the construction of sidewalks and parks,
developers were allowed to use higher floor-area ratios21s. The program tried to avoid the
mistakes made in the adjacent Rosslyn station, where low-quality office space was built,
reducing the attractiveness of the area. In this case WMATA created class-A office space
and multi-familiar housing. The project also included a Hilton Hotel, university facilities
216
and a shopping center
211 Cervero (1992).
212 Cervero (1992).
213 McNeal and Doggett (1999).
214 McNeal and Doggett (1999).
215 Personal communication with Robert Brosnan, Arlington County Government, VA, March 26, 2002.
2 16 Renne and Newman (2002).
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Bethesda Metro Center includes 378,000 square feet of office space, a 380-room Hyatt
Hotel and 60,000 square feet of retail space. The project helped revive a once decaying
area, and provide WMATA with around $1.6 million a year in rents.
MARTA has also had successful experiences with joint development. Two examples are
Resurgence Plaza at Lenox Station and One Atlantic Center, near Arts Center Station.
Both are office buildings, and have provided more than $1 million a year in leases. They
217have also helped to increase ridership in the adjacent stations
MARTA has had a proactive attitude towards development. It has created a standard
planning process for the development of the areas around stations. It includes the
acquisition of land around existing or proposed stations for value capture purposes, the
selection of a developer, and the formation of special districts for making land assembly
218possible
Other transit authorities have used other approaches different from joint development.
MTA, the transit authority of New York, has used zoning incentives such as density
bonuses to encourage developers to renovate subway stations. SEPTA, the transit
authority of Philadelphia, leases store areas at lower rates in exchange for developers
maintaining and upgrading the areas around their stores. One of the stations of the Santa
Clara Light Rail, Moffett Park, was paid by the developer of an adjacent plot, in
exchange for a 60% increase in the floor area ratio. The total cost of the station was $2
million219
The case that most resemble a pure value capture mechanism in the US is Los Angeles'
benefit assessment program. In the late 1980's, the City of Los Angeles began to build a
metro system. To fund the first section of the first line, two benefit assessment districts
were established. Under this system, properties located up to 1/3 of a mile of a station
were charged a proportion of the increase in land values expected from the construction
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of the rail line. The charge was made per area of plot of land, except for retail, hotels and
office buildings, which were charged per floor area. Housing and charitable institutions
were exempt from the charge. The funds were used to pay the bonds for the metro, and
accounted for a 9% of the total estimated costs22 0. The charge had a cap of $0.42 per
square foot, and will be charged from 1985 to 2007m
Under Los Angeles' systems, property owners could petition not to be charged if rail
transit did not benefit their property. So far, there have been 25 petitions like that, and
only one case were the exemption was granted. The system was not used in subsequent
extensions of Los Angeles's metro, partly because Proposition 218 was passed in 1996,
which makes it very difficult to form new benefit assessment districtsm
8.4 Land value capture in Europe
In Sweden, the city government has developed a system of satellite cities around
Stockholm in the last 50 years. All these cities are served by a rail transit system, which
has the highest modal share in all of them.
To develop the satellite cities, the local government has acquired and developed land, and
then built new rail lines. The design of the satellite cities has been oriented to transit.
There are plazas next to the stations, and around them stores have been built. Near the
plazas, high-rise buildings are located, and further away lower densities are allowed. All
the areas around stations exhibit high quality pedestrian facilities. The government has
tried to balance the flows in the network, so it has promoted the opening of jobs in all
these cities. Stockholm has six of these satellite cities now, which account for of its
total population223
220 Information retrieved from http://www.mta.net/trans planningCPD/bad/default.htm.
221 Ridley and Fawkner (1987).
222 Personal communication with David Sikes, from the Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation
Authority, 8/1/2003.
223 Cervero (1998).
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In other European countries, other approaches have been used to capture land value
increases:
In Milan, a special tax was charged on properties located up to 500 meters of each station
of the subway. The charge was based on the increase in the value of built-up land. The
tax was only used for the construction of the first 35 km of the subway system, and has
been replaced by a tax on property transfers2
Land value capture was also used to pay part of the cost of light rail to the Docklands in
London. The Dockland was a port area, located next to the Central Business Areas. The
once thriving area began to be abandoned in the mid 1960's for other ports in southern
225England such as Felixstowe and Southampton . By the early 1980's, the British
government decided to redevelop the area "... with offices, trade centers, housing and
light industry"226 . To trigger this redevelopment, the government funded the construction
an 11.7 km light rail. Because of budget limitations, the light rail only got from Tower
Gateway to the Docklands, lacking a direct connection to the City of London, and a more
convenient connection to the rest of London's Undergroundm. In 1985, a group of
investors proposed a E 1,500 million development project in Canary Wharf, in the
Docklands. This development included office space, a shopping center and leisure
facilities. To make the project attractive, the investors agreed to pay E 45 millions of the
required E 130 millions to extend the light rail to Bank Station in the City of London.
Eventually, the developers went bankrupt, but the Docklands is now a thriving area, with
an easy connection to the rest of London.
After the spectacular rise in land values around the stations of the recently opened Jubilee
Line in London 22 8, there is a growing interest for using land value capture to fund future
extensions of the Underground. The British government has announced that landowners
224 Ridley and Fawkner (1987).
225 Hall (1996).
226 Ridley and Fawkner (1987).
227 The initial alignment connected with London's underground in Shadwell station, but only the East
London line serves that station. Bank station, located in the city of London, is served by the Circle, District,
Waterloo & City, Central and Northern lines.
228 See Riley (2001).
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will have to give "significant contributions" to the funding of Crossrail, the new line
being planned for London229
8.5 Land value capture in Asia
In Japan, several private companies have developed satellite cities served by rail transit,
whose designs are very similar to Stockholm's satellites. These firms have purchased
land in the outskirts of Tokyo, Osaka and Kobe and have then built suburban trains to
downtown, before developing the land. Neither the train nor the developments have
received any subsidy from the public sector. Most of these private companies work in
conglomerates that include rail operators and department stores. In most of these projects,
they have built big stores next to the stations, and high-density housing around them,
connected to the rail stations by high quality pedestrian streets230. The firms have reaped
huge benefits in the land developments, and even make a profit out of the rail
231
operations
One of the most successful cases in Tokyo has been Tama Denin Toshi, which has been
developed by the Tokyu Corporation from the 1960s. The company purchased land
before announcing their plan to build the rail line. To avoid hostile reactions by other
landowners and given the impossibility to purchase land all along the alignment, they
started a joint venture with other landowners. They readjusted land, and shared the land
development cost, and the benefits. Tokyu Corporation has used the same modus
operandi for other satellite city projects233. The Japanese government tried to emulate the
234
experience with the construction of Tama New Town, close to Tama Denin Toshi
229 Norris (2003).
230 Bernick and Cervero (1997).
231 Bernick and Cervero (1997).
232 Hanayama (1986).
233 Hanayama (1986).
234 Bernick and Cervero (1997).
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In Hong Kong in the early 1980's, the city government raised HK$5 billion from the
profits obtained from the development of the 13 station areas of the newly extended
Hxs 235Island Line. These revenues helped financing the HK$ 7 billion extension
8.6 Land value capture in Latin America
There are few examples of the usage of land value capture to fund rail transit in Latin
America. Sao Paulo's metro has been the one that has used this kind of mechanisms more
extensively, but Caracas' metro is planning to use it in the near future. In both cases, the
approach the metros have used is joint development. In other two cases, attempts to use
tax systems have failed.
Sao Paulo's subway has several joint development projects from which it gains revenue.
Around twenty years ago, an intercity bus terminal was built next to Tiete station (Line 1)
on land rented to the metro. Two other bus terminals were built under similar
arrangements. In 2002, these terminals generated R$8.7 million (around USD 3 million)
in revenue to the metro, not including the fare revenue they generated 236 . The Metro has
also promoted the construction of shopping centers in land of it property. Currently three
malls operate on land owned by the Metro: Santa Cruz, Itaquera and Tatuape. In 2002,
Santa Cruz, the only one that was in operation, generated more than R$1.3 million in
rents, plus reductions in operational costs, and fare revenue
In Caracas, the Fundacion Fondo Andres Bello is planning to make a $688 million
development around the station Zona Rental, one of the four stations being built in the
first phase of Line 4. The metro has agreed to make the station's design oriented towards
the future development of the area238. The metro will not benefit directly, except from the
fare revenue generated buy the flows that the project will generate. Nevertheless, the
235 Riley (2001).
236 Metro SP (2003).
237According to Metro SP (2003), in this case the cost of operating an adjacent bus terminal was transferred
to the operator of the shopping mall.
238 Metro Caracas (no date).
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foundation is owned by the Universidad Central de Venezuela, which is a public
university. This way, the national government will capture part of the value added by the
new line.
There have also been some failed attempts to use value capture to fund rail transit. In
1987, the municipality of Buenos Aires approved a law that levied a special charge on
properties located up to 400 meters from the stations of a new extension of the subway.
Property owners would have to pay the total cost of the extensions for up to 15% of the
value of their properties in 5 years. For lack of political will this tax was never charged,
and some of the extensions were funded through an increase of property taxes all over the
city, an increase in metro fares, and an increase in car-registration charges 239.
In Santiago, the extension of Line 1 to the East was built at the same time as the
construction of a new avenue parallel to the main East-West axe of the city, and located
one-block from it. Part of the alignment of the metro was along this new avenue,
originally called Nueva Providencia, and then named "11 de Septiembre" after the date of
1973's coup. The municipality of Providencia presented a plan to charge property owners
a special contribution to the cost of building the new avenue and the metro. The charge
would be proportional to the distance to the avenue and to the stations. Even though the
plan was then rejected by the national government, the consortium formed by the City
government of Providencia and the national urban renovation agency (CORMU), was
able to sell the unused expropriated areas at a higher price than what it paid for it,
capturing some of the land value increases produced by the Nueva Providencia and the
Metro extension. Indirectly, the extension of the Metro was made possible by this
value-capture mechanism.
Currently, Santiago's Metro is considering the usage of value capture mechanisms to
finance a new extension of Line 1 to the East. Given the fact that the alignment would
cross high-income areas, the national government is not willing to pay all the cost of the
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2 39 Clichevsky (2001).
240 Cceres and Sabatini (2001).
investment. The two-station extension is attractive for the metro, since the area is very
dense, and the last station would be built next to a shopping mall. The Municipality of
Las Condes and the Metro are negotiating with the developers of Nueva Las Condes, a
housing and office project located close to the proposed alignment, to ask them to
contribute to the cost of the extension in exchange for an increase in the allowed FARsm
Santiago's metro has had similar negotiations before. In 2002, they negotiated with the
owners of the Costanera Center the extension of line 4 to that mall, and with the owners
of Ciudad Empresarial, the extension of line 2 to that office park. In both cases the
owners were asked to fund a significant part of the cost, and in both cases no agreement
was achieved. In both cases, the developers already had the permits to build at the FARs
they wanted, so the municipalities and the metro could not use these permits as trade-
coins.
241 Pedro Sabatini, from Metro, personal communication 1/7/2004.
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9 Proposals
This section discusses several ways to implement land value capture. It then focus on
Mexico City and Santiago de Chile to discuss the lessons learned from the previous
Chapters, and the ways to implement land value capture mechanisms to fund future
extensions of these cities' rail transit systems.
9.1 What to do
Mexico City and Santiago de Chile present several advantages for the usage of value-
capture mechanisms. Some of these advantages are the following:
* The high proportion of house owners, which reduces the number of people who
may be displaced because of the increase in land values (see section 3.5)
* Existing rapid transit networks, which increases the attractiveness of new lines,
since new users gain access to an already extensive network
* Probably relatively low land values, which may increase fast as their economies
develop
* A relatively segregation of people of different income, which is not good by itself,
but allows for market segmentation, i.e. charging more to people that are willing
to pay more. This approach can be used to capture land value increases
Many approaches can be taken to implement a system of land value capture to fund rail
transit. Some of the mechanisms that are discussed require the passing of laws at the
federal level; others can simply be applied at a local level, using existing attributes of
local governments.
9.1.1 Using tax increment financing
Tax incremental finance (TIF) is a common mechanism used to fund public investment in
the US. It consists on a freeze of the revenue from property tax going to the government
of a designated area for a certain time. The incremental gains in property tax, caused by
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the increase in property values or the addition of new properties in the area, are
242earmarked to pay for a public work, which in theory causes land values to increase24
Not all the property tax base can become available as in redevelopment districts, but only
the incremental revenue, and for a limited time (usually around 20 years).
In the US, tax increment financing has been used to fund several types of infrastructure
such as sewage, lightning, and other. Nevertheless, it has not been extensively used to
fund transit 243 . In the 1980's, there was a project to build a light rail in Chicago, which
considered the usage of TIE. That would have been the first time TIF was used at that
scale to fund transit. The project was finally canceled because of political opposition 244.
Being the average US property tax bellow 2% a year 245 , this mechanism only captures a
small part of land value increases. Even worse, in Chile the maximum rate is 1.5% a year,
and there are several properties exempt from it. In Mexico it varies from 0.1% to 4.0%
but the higher percentages are only in cases where there is an obvious undervaluation of
the properties 246.
Each year the TIF is in place, the incremental tax revenue Rt is the following:
R, = A* tax Equation 17
Where A is the change in property value, and tax is the property tax.
The net present value of the twenty years of tax revenue (R) can be calculated with the
following equation:
20 R
R = IEquation 18
=(1+ X) t
242 Park (1999).
243 Cervero et al (1992) reports that TIF was used to fund part of the cost of BART's downtown stations. I
could not find any other case reported in the literature.
244 Personal communication with Paul Fish, from the Chicago Transportation Authority, 8/13/2002.
245 The average property tax for the 75 largest US metropolitan area is 1.83% (Information retrieved from
http://www.meyersgroup.com/analysisobjects/affordabilityexist.asp?ProductCategory=HA).246 Perl6 and Zamorano (2001).
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Where X is the discount rate.
Finally, the proportion of land value increases that is captured (Y) is the following:
R Equation 19
Or using the previous equations:
Y = tax
t=1 (1+ X) t
Equation 20
In Chile, the government does not update property values very often from its records247,
and anecdotal experience suggests that the assessed property values are well below
market prices. This situation is similar in Mexico, except that the tax rate varies in each
municipality. The following graph shows the percentage of value captured by property
taxes in Chile, assuming a 1.5% rate, and a TIF valid for 20 years:
Figure 30: Percentage of Increasing Land Value Captured by TIF for Chile
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Source: Developed by the author. Assumes accurate valuation of the property
24 According to Arriagada and Simioni (2001), between 1977 and 1995 no new appraisals were made.
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Assuming a social discount rate of 10% a year, which is the rate used by the government
to evaluate projectS248, we can see in the case of Chile only around 13% of property value
increases could be captured by property taxes.
If we include all the revenue gained by the government after the increase in property
value, we will have to include the taxes paid after year 20. In this case, the percentage of
property value that the government will gain can be estimated with the following
equation:
taxY = tx Equation 21
t= (1+ X)'t
Where tax will be 1.5% and X = 10% in this case.
Therefore Y = 15%
So there is a very small difference between the net present value of the revenue generated
in the first 20 years, and the one generated if the revenue is permanent. The current rate
of property tax in Chile is too low to capture a major portion of land value increases. In
the case of Mexico the situation varies from one state to the other, but most likely the
mechanism would not work without adequate valuation.
9.1.2 Direct negotiations
This approach consist on local governments negotiating with developers, asking for
contributions to the cost of the transit infrastructure, in exchange for permitting the
project or allowing a higher FAR. This approach has been used extensively in London to
fund commuter car parks249 . It has also been used in Washington D.C. and San Francisco
248 Information retrieved from http://bip.mideplan.cl/bip-consultas/SEBI/2004/html/PreciosSociales.htm.
249 Ridley and Fawkner (1987).
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for their joint development programs2s . As was pointed out in section 8.4, direct
negotiations were also used for the extension of the Docklands light rail in London.
Direct negotiations give governments a lot of discretion. This discretion may be
dangerous, as it may cause corruption, and even worse, may scare developers away as it
creates uncertainty in the developing process. To avoid this problem, transit agencies
should make developers know in advance what their interests are, so that uncertainty can
be reduced.
Direct negotiations have been in use in Chile in the next few years for the funding of
infrastructure to serve suburban housing developments around Santiago. The government
negotiates in a case-by-case basis with developers to obtain contributions to pay for the
infrastructure, in exchange for building permits251.
9.1.3 Special benefits assessment
Special benefit assessment was the mechanism used in Los Angeles to fund metro line.
With this mechanism, a special tax is charged on properties located up to a certain
distance from the station, in the assumption that rail transit will increase the value of their
properties. This approach has been used extensively for other uses in the US. In
California, it has also been used to fund "...parking facilities, street lightning, sewers and
,,252flood control"
The difference of this system with Tax Increment Finance (TIF) is that with special
benefit assessment property owners face an increase in the money they have to pay. This
difference makes Special Benefit Assessment more difficult to implement.
The usage of this system may deter development, as people may want to postpone the
253
investments, and speculate with the land, rather than put it to its best use right away In
250 Cervero (1987).
251 See Zegras (2000).
252 Ridley and Fawkner (1987).
253 Wetzel (2003).
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the case of sites that are already developed, there may be few incentives to agree to pay
the tax, since the opportunities for redevelopment, and high land value increases are
lower for developed land than for undeveloped land (see section 3.3).
9.1.4 Differentiated pricing, capturing of consumer's surplus
If charging property owners is not feasible, there are still indirect ways to capture part of
the increases in land value. One of them is to use differentiated pricing, to increase the
proportion of consumer's surplus captured by the transit agency.
Although it is illegal to charge a different fare to people based solely on their income,
transit agencies in Mexico City and Santiago can take advantage of the segregated pattern
of their cities, and charge different fares for people in different lines. They can also
provide different service attributes to these different segments, based on the
characteristics of the potential users in a corridor. This strategy would allow metros to
offer value propositions better tailored to potential users, and generate revenue that may
be used to build new lines in areas of the city that because of their high average income
per capita, are very unlikely to receive large public funds for metro expansions.
The following is an example of how this mechanism would work. Let us suppose a new
metro line is built is Santiago from the area around the Plaza Nuiloa, along Los Leones,
connecting to the station with the same name in Line 1, and continuing along Vitacura,
up to Manquehue. The area around the alignments houses upper-mid and high-income
people, so, because of fairness concerns, the government will probably refuse to fund
such a line. A differentiated pricing scheme could be implemented. Passengers boarding
this line will need to pay 20 cents of a dollar more than the fare of the other lines. Some
frills can be added to this line, such as air conditioner in the trains. Passengers could be
granted free boarding from this to the other lines, and would have to pay the 20 cents
difference in the other way. Charging this connection fare would be easy with the
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smartcard being used in Santiago2 . Given that most likely average income around the
alignment is higher than around the rest of the alignment, this scheme would allow for a
better alignment of fares and willingness-to-pay of people to board the line.
A similar scheme could be used in Mexico City to extend rail lines into mid- and high-
income communities. A different standard of service and fare would reduce the big
barriers that mid income people have for using the service. Just as an example, a
premium line might be built along Reforma Avenue, from Hidalgo station (lines 2 and 3),
to either Polanco or Lomas. Maybe in the future such a line could be extended to Benito
Juarez International Airport. A line like this would serve areas that probably have higher
income than average, and that are fairly dense in housing, commercial, office and hotel
development.
9.2 Proposal for Santiago
There are several barriers to the introduction of land value capture to fund future
extensions of Santiago's metro. Some of them are the rejection that people feel for new
taxes, the technical difficulty to estimate the time and geographic impact of new lines on
land values, and the fear that mechanism like this may make the government choose
projects that are able to generate a lot of revenue from this source, but are not the most
socially-desirable projects.
The recent attempts to use land value capture to fund for the construction of a new line to
Cerrillos and to extend Line 1 to the East, make us think that these barriers are not
impossible to overcome. Although the construction of a new line to Cerrillos is
unrepeatable experience (never will the government have such a large piece of land to
develop close to the city center), it will test if land value capture makes economic sense
in Santiago.
254 From 1982 to February 1993 a similar fare policy existed in Santiago's subway: tickets for Line 2 were
cheaper than for Line 1, and a connecting fee was charged only to passengers going from Line 2 to Line 1.
There was not smartcard by then.
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The usage of value-capture mechanisms is the only politically feasible mechanism to
allow for any extension of the metro network to the East. As was said in section 6.1,
average income in this section of the city is much higher than in the rest of the city, so it
is very unlikely that the government will be willing to invest in this area. Land value
capture has a high potential to succeed in this area of the city, given the demand for
commercial and office space in the eastern part of the city, and the high incomes of its
residents.
One way to implement land value capture is Santiago is by reforming property taxes the
way I described in section 8.1. This reform would require making property value
appraisals more often, and in all the metropolitan area, which is politically and
technically very difficult. This approach has more potential in Santiago than in Mexico
given the low proportion of informal settlements in Santiago. Depending on the rate the
tax could capture a significant part of land value increases, without paying the cost of
having special schemes organized for every new project. This approach would require the
government to overcome the usual opposition to new taxes25 5 .
Special benefit assessment can be more difficult to implement than reforming property
taxes, since it requires the passing of a special law each time. Nevertheless, special
benefit assessment would only target the beneficiaries of the investment and not all
property owners, making it more acceptable for the public than taxes. The fact that the
metro is perceived to increase property values in Santiago, and the contrary in Mexico
City, makes this approach easier to implement in former than in the latter.
A rough estimation of the potential revenue from a special benefit assessment scheme
applied to a metro line like the one described in section 9.1.4 is around 167 million
dollars. I assumed a charge exclusively on the land, equivalent to 6% of its value for land
located up to 400 meters from the stations, and 3% for land from 400 to 800 meters from
255 The implementation of the tax could be accompanied by a reduction of other taxes to reduce the
opposition.
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the stations (see Appendix 5 for details). Considering the line would be 10.5 km long, and
assuming an average cost of 70 million dollars per km (including rolling stock)25 6, this
mechanism alone would be able to pay for almost one fourth of the total cost.
Santiago's Metro should adopt an active approach with respect to urban development
around its future station. It should associate with the municipalities, and negotiate
development rights with property owners in exchange for funds for expanding the metro
to these areas. The metro should also coordinate with the municipalities for the
redevelopment of the areas around stations. The plans for redevelopment should include
land assembly, the expedition of building permits, and the legalization of the tenure of
land. The plans should also consider allowing potential developers to use higher FARs,
and other exemptions from previous zoning, in exchange for funds to invest in rail transit.
The failure to make big developers pay for the extension of the subways, which I
described in section 8.6, serves as a lesson that without building permits to negotiate, it is
very unlikely that developers will be interested in funding any significant part of the
investment in new extensions2
The high spatial segregation of Santiago provides an excellent opportunity to use
differentiated pricing, in the way I described in section 9.1.3. Moreover, the fact that a
smart card is already in use, makes this approach even easier to implement.
In future extension, Metro should try to replicate the synergies that have arisen between
Plaza Vespucio and its metro station. The presence of both a mall and a station has been a
strong attractor of dense housing development. Moreover, parking facilities have been
shared, providing alternative for people willing to park-and-ride. Metro should consider
the extensions of current lines to some of the existing malls in the suburbs.
256 The Chilean government recently announced a 4.3 km extension of line 2 to the north, which will cost
200 million dollars (including rolling stock), i.e. 46.5 million dollars per km, and will be built underground
(Information retrieved from http://www.estrategia.cl/histo/200306/26/ambito/metro.htm). I am assuming
higher costs for the new line.
257 In both cases the developers had building permits in their hands before starting to negotiate.
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9.3 Proposal for Mexico
There are no major legal barriers for the implementation of value capture mechanisms in
Mexico. There is already a law establishing a tax on property value increases, resulting
from the construction of public works. This law though, lacks adequate rules for its
usage, and therefore has not generated significant revenue. Moreover, property values are
usually outdated, because of lack of resources and political lobby258
There are other problems that make land value capture difficult to apply in Mexico City.
Some of them are the following:
e As mentioned in section 6.1, around 40% of properties are not legal, either
because they are in squatter settlements, or are not registered
* There is a more common mistrust in the government in Mexico than in other
countries. People may fear that value capture would allow for corruption
e As discussed in previous sections, the metro in Mexico City only appeals low-
income people, who are the ones with the least capacity to pay for the value added
to their properties
* Many people have informal jobs. Their income is presumably less constant in
time, making them less able to pay taxes in a periodical way
As said in the previous section, reforming the property system or tax-increment financing
are not promising approaches in Mexico City. Special benefit assessment may be easier
to implement, particularly if it is used in an area of the city of mid- to high-incomes,
which may have a low proportion of the land being occupied informally. Nevertheless,
only with a premium service and a different branding than today, could land values
increase, and may property owners accept paying part of the investment cost of new lines.
I think there are opportunities to use special benefit assessment to fund suburban trains
and new metro lines offering a premium service. As I mentioned in section 5.2, the
government is planning to build a commuter line to the Northeast of the Metropolitan
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258 Per16 and Zamorano (2001).
area. This line would allow for green-field development in the periphery of the city.
There is a plan formulated for this train, which considers charging a fare of 9.25 pesos,
well above the current 2 pesos fare of the subway 259. Probably, a train with a fare like this
will not attract low-income people.
For this new commuter line, the experience of Tokyo and Stockholm, described in
sections 8.4 and 8.5, could serve as an example. A consortium of the DF, the State of
Mexico and private companies should be established to acquire land around the proposed
alignment, and rail stations should be built in the core of the new housing developments.
With this strategy, the consortium would be able to generate a significant portion of the
cost of the commuter lines, as it would convert rural land into urban land.
The other case where special benefit assessment may be used is for the funding new
premium-service lines, such as the one I described in section 9.1.4. The fact that station
would be located in areas of relatively high-income, and presumably without informal
settlement, reduce the problem of a lack of registration of the property located around it.
Property owners may be required to contribute to a significant part of the cost of the
lines. In exchange for the contribution, the city government may allow for an increase in
density of future development in the area. As explained in section 3.3, this kind of
approaches can generate a high proportion of the cost of the lines when there are
redevelopment opportunities around stations.
Differentiated pricing in potential new premium lines also seems to be possible to
implement in Mexico City, because of several characteristics of the city. First, there is
spatial segregation by income, so it is easy to segment the market by building lines with
premium service to the South and the West, maybe along Reforma and Insurgentes
Avenues. Second, there is already an extensive metro network, which may serve potential
users of the new premium lines in some cases. Third, the current fares are very low, and
there is space for raising fares for premium service without making them completely
unaffordable to most people. Finally, there is a high level of congestion in the city, and
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therefore a metro with a higher comfort and safety standard than today can become an
interesting value proposition for mid- and high-income Mexicans, and can convert this
mode into a viable alternative to the car.
Future implementations of land value capture mechanisms will require a better appraisal
of property values, the legalization of illegal squatters, a more developed market for
house renting. The governments of the DF and of the State of Mexico should continue
their efforts to achieve these goals.
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Conclusions
This report describes the mechanism through which increases in accessibility created by
rail transit determine rises of the demand for locating in the land around stations, and
increases in land values and redevelopment. The next diagram shows some of the
relations of this mechanism.
Figure 31: Diagram of the effect of rail transit on real estate markets, and the potential for
value capture
Rail transit
construction
-Higher impact for most trip-intense uses, and depends on whether
metropolitan area is monocentric or polycentric
- Location in the network is more important for retail than for other uses
- Higher rises in demand with congestion and low availablility of accesible land
- Demand is afected by local externalities
- Higher rises expected for systems that provide a lot of accesibility, for which
ridership is a proxy
-Rises in demand affected by the state of the economy and of the real estate ma
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The effect of the construction of rail transit on the demand for the land located around
stations depends on several factors, such as the following:
e It is more intense for land-uses which generate or attract more trips per unit of
ground, which in most cases are retail and office space
e Retail is attracted to the area immediately adjacent to the most accessible stations,
because is in this area where it benefits from high pedestrian flows
e Access to rail transit benefits office buildings almost regardless of the number of
people that use a station, and the relative position of the station in the network, since
people are willing to travel farther to work than to go to other activities
e Housing is less attracted to the area immediately next to the station than retail
e The opening of retail space next to the station is an additional factor attracting
housing to the area around stations
e The effect of rail transit on office space and housing values is affected by the shape of
the metropolitan areas, and of the line: in mono-centric cities, radial rail lines only
benefit housing values in the periphery and office space values in the city center. On
the other hand, in poly-centric cities, radial lines only benefit housing values
regardless of their location, and office space in the city's main center
e The rise in demand is affected by the growth of the economy, which affects the rate
of growth in the number of households, and the aggregate demand for housing
e The rise in demand depends on the availability of alternative land in other parts of the
city, especially of land with high accessibility
* The rise in demand is especially intense in metropolitan areas with road congestion,
which makes rail transit more competitive to other modes
e The demand for locating in the areas around stations is also affected by local
externalities, such as the existence of heavy industries
e There are economies of network, so systems that provide high accessibility, e.g. with
many different rail lines, generate a higher impact on the demand for land
* The provision of pedestrian and urban amenities raises the attractiveness of the area
around stations to housing, and expands the area of influence of the stations,
increasing ridership
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" The existence of pricing mechanisms to discourage car usage attracts people to the
areas next to metro stations
" The demand for the land located next to station is affected by visual intrusion and
annoyance generated by the stations
In the cases when there is potential for redevelopment, the rises in demand for locating
next to the stations generate the maximum land and property values. Many of the
conditions to allow for redevelopment depend on the governments. Some of them are the
following:
" Zoning that allows for dense development and mix-uses around stations
" Regulations to discourage sprawl
e Partnership between transit agencies and private developers to promote joint
development
e Government's leadership to redevelop station areas, specifically to expedite building
permits, assemble land, and secure financing for development projects
e Metropolitan coordination to redevelop the area around the alignment from non-
intensive land uses (e.g. industry, single-family housing) to more intensive uses, and
to maintain equilibrium of land uses in the alignment (e.g. assure that in every line
there is housing and office space to assure balance of flows)
As the increases of land values are in part a capitalization of the consumer's surplus of
the riders, the systems whose riders have high purchasing power produce higher increases
in land values than those whose riders have low average incomes. The presence of
relatively high-income riders also increase the benefit of the stores located close to
stations, increasing the attractiveness of the station area for them, and hence land values.
To foster an intensification of land uses around stations, rail transit needs to offer of a
value proposition attractive to people that could afford and would want to live in these
areas.
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In the cases where land values have increased after the construction of rail transit, it has
taken time for these increases to materialize, because of the short-term elasticity of the
real estate supply with respect to prices, and the cyclical nature of the real estate market.
The redevelopment of the land also takes time to materialize. In this process there are
some risks of gentrification to occur. This risk is tempered by the potential of allowing
for relatively high-density multi-family housing in the area around stations, which may
be an attractive value proposition for low-income people, especially in developed
countries. In developing countries, multi-family housing is much less attractive for low-
income people. During the redevelopment phase it is possible to promote transit-oriented
development.
There is evidence that retail and office space development has followed the migration of
housing, and not the opposite. This characteristic suggests that firms and shops are only
interested to move close to stations if there is housing nearby, or close to other stations of
the system. On the other hand, the sole presence of firms and shops around stations
would not attract housing development by itself.
In the cases when land values increase, there is potential for the usage of land value
capture mechanisms. In the cases when systems gain a large number of riders, especially
when riders are heterogeneous in terms of income or travel patterns, there is potential to
use value capture through differentiated fares.
There are several ways in which transit agencies can reap part of the increased value of
land to fund the extension of rail transit. These mechanisms have been successfully used
in Europe, Asia and less intensively in the United States and Latin America. Some of
them are the following:
e Charging a direct fee to land owners to help pay for the infrastructure
" Raising property-taxes
e Negotiating with property owners changes in zoning in exchange for contributions to
fund transportation infrastructure
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It was proved that most areas around new and existing metro stations in Mexico City had
a slower growth of population, income per capita, and commercial and service
employment than comparable areas in the rest of the city during the 1990's. It was also
proven that in the same decade in Santiago, the areas around stations had a higher growth
of population and income per capita than the comparable areas in the city, especially the
areas around the lines built before the 1990's.
It was proved that since 1981 the metro in Mexico City has behaved as an inferior good,
i.e. one whose consumption has a negative relation with income, whereas the metro in
Santiago has behave as a normal good. This finding is congruent with the results of
previous surveys about the characteristics of the riders in both systems. It was also
proved that since 1981 the demand in Mexico City's metro has been inelastic to changes
in fares, whereas in Santiago it has been elastic. This may be a consequence of the large
difference in fare between the two metros.
The Metro in Santiago has reinforced the intensification of land uses only around certain
parts of its alignment. The Metro was an important factor in the emergence of a
secondary employment and retail center in the eastern part of the city, and of the
continuation of the growth of La Florida in the last few years. There have been lower
effects in the areas around the western part of Line 1 and around Line 2, except for a
recent significant growth of multi-family building. Finally, Metro has helped stop the
decline of the city center and has helped to revitalize residential, office, and retail
development in this area.
Three approaches are proposed for implementing value capture in Santiago de Chile:
special benefit assessment, joint development and differentiated pricing in corridors
serving high-income areas of the city.
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The metro in Mexico City has been one of the factors producing the loss in population of
the city center, its specialization in tertiary activities, the growth of the metropolitan area,
and the reinforcement of previously existing secondary centers.
The fact that the metro in Mexico City is perceived to produce negative impacts on land
values makes the usage of land value capture difficult. A plan to use special benefit
assessment and differentiated pricing in a new commuter lines, and in new lines is
proposed. Value capture is proposed exclusively for premium-service lines, which would
need to have differentiated pricing and a distinct branding.
More studies need to be done on the effect of changes in GDP on ridership of rail transit
systems. These studies need to include data for shorter periods of time, maybe quarters,
and account for demand seasonality. Models might gain precision by considering
generation of trips separated from modal choice, so they will need to include data on the
cost of alternative modes. The results of those studies will not only be useful for
researchers, but also for transit managers.
Empirical studies on the effect of transit on land values in developing countries should
also be performed. There are very few studies in this area, and the existing databases on
property values are not easy to access for researchers, and may not be accurate.
Finally, more research is needed into the details of the implementation of land value
capture mechanism. This thesis has only given general guidelines in this area. A good
implementation in demonstration projects may determine the viability of land value
capture mechanisms in the future.
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Appendix 1
Some of the people who were interviewed are the following:
* Maria Teresa Atriin, Seduvi
* Leonardo Martinez, Sigea
* Joel Ahumada, Setravi
e Ricardo Ndfiez, STC
* Jose Flores, STC
e Francisco Sabatini, Metro de Santiago
e Robert Brosnan, Arlington County Government
* David Sikes, Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority
* Oscar Figueroa, Pontificia Universidad Catdlica de Chile
* Paul Fish, Chicago Transportation Authority
201
Appendix 2
The following is a table with the number of riders, GDP, average fares, and number of
stations for the 1981-2003 period in Mexico City:
Table 42: Ridership, GDP,
stations in Mexico City
average fare, average fare/GDP per capita and number of
Year Pax GDP Fare Fare*lmillion/GDP
per capita
1981 987.4 758,357 0.78 19.70
1982 1,037.5 754,246 0.39 10.20
1983 1,116.7 722,596 0.22 6.02
1984 1,242.2 748,683 0.14 3.73
1985 1,324.4 768,099 0.08 2.27
1986 1,361.9 739,265 0.68 19.49
1987 1,414.1 752,068 0.65 18.86
1988 1,476.1 761,163 0.86 25.03
1989 1,542.9 793,119 2.16 59.44
1990 1,447.7 833,317 1.66 44.38
1991 1,433.6 868,501 1.40 36.52
1992 1,436.1 900,016 1.66 42.76
1993 1,421.6 917,571 1.54 39.55
1994 1,422.7 972,693 1.44 35.48
1995 1,474.0 899,000 2.37 63.81
1996 1,425.3 945,328 2.41 63.29
1997 1,361.5 1,009,345 2.40 60.10
1998 1,344.0 1,060,119 2.03 49.04
1999 1,301.1 1,098,525 1.80 42.81
2000 1,394.2 1,171,438 1.66 37.42
2001 1,433.7 1,170,267 1.59 36.43
2002 1,396.4 1,178,458 2.00 46.33
2003 1,375.1 1,193,778 1.84 42.75
The sources of information are the following:
" Ridership is from STC, direct communication with the author
" GDP 1981-2000 from http://oxlad.geh.ox.ac.uk/search.php
e GDP 2001-2003 from INEGI, www.inegi.gob.mx
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* Fares from Palerm, A.(no date), and brought to constant pesos, using the CPI,
reported by Banco de Mexico's web site (http://www.banxico.org.mx)
* Number of stations from www.urbanrail.net.
* For the number of stations I rounded the day of inauguration of the station to the
nearest month
* Population 1981-2000 from http://oxiad.geh.ox.ac.uk/search.php
e Population 2001-2003 projected using the linear projection in percentage of growth in
population between 1999 and 2000
The following is the same table for Santiago:
Table 43: Ridership, GDP, average fare, average fare/GDP per capita and number of
stations in Santiago
Year GDP (million Fare (CHP of Fare*1million/GDP numbstat
CHP of 1995) 2002) per capita
1981 13,585,241 187 116.7 35
1982 11,739,268 129 94.5 35
1983 11,410,329 118 90.9 35
1984 12,081,876 136 100.7 35
1985 12,319,699 136 100.5 35
1986 13,009,137 134 95.4 35
1987 13,866,995 167 113.3 36
1988 14,880,851 147 94.1 37
1989 16,452,304 140 82.7 37
1990 17,060,640 153 87.7 37
1991 18,420,357 156 84.2 37
1992 20,682,012 152 74.6 37
1993 22,126,912 175 81.3 37
1994 23,389,943 181 80.9 37
1995 25,875,727 191 78.6 37
1996 27,794,001 193 75.0 37
1997 29,629,956 195 72.0 46
1998 30,587,263 207 74.9 49
1999 30,354,539 215 79.8 49
2000 31,717,177 221 79.2 52
2001 32,792,398 264 92.7 52
2002 33,517,771 270 94.1 52
2003 34,612,438 288 98.1 52
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The sources of information are the following:
* Ridership 1981-2002 from Metro de Santiago (2003)
* Riderhip 2003 from www.ine.cl
* GDP 1980-1995 from Braun et al (2000)
e GDP 1996 from http://oxlad.geh.ox.ac.uk/search.php
e GDP 1997-2003 from www.bcentral.cl
e Operational Income 1981-1984 from Morales (1988)
e Fares 1985-2002 from Metro de Santiago (2003)
* Fares 2003 from www.metrodesantiago.cl
e Number of stations from Metro de Santiago (2003)
* Population 1981-200of Chile from http://oxlad.qeh.ox.ac.uk/search.php
* Population 2001-2003 from www.ine.cl
Average fares were estimated the following way:
" For 1981-1984 it was estimated by dividing operational income, reported in Morales
(1988) by the number of passengers
" For 1990 it was estimated as the average of the fares for Line 1, for Line 2 and for
students, weighted by the number of passengers in each line, and by the proportion of
full-fare passengers and students (these proportions were taken from Metro de
Santiago, 2003)
* As 1990 was the first year in which free transfer between lines was allowed, and fares
in Line 2 rose proportionally more than for Line 1 in that year, I estimated the
difference between the resulting average fare, and the one that would have result from
a proportional increase in the fare of the two lines. This difference was CHP 5.8
e For the 1985-1989 period, it was estimated as the average of the fares for Line 1 and
Line 2, plus the CHP 5.8 I mentioned, which accounts for the revenue from the
transfers from Line 2 to Line 1
e For 1991 and 1992, it was estimated using the same formula, but also adding the
students' fare, and the proportion of passengers using full-fare and students' fare
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" For 1993-2003, it was estimated as the average of the rush hour fare, the regular fare,
the students' fare, and the senior citizens' fare, weighted by the proportion of
passengers at rush and non-rush hours, and the proportion of people using the other
two fares
" The proportion of people paying rush hour fare were estimated for 2002 by making
the above-mentioned formula equal to the income from tickets divided by the number
of passengers. Both figures were taken from Metro de Santiago (2003)
e For 1996-2001, the proportion of full-fare passengers paying rush-hour fare was
estimated multiplying the equivalent proportion for 2002, estimated as mentioned
before, by a factor I called "Factor A"
" Factor A is the summation of the average number of passengers at the peak 1-hour
between March and December of each year in each line, (obtained from Metro de
Santiago, 2003), divided by the same for the year 2002. By construction Factor A
equals 1 for 2002
" For 1993-1995 I used the same proportion of rush-hour tickets as in 1996
" For 2003 I used the same proportion of rush-hour tickets as in 2002
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Appendix 3
The following tables show the population, income, distance to city center, and urban area
for the 34 municipalities of the Santiago Metropolitan Area.
Table 44: Income per capita, distance to city center, Urban Area for municipalities in the
Santiago Metropolitan Area
Comuna Income per Capita Distance to Urban Current Urban
1998 (CHP/year) Downtown Area Area (Ha)(Km) 1992 (Ha)
Cerrillos 466 8.0 1,200 1,288
Cerro Navia 286 9.1 910 1,110
Conchali 372 8.4 1,060 1,070
El Bosque 340 13.5 1,390 1,410
Estacidn Central 394 4.8 1,340 1,340
Huechuraba 410 10.6 640 1,791
Independencia 527 4.6 740 740
La Cisterna 540 9.5 1,000 1,000
La Florida 596 12.5 3,250 3,462
La Granja 361 10.8 1,000 1,010
La Pintana 274 16.0 1,290 3,060
La Reina 1,649 12.5 1,780 2,340
Las Condes 1,671 12.5 3,590 5,105
Lo Barnechea 1,671 20.9 1,540 4,607
Lo Espejo 284 7.6 720 720
Lo Prado 482 6.8 660 670
Macul 567 7.6 1,230 1,290
Maipd 474 13.3 2,770 3,210
Nunoa 1,174 5.9 1,630 1,630
Pedro Aguirre Cerda 371 6.5 860 860
Peialoln 452 12.9 1,560 2,730
Providencia 1,622 5.3 1,440 1,440
Pudahuel 372 10.3 860 1,724
Puente Alto 374 19.0 2,760 3,191
Quilicura 373 12.5 560 1,988
Quinta Normal 385 5.3 1,160 1,160
Recoleta 374 5.9 1,500 1,500
Renca 335 8.4 1,180 2,420
San Bernardo 356 16.3 2,360 3,878
San Joaguin 415 6.3 970 970
San Miguel 615 5.7 950 950
San Ram6n 327 10.6 650 650
Santiago 597 0.0 2,240 2,240
Vitacura 1,622 12.2 2,830 2,830
206
Table 45: Income per capita, distance to city center, Urban Area for municipalities in the
Santiago Metropolitan Area
Comuna Population Population Population Population
1970 1982 1992 2002
Cerrillos 34,903 67,013 72,137 71,906
Cerro Navia 83,755 137,777 154,973 148,312
Conchaif 117,405 157,884 153,089 133,256
El Bosque 89,030 143,717 172,338 175,594
Estaci6n Central 131,157 147,918 142,099 140,000
Huechuraba 22,217 56,313 61,341 74,070
Independencia 95,723 86,724 77,539 65,479
La Cisterna 80,512 95,863 94,732 85,118
La Florida 58,698 191,883 334,366 365,674
La Granja 77,263 109,168 126,038 132,520
La Pintana 37,994 73,932 153,586 190,085
La Reina 55,048 80,452 88,132 96,762
Las Condes 112,590 175,735 197,417 249,893
Lo Barnechea 11,174 24,258 48,615 74,749
Lo Espejo 73,111 124,462 119,899 112,800
Lo Prado 53,365 103,575 110,883 104,316
Macul 89,823 113,100 123,535 112,535
Maipd 44,733 114,117 257,426 468,390
Nunoa 149,001 168,919 165,536 163,511
Pedro Aguirre Cerda 141,592 145,207 128,342 114,560
Peialol6n 50,983 137,298 178,728 216,060
Providencia 121,437 115,449 110,954 120,874
Pudahuel 50,959 97,578 136,642 195,653
Puente Alto 76,694 113,211 254,534 492,915
Quilicura 11,397 22,605 40,659 126,518
Quinta Normal 133,187 128,989 115,964 116,000
Recoleta 141,694 164,292 162,964 142,220
Renca 48,343 93,928 129,173 133,518
San Bernardo 79,150 129,127 188,580 246,762
San Joaquin 115,085 123,904 112,353 97,625
San Miguel 93,784 88,764 82,461 78,872
San Ram6n 59,033 99,410 101,119 94,906
Santiago 289,877 232,667 202,010 200,792
Vitacura 40,343 72,038 78,010 81,499
The following are the sources of the information:
" The sources of population are the Census of 1970, 1982, 1992 and 2002
" The source for income is www.ine.cl.
" The sources of the distance to the city center is Cummings and DiPasquale (2000)
" Inner City: municipality of Santiago
" Intermediate Area: municipalities located up to 6.5 km. from the city center
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* Second Ring: municipalities located between 6.6 and 12.9 kilometers from the city
center
* Third Ring: All other municipalities
" The source of total area per municipality is www.ine.cl
e The source of urban area in 1992 is Arriagada and Simioni (2001)
* It was assumed that all the area was urban except for municipalities with large
undeveloped areas, which are the following:
o Cerrillos: I assumed density remained constant from 1992
o Estacion Central: I assumed same urban area as 1992
o Huechuraba: I assumed same density as a La Reina
o La Florida: According to the municipality's web site (www.laflorida.cl),
48.9% of the land is urbanized
o Las Condes: I assumed same density as 1992
o Maipd: Urban area retrieved from municipality's web site (www.maipu.cl)
o Rufloa: I assumed same urban area as 1992
o Pefialolin: According to municipality's web site (www.penalolen.cl), real
density is 77.13 residents per hectare
o Pudahuel: I assumed same density as 1992
o Puente Alto: According to the municipality's web site (www.puentealto.cl),
48.9% of the land is urbanized
o Quilicura: I assumed same density as San Bernardo
o Quinta Normal: I assumed same urban area as 1992
o Recoleta: I assumed same urban area as 1992
o San Bernardo: Based on the municipality's map at
www.sanbernardo.cl/index 01.html, I estimated that 25% of the
municipality's land is urbanized
208
Appendix 4
The following municipalities in the Santiago metropolitan area were included in the
analysis of section 6.3.2:
* Estaci6n Central
" La Cisterna
" La Florida
* La Granja
* La Reina
* Las Condes
e Lo Espejo
* Lo Prado
e Macul
SNuioa
* Pedro Aguirre Cerda
e Peialolkn
* Providencia
e Quinta Normal
e San Joaquin
* San Miguel
" San Ram6n
" Santiago
The rule was to select all those that included zones located at a relatively same distance to
the city center as the zones that gained access to Line 5. La Reina and Las Condes were
included to provide base for comparison with the zones in Providencia and Nufioa
located next to the metro. As mentioned in section 6.1, these 4 municipalities, along with
Lo Barnechea and Vitacura form the Zona Oriente, the area with the highest income per
capita in the metropolitan area by far.
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The municipalities of Maipd, Pudahuel and Recoleta were not included, because a high
number of the zones of the 2001's survey were not fully contained into a single zone of
1991's survey, making it impossible to compare the changes in population and income
per capita in the same area.
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Appendix 5
I assumed a new line would be built along the alignment described in section 9.1.4. This
hypothetical line would have twelve stations, which are described in the following table:
Table 46: Hypothetical stations in a new metro line in Santiago
Name Intersection Municipality Distance to next station
(meters)
Plaza Nufioa Chile-Espana / Nufioa 914
Irarrizaval
Sim6n Bolivar Chile-Espania / Sim6n Nufioa 1153
Bolivar
Diagonal Oriente Los Leones / Diagonal Border of Nufioa and 985
Oriente Providencia
Bilbao Los Leones / Bilbao Providencia 1116
Eliodoro Yiez Los Leones / Bilbao Providencia 1185
Los Leones (connection Suecia / Nueva Providencia 980
to Line 1) Providencia
El Bosque Vitacura / Helvecia Las Condes 1203
Vitacura / Nueva Vitacura 649
P6rez Zujovic Costanera
Alonso de C6rdova Vitacura / Alonso de Vitacura 753C6rdova
Vitacura / Am6rico Vitacura 773
Am6rico Vespucio Vespucio
Luis Carrera Vitacura / Los Gomeros Vitacura 830
Clinica Alemana Vitacura / Manquehue Vitacura
Source: Created by the author. Distance between stations retrieved from www.mapcity.com
To have a rough estimation of the potential revenue that could be gained using special
benefit assessment, I assumed that the government would charge landowners a special
charge equivalent to of 6% of the value of their land (if located up to 400 meters from
stations), or 3% (if located between 400 and 800 meters from stations). The charge would
be exclusively on land values, not on the value of buildings.
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I estimated the potential revenue of such a scheme, based on the average value of land
sold in the four municipalities. The following table shows these values for the fourth
quarter of 2002, which are assumed to be the same as today's prices. Real estate prices in
Chile are quoted in UF, which is an inflation-indexed unity, and is equivalent to
approximately 27 US dollars.
Table 47: Average value of land sold in the fourth quarter of 2002 in selected
municipalities of the Santiago metropolitan area
Municipality Average value of land sold Average value of land sold
(UF/m2) (USD/m 2)
Providencia 21.7 586
Vitacura 14.7 397
Nufnoa 11.2 302
Las Condes 19.9 537
Source: Trivelli (2003), quoted in http://www.loaguirre.cl/evol/pag 18.htm
The following are some assumptions I made:
e 60% of the land around stations is privately owned (i.e. 40% of the land is used by
streets and parks)
* All the stations are in the same line, so the circle whose radius is 400 meters, and the
ring whose outer radius is 800 meters and its inner radius is 400 meters can both be
divided into one part heading the following station and one part heading the previous
station
* Based on the previous assumption, areas where circles and rings of more than one
station were placed on top of each other were estimated, to avoid double-counting
* The circles with 800-meter radius located around stations Perez Zujovic and Americo
Vespucio do not intersect. This was the only case where the circles of stations not
located immediately adjacent to each other intersect
* The value of land around station Diagonal Oriente is the mean between the average
values of land in Providencia and Nufioa
e The scheme would not be used in Los Leones station, since there is already a metro
station (Line 1). That is why this station was left out of the analysis
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The total land located around each of the stations and the potential revenue generated by
the special charge are shown on the following table:
Table 48: Total area around stations subject to special charge, and generated revenue
Station name Private land located at less than Private land located at more than 400 meters
400 meters from station and less than 800 meters from station
Area (m2 ) Revenue from 6% Area (m2) Revenue from 3%
tax on land values tax on land values
(US dollars) (US dollars)
Plaza Nunloa 302,000 5,500,000 715,000 6,500,000
Sim6n Bolivar 302,000 5,500,000 613,000 5,600,000
Diagonal 302,000 8,000,000 640,000 7,600,000
Oriente
Bilbao 302,000 10,600,000 628,000 11,000,000
Eliodoro Ydinez 302,000 10,600,000 698,000 12,300,000
Los Leones - --
El Bosque 302,000 9,700,000 655,000 10,600,000
Pdrez Zujovic 287,000 6,800,000 533,000 6,300,000
Alonso de 285,000 6,800,000 366,000 4,400,000
C6rdova
Amdrico 298,000 7,100,000 406,000 4,800,000
Vespucio
Luis Carrera 300,000 7,200,000 435,000 5,200,000
Clinica 302,000 7,200,000 681,000 8,100,000
Alemana
Total 3,284,000 85,000,000 6,370,000 82,400,000
Source: Created by the author. Areas and revenues were rounded.
So the total revenue that the government would be able to obtain is 167 million dollars.
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